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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY
1.1. Introduction
The term "accident" is not a rigorously defined scienti­
fic concept but a word generally used by layman to describe 
some unforeseen or chance event that produces injury and/or 
property damage. The above term which also implies the un­
predictability and the uncontrollability of accidents was 
strongly carried over to the twentieth century (Hahn, 1980). 
These implications are also the main reasons for the lack of 
an early scientific effort to prevent accidents which is, 
however, not unusual since there was neither the requisite 
understanding of the accident process nor the incentive to do 
so. It took the Industrial Revolution to create the conditions 
which led to the development of accident prevention as a 
specialized field.
It was not until the last half of the nineteenth century, 
during which the American factories were expanding their pro­
duction lines and producing goods at high rates, that the ugly 
consequences of industrial accidents became obvious. When 
this was brought to the attention of some community and 
business leaders, they felt a moral obligation to prevent
accidents in this country (NSC, 1978). Various efforts to make 
employers financially liable for accidents led to the enactment 
of the Workers' Compensation Law. This-law provided the first 
and the major incentive for understanding the accident process 
in order to reduce the resulting economic losses, property 
damages, injuries, and fatalities (Hahn, 1980). The early 
concept of the underlying causes of accidents was basically 
derived from work in the industrial setting so that the conse­
quent corrective activities were mainly applications of engi­
neering solutions to accident prevention.
The economic losses and the increasing awareness and 
sensitivity to human losses, however, induced scientific in­
terests in the accident field. Researchers, seeking more 
universal solutions to the problems, developed many accident 
causation models and came to the same conclusions : accidents
do have causes or etiology and they are mostly preventable.
The causes of accidents, however, are very complex because 
they consist of multiple factors which interact with each 
other to cause accidents. These causes are classified as 
direct causes and indirect causes. The relationships between 
accidents and these causes are best described by Heinrich 
(1980) in his well-known domino theory which is based on the 
following theorems:
(1) Industrial injuries result only form 
accidents.
(2) Accidents are caused directly only by
(a) the unsafe acts of persons or
(b) the exposure to unsafe mechanical 
conditions .
(3) Unsafe actions and conditions are caused 
only by faults of persons.
(4) Faults of persons are created by environment 
or acquired by inheritance.
Theorems 3 and 4 are also referred to as the quality, the 
enforcement, and the implementation of the Management Safety 
Policies (MSP), because management is responsible for the work 
condition and safety in an industrial environment. A manage­
ment safety policy includes: management's intent; production
and safety goals; staffing procedures; use of records; as­
signment of responsibility, authority and accountability; 
employee selection, training, placement, direction and super­
vision; communication procedures; inspection procedures ; 
equipment, supplies, and facilities design, purchase and 
maintenance; standard and emergency job procedures; and 
housekeeping (Heinrich et al, 1980).
Accident prevention models were developed based on the 
accident causation models and motivated by the legal require­
ments; their application in industrial settings have reduced 
accidents significantly. At present, unsafe working conditions 
as causes of accidents comprise only 20% of all accidents.
On the other hand, the unsafe acts of persons cause 80% of 
all accidents occurring at this time (Denton, 1980; Heinrich, 
1980; NSC, 1978). Most of these accidents are now occurring 
in the so-called "high hazard" industries. The oil-field 
industry is the most hazardous within this classification; 
its accident rates between 1972 and 1978 were double the rates
of all private Industries combined in the U.S.A. Half of these 
accidents were incurred in the oil-well drilling industry 
(NIOSH, 1982).
The consistently high accident rates incurred by the oil- 
well drilling industry reflect the maximum ability for accident 
prevention that could be achieved by the present safety practices. 
Safety activities are generally motivated by the existing legal 
requirements and emphasis is placed on eliminating major ac­
cidents, unsafe acts, and unsafe conditions (Denton, 1980; 
Heinrich, 1980). Hence, the underlying causes of accidents 
have not yet been addressed. Recently, Levitt (1975) found 
that the major difference existing between the high and the 
non-high hazard companies in the construction industry is 
that, in the latter case, top management is knowledgeable 
about the safety aspects of the company. This finding sug­
gests that the approach to safety in a high-hazard industry 
should now shift from engineering to management. It could 
also be concluded that if top management is to be adequately 
informed about the safety aspects of their operations, reports 
addressed to top management must contain meaningful information. 
Traditionally, management is presented with accident records 
or accident rates which might not mean anything to them. To 
make these reports useful, the accident data should be con­
verted into other parameters which induce interest or which 
contribute to their performance of managerial duties such as 
making, evaluating, and controlling safety decisions. A model
that converts data into meaningful information to aid manage­
ment decision is called a Management Information System (MIS) 
which originated from the business world.
Most accident prevention models currently take the legal 
requirements as a source of motivation. Such a source, however, 
only leads to the following conditions :
(1) Safety activities are not designed to prevent 
accidents, but rather to avoid the inconveniences 
created by legal citations.
(2) There is no allowance for a cost-effectiveness 
evaluation of any safety activity which, in 
turn, creates a negative attitude of management 
towards safety.
Since legal requirements always exist in an industrial setting, 
it has become necessary to include incentives other than legal 
ones in a prevention model.
A study by Robinson (1979) found that the total accident 
costs incurred by the construction industry, which is also 
classified as highly hazardous, can be used to motivate mana­
gers in accident prevention. A total accident cost consists 
of the direct or insured costs and the indirect or uninsured
costs. The direct costs are those costs covering compensation
payments, first aid, medical and surgical expenses, legal fees 
and overhead costs. The indirect costs, on the other hand, 
consist of costs of decreased production output due to the 
interruption caused by the accident, costs of man-hours lost
because of the absence of the injured worker and others helping 
the injured at the time of the accident, costs of man-hours 
used to train a replacement, and costs of the damaged materials 
and tools. It had been reported that the ratio of direct to 
indirect costs ranged from 1:2 to 1:13. Using the ratio of 
1:2 Robinson (1979) developed a matrix method to estimate the 
total accident costs. This method uses three accident varia­
bles (nature of injury, part of the body injured, and whether 
the injury resulted in lost time) to estimate the direct costs. 
This direct cost is then used to estimate the total costs by 
multiplying it by three. These total costs are then presented 
monthly to the managers to be used in the accident costs ac­
counting, i.e., costs are charged to the individual projects 
as losses. This accident cost accounting system is a new 
concept which stimulates management interest in preventing ac­
cidents. Traditionally, projects are charged with costs for 
accident prevention, but should an accident occur, the projects 
are not held responsible for its costs. This type of policy 
does not promote accident prevention; it is, however, under­
standable since up to the present time the total accident cost 
estimates could only be obtained after one or two years lapse 
time. This is true for the severe injury cases which need 
extended medical treatments. Robinson's method of estimating 
these total costs in a very short time can reverse existing 
conditions and induce management to prevent accidents. Robinson 
(1979) also reported that his method was applied in some con­
struction industry with successful results. Also, the magni­
tude of these total costs were reported to be significant 
enough to increase motivation of management in the area of ac­
cident prevention.
Since most of the accidents are preventable, the costs 
incurred are unnecessary losses. For the cost-conscious ma­
nager, such costs should be eliminated or reduced. Also, the 
benefit of accident prevention goes beyond economic losses; 
it will reduce human suffering and losses and will also in­
crease productivity and standards of living.
1.2. Purpose and Scope
The purpose of this dissertation is to develop a manage­
ment information system (MIS) which in an oil-well drilling 
industry could reduce the accident rates. The MIS represents 
a better model than traditional safety activities and it has 
the following qualities:
(1) The MIS can convert accident/hazard data into 
meaningful information, hence the name MIS.
(2) The model will serve to motivate managers to 
prevent accidents.
(3) This model will involve managers in safety 
activities so that they become knowledgeable 
about the aspects of safety.
(4) The MIS provides for setting priorities for 
corrections other than those based on the psycho-
logical impacts of the consequences of 
a major injury.
(5) Finally, this MIS will eliminate or minimize 
the underlying causes of accidents.
Since an MIS generally has a very broad scope covering the 
data base management subsystem (DBM), the decision models 
subsystem, and the structured reporting subsystem, this disser­
tation will concentrate on the decision models subsystem only.
The part of the DBM and the structured reporting subsystems 
which will be addressed are limited to the required input and 
output of the MIS. Also, since the direct causes of accidents 
are numerous, methods of categorizing unsafe conditions and 
acts will be defined to make them manageable. Finally, the 
MIS will be designed for safety activities specifically appli­
cable to the oil-well drilling industry; the term "oil", how­
ever, is used here to refer to petroleum only.
1.3. Method
The method used in the development of the MIS model started 
with a literature review followed by design and development 
phases. The literature review analyzed the existing oil-well 
drilling operation, accident causation models, sources of 
motivation, and the accident prevention models. It was per­
formed to identify the prevailing problems and to search for 
methods, techniques, and models applicable to the solution of 
the problem. The outcome of the literature review was then
carried over to the design and development phases.
The design phase started with the determination of the 
goals and objectives of the MIS which helped specify the 
output of the MIS. This output, in turn, determined the re­
quired decision models from which the necessary input was 
identified. At the end of the design phase, the MIS was il­
lustrated as a total system. This was accomplished through 
the identification of each subsystem necessary to perform the 
MIS functions and their interrelationships so that the total 
system could be outlined.
The development phase was carried out by testing to see 
whether the model could perform its expected functions. The 
tests were carried out with the use of a hypothetical and an 
authentic accident data set. The hypothetical data set was 
designed to fulfill the exact required input of the MIS. The 
real data set was an example of the existing accident data in 
an oil-well drilling industry. The degree of compatibility 
of the real data set with the input of the MIS was expected to 
show some important aspects of accident prevention activities 
as related to the information system existing in the oil-well 
drilling company. It was also expected that the test results 
carried out with the real data set could support some of the 
test results using the hypothetical data set.
1.4. Summary of Conclusions
This summary is divided into two groups:
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(1) The conclusions deducted from the literature study.
(2) The conclusions drawn from the design and develop­
ment phases.
1.4.1. The Conclusions Deducted from the Literature Review
The conclusions drawn from the literature study are as 
follows :
(1) The MIS model should be based on the management and 
the system causation models. The management causa­
tion model provides the "people" approach needed by 
the oil-well drilling industry. According to this 
model, the underlying causes of accidents are re­
lated to poor management practices. The system cau­
sation model will give a feedback mechanism to the 
MIS to monitor how well the management safety poli­
cies are being executed so that the underlying 
causes can be reduced or eliminated.
(2) The sources of motivation which assure the function­
ing of the MIS are the existing legal penalties and 
the total accident cost as was previously discussed.
(3) The priorities for corrections and the consequent 
alternative assessment should basically follow the 
model developed by Fine (1980). The priorities 
are determined based on the severity or consequences 
of accidents, the frequency of exposure to the direct 
causes, and the probability that similar accidents
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will occur. The alternative assessment is based on 
the relative cost effectiveness of each alternative.
(4) To be able to provide feedback on the implementation 
of the management safety policies, the "4x4 problem­
solving technique" (Jones, 1980) should be used.
This technique provides a method of accident in­
vestigation which reveals the underlying causes of 
accidents correlated to levels of management (Super­
intendent, Toolpusher). These underlying causes of 
accidents should then be reported so that they may 
be used for the improvement and the evaluation of 
the safety performance of the managers.
(5) The most useful categorization for unsafe acts, at 
present, is suggested by Siskind (1982) which is 
based on the period of time a worker has been em­
ployed.
(6) The unsafe conditions should be categorized based 
on the task of the crew members, namely the task of 
the toolpusher, the driller, the motorman, the 
derrickman, the floorhand, and the maintenance man. 
The selection of this categorization is supported 
by the result of a direct observation of the oil- 
well drilling operation in the field.
1.4.2. The Conclusions Drawn from the Design and the Develop­
ment Phases
The conclusions derived from the design and develop-
12
ment phases are as follows:
(1) This MIS uses a system causation model as its basis 
because it has a feedback mechanism. It requires 
the investigation and monitoring of hazard and ac­
cidents so that the underlying and the direct causes 
can be found and fed back into the system as inputs.
(2) rhe MIS is bared on a management causation model 
because it considers inferior management practices 
to be the underlying cause of accidents which can be 
reduced or eliminated. The safety activities reflect 
the reports this MIS produces:
(i) The accident causation reports show the errors 
made by levels of management in the previous 
month and how they should be corrected.
(ii) The reports resulting from the two-stage pro­
cess reveal the underlying causes of accidents/ 
hazards of the prioritized rigs (i.e., rigs 
prioritized for correction). Such reports 
identify the causes in accordance with the ac­
cident sequence described by the management 
causation model.
(iii) The report on priority rigs provides a list of 
all rigs ranked by their respective risk scores. 
The magnitude of the risk scores accumulated by 
each rig depends on the degree of frequency and 
severity of the accidents/hazards incurred.
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The same type of accident might occur in 
several different rigs, but the consistency of 
their occurrence in the prioritized rigs de­
termines the high risk scores. Hence, the risk 
scores indicate the degree of safety perform­
ance of the managers (both the superintendents 
and the toolpushers) and the report is eventu­
ally a safety evaluation of managers.
(3) This MIS uses the legal requirements as a source of 
motivation as shown in its definition of hazards.
A hazard is considered to exist only if an identi­
fied safety problem violates the effective stan­
dards, laws, or regulations.
(4) The MIS also uses total accident costs as another 
source of motivation as shown in the communication 
of the monthly costs reports to all levels of mana­
gement. The use of these reports in the accident 
cost accounting will motivate managers to prevent 
accidents. Total accident costs (losses) reported 
are charged to the individual projects, but the 
costs of accident prevention will be the responsi­
bility of the company. This total cost report can 
also be used to see the trend of accidents incurred 
in each rig over time. The low but consistent costs 
incurred by a rig indicate poor management practices 
and also serves as a safety evaluation report.
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(5) The ability of the MIS to convert data into meaning­
ful information can be seen from several reports:
(i) The total accident cost report, which shows
the man-hour losses due to accidents by rig
(for all rigs) is prepared from injury data 
(nature of injury, part of the body injured, 
and whether the injury resulted in lost time). 
This injury data would normally not reflect any 
cost value when presented to the reader.
(ii) The report on prioritized rigs, which shows the
list of rigs ranked by their respective risk 
scores, is made based on the severity and fre­
quency of accidents. These severity and fre­
quency data are, in turn, derived from accident 
experience existing in a company. Withbut this 
conversion process, the accident records by 
themselves will not show the urgency for cor­
rections .
(6) This model, which sets priorities for corrections, 
as determined by the magnitude of the risk scores 
accummulated by each rig, attempts to predict the 
long-term effect of the present safety management. 
This MIS is a tool to help management identify 
complex problems; without decision models like those 
incorporated in this MIS, the urgency for correction 
will not be recognized.
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(7) Major accidents which create large losses seldom 
occur and, therefore, are of short-term importance 
only. Minor accidents, on the other hand, are in­
curred frequently and the consistency of their oc­
currence has long-term adverse effects. Thus, both 
major and minor accidents deserve equal attention 
and should be investigated with equal thoroughness.
(8) Priority determination, which predicts the long-term 
effect of the present safety management, is there­
fore an evaluation process needed to revise the 
existing management safety policies (MSP).
(9) All of the conclusions above show the activities 
induced by the existence of the MIS. These activ­
ities lead to the improvement of faulty management 
practices or of the underlying causes of accidents. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that this MIS at­
tempts to reduce accidents through the elimination 
of their underlying causes.
(10) The Robinson matrix, which has been used throughout 
this dissertation to calculate the total accident 
cost, was originally designed for the construction 
industry. Its compatibility with the oil-well 
drilling industry has not been verified. Because 
of its importance in the process of preparing the 
total accident cost reports for management moti-
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vation, it is recommended that such a matrix be 
developed for the oil-well drilling industry in the 
future.
(11) It is also recommended that a safety data base mana­
gement system be developed since it is an indispens­
able unit for an MIS and also serves as a valuable 
source of reference.
(12) The real data set used in the testing procedure does 
not contain any data pertaining to the causes of 
accidents (both the direct and the underlying causes). 
However, specific entries to record this data in the 
forms used are available. Consequently, the data 
included in real accident reports are obviously not 
intended to be used for accident prevention. It 
would be ideal if providers of data were also the 
users so that the quality of the data set could be 
guaranteed, and the benefit of recording data would 
justify the cost of data collection.
(13) The consistently high risk scores found for Task 4 
and Length of Employment 1 (LE 1) indicate that the 
most unsafe conditions and acts result from the 
task assigned to floorhands and the acts of workers 
employed within the 1-3 months category, respectively. 
There is an obvious need to train all new workers, 
irrespective of their experiences in order to elim­
inate or reduce accidents incurred by workers in
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LE 1. As for the alleviation of the hazards asso­
ciated with Task 4, further research is recommended. 
These findings are examples of additional advantages 
obtained by having an MIS which could be used to find 
problem areas which need further study.
(14) This MIS is adaptable to changes due to the advance­
ment of technology. Changes of models, as well as 
categorizations used in this MIS, can easily be 
changed without changing the basic concept of this 
MIS.
(15) This MIS is also flexible.. The routines used to 
prepare reports are very simple, consisting mostly 
of short command statements. Hence, they can eas­
ily be changed or edited whenever management feels 
that it is important to communicate additional 
information, or that the same reports should also
be addressed to other personnel who are not presently 
included.
1.5. Summary of the Organization of the Report
The rest of this dissertation is organized in accordance 
with the method of development discussed previously. It starts 
with a literature review chapter which analyzes the problems 
existing in the oil-well drilling industry and identifies 
possible solutions to the problems.
The design phase follows the literature review; it dis-
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eusses the design process and the design itself by using the 
criteria and findings carried over from the previous chapter.
The next chapter is used to discuss the testing procedures 
and the results of the tests, followed by the conclusions, bi­
bliography, appendices, and glossary of terms.
Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter attempts to analyze the existing accident 
causation and accident prevention models, sources of moti­
vation, and prevention practices to find any prevailing prob­
lems and to search for some possible criteria or qualities 
for an improved model applicable to an oil-well drilling com­
pany. The findings deduced in this chapter will be carried 
over to the design phase of the MIS in the next chapter. The 
discussions of the aforementioned topics will be organized 
according to their relationships as follows :
(1) Accident causation models.
(2) Sources of motivation.
(3) Accident prevention models.
(4) Traditional accident prevention practices.
(5) Qualities and/or criteria for a better model.
The review on accident prevention models is preceded by 
short reviews on accident causation models and sources of moti­
vation because they are the basis for the development of pre­
vention models. The effectiveness of accident prevention 
models depend very much on how they are being implemented; 
therefore, the review on accident prevention activities should
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follow that of the accident prevention models.
2.1. Accident Causation Models
In the past, the word "accident" was taken to represent 
an event without cause, an unintended happening, a chance or a 
mishap (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1979). Therefore, ac­
cidents were considered to be non-preventable. However, as the 
number of accidents increased over time, it motivated the search 
for their causation (NSC, 1978; Heinrich et al, 1980). This 
search resulted in several causation models, all of which have 
two important opinions in common, namely, (1) accidents do 
have causes or etiology, and (2) they are mostly preventable. 
The etiology, however, is not simple because it consists of 
multiple factors which act and interact with each other to cause 
accidents (Heinrich et al, 1980; Hahn, 1980; Denton, 1982).
These multiple factors can be divided into two large categories:
(1) immediate causes which are also very often called direct 
or primary causes and (2) real causes, which are also known 
as indirect or underlying causes. The first category can 
further be subclassified into (a) the unsafe acts of workers 
and (b) the unsafe conditions of the working environment and 
machinery. The second category is subclassified into (a) per­
sonal factors (physical and psychological), (b) environmental 
factors (physical, chemical, biological, psychological), and 
(c) management factors (policies, decisions, evaluations, 
control, administration).
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Accident causation models are grouped into several cat­
egories according to which of the above factors is being 
stressed in a model (Heinrich et al, 1980):
(1) Behavior model.
(2) Human factor model.
(3) System model.
(4) Epidemiologic model.
(5) Decision model.
(6) Management model.
Behavior models place behavior as a prime causative agent 
in accidents. These models were historically based on the 
theory that affirms the existence of accident-prone workers.
Such models, including their modifications, have been described 
by Shaw and Sichel (1971); Hahn (1980); and Kerr (1957). 
Presently, however, statistical, and clinical findings, as 
well as daily experiences question the justification of this 
theory and necessitate the re-examination and/or further study 
of these models.
Human factor models place human factors as a prime caus­
ative agent in accidents. These models affirm the theory that 
accidents are caused by human error. The underlying causes of 
these errors are considered to be due to work overload, incor­
rect responses of the workers, and improper acts of personnel. 
Among the studies of these models are those described by 
Ferrell, as cited by Heinrich et al (1980); and Petersen (1978).
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These human factor models have resulted in the specification 
of human capabilities or characteristics which, in turn, are 
used for two purposes: (i) to design machinery and/or a
working environment and (ii) to select employees to meet cer­
tain requirements to do a specific job or to operate specific 
equipment. Most of these studies have been done in the labo­
ratory with well-controlled conditions, so that generaliza­
tion of these findings cannot be advised. Also, studies that 
could be related to the oil-well drilling industry are not 
available at this time.
System models place man-machine interactions as a prime 
causative agent in accidents, in which the personal factors 
of workers play a very important role, namely, as the con­
trolling agent. Compared to the other models, these system 
models have one outstanding advantage; they have a feedback 
mechanism. This feedback mechanism is an indispensable part 
of a monitoring procedure which reveals how well an accident 
prevention policy is being implemented. An example of the 
system model is that which has been described by Firenze as 
cited by Heinrich et al (1980).
Epidemiologic models place the results of the interac­
tions among the host (man), the agent (cause), and the envi­
ronment as the primary causative agent in accidents. These 
models are analogous to those used in the study of epidemics 
and the causation of diseases. Instead of searching for the 
causes of epidemics and diseases, the studies now look for
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the causes of accidents. According to the epidemiologic 
model, injuries and damages are the measurable indices of 
accidents, but the accidents themselves are still considered 
to be unexpected, unintentional, and unavoidable. Hence, as 
a preventive measure, these models are inadequate. An example 
of studies on these models is described by Suchman as cited 
by Hahn (1980).
The decision model as described by Surry (1974) places 
the human capability to make safety decisions as its prime 
causative agent in accidents. This model states that if the 
above capabilities do not exist, then danger will build up, 
become imminent, and an accident will occur. The human ca­
pability to make safety decisions starts with the ability of 
the workers to recognize and analyze hazards, and then decide 
to take proper actions to prevent accidents from occurring. 
Thus, this model stresses personal factors required to make 
safety decisions such as knowledge, skill, emotional status, 
awareness, and motivation.
Management models place management policy as a prime 
causative agent in accidents and are the updated domino theo­
ry with modifications. The domino theory itself describes the 
sequence of accident occurrence and reveals the causes of ac­
cidents. The theory is based on the following theorems or 
sequence:
(1) Industrial injuries result only from accidents.
(2) Accidents are caused directly only by:
(a) the unsafe acts of persons or
24
(b) exposure to unsafe mechanical conditions.
(3) Unsafe actions and conditions are caused only by 
faults of persons.
(4) Faults of persons are created by the environment or 
acquired by inheritance.
(Heinrich et al, 1980)
Based on these theorems several management models were 
developed, such as those described by Bird Jr. and O'Shell 
(1980); Adams (1976); and Weaver (1971). Bird's model is an 
update of the domino theory to which a fifth sequence has been 
added, namely, that behind the faults of persons lie managerial 
errors such as not setting up appropriate safety management 
policies. Adams's model updates Bird's by redefining the 
direct causes of accidents, or the second sequence, as tacti­
cal errors of workers, behind which lie managerial and super­
visor operational errors. On the other hand, Weaver's model 
updates the domino theory by redefining the second sequence 
as symptoms of accidents, behind which lie poor management 
practices.
In summary, all these causation models could actually 
be grouped into two categories based on their orientation.
The first category consists of those models oriented toward 
"people" and their faults, which can include the behavior, 
the human factor, the decision, and the management models. 
Among these four models, only the decision and the management 
causation models are presently acceptable as a basis for an 
accident prevention model in an oil-well drilling company.
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The second category contains those models oriented toward the 
interactions among people, machinery, and the environment.
This latter category includes the system and the epidemiologic 
models, of which only the system causation model is presently 
adoptable for the basis of an accident prevention model.
2.2. Sources of Motivation
Accident prevention models could be developed based on 
the causation models. For example, a model could be developed 
based on a management causation model by simply eliminating 
and/or modifying either the second, the third, the fourth, or 
the fifth accident sequence. "But such a model is useless 
whenever the incentive to prevent accidents does not exist. 
Hence, a model should also be equipped with an incentive to 
motivate the prevention of accidents. The incentive is usu­
ally referred to as the source of motivation.
Sources of motivation are situations and conditions that 
could induce or stimulate people to prevent accidents. Basi­
cally, there are four sources of motivation: the legal re­
quirements imposed upon industries by the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA); the humanitarian concern; 
the company's safety image; and the total accident costs 
(Levitt, 1975; Robinson, 1979; Simonds and Grimaldi, 1956; 
Hammer, 1976).
The legal requirements as imposed by OSHA are expressed 
as laws, rules, and ordinances that require workplaces and
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equipment to be kept in safe condition. Furthermore, adequate 
first-aid facilities must be provided, accidents and diseases 
must be recorded, employees must be trained, and employees 
must also be compensated for injuries or occupational diseases. 
These legal requirements are made clear, and so are the pen­
alties for non-compliance. For these reasons, much time and 
resources have been spent on safety activities to avoid legal 
citations, irrespective of their lack of cost effectiveness. 
Hence, this type of motivation can be thought of as a negative 
incentive because the activities induced thereby have as their 
main purpose compliance with the law, and any reduction of acci­
dents has been only a side-effect of these activities (Denton, 
1982; Petersen, 1978). These legal requirements, however, will 
always exist in an industrial setting, so that the presence 
of another source of motivation is necessary to stimulate a 
real accident prevention activity.
The humanitarian concern for the injured workers and 
their families appears to be an important source of motivation 
to managers. This is especially true in small companies where 
there is strong personal contact between managers and their 
employees (Levitt, 1975). In general, such motivations are 
difficult to create in large companies such as oil-well drill­
ing companies.
The company's safety image creates a motivation for safety 
whenever this image could promote sales of their products and/ 
or their services (Levitt, 1975). The determination of this
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safety image, however, is only based on the number of spec­
tacular injuries; the less severe, but nevertheless frequent, 
accidents are not being reported. Since both severity and 
frequency of accidents are equally important in the evaluation 
of safety, this source of motivation is considered inadequate 
for accident prevention.
The total accident cost is another important source of 
motivation, especially whenever these costs account for a 
substantial portion of the operational cost of the company, 
such as those found in the high-hazard.-.industries (Levitt,
1975; Robinson, 1979). The total accident cost consists of 
the direct and the indirect costs of an accident. The direct 
costs, in turn, consist of compensation payments, first aid, 
medical and surgical expenses, legal fees, and overhead costs. 
These costs are mostly insured, and are being used in the 
determination of the company's future insurance premium due 
to experience rating. Experience Rating is a procedure util­
izing past insurance experience of the individual policy holder 
to forecast or predict future losses (NCCI, 1981). The future 
insurance premium can be increased or decreased depending on 
the magnitude of these direct costs incurred in the last 
three years. Cases of severe injury, i.e., where the direct 
costs account for more than a pre-specified value, like $2,000 
(NCCI, 1981), the company will be charged primary values 
which can be looked up in a table or calculated from a formula 
(NCCI, 1981; Petersen, 1978). All other injuries resulting in
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losses less than $2,000, the whole amount is taken as the 
primary value. Hence, in these cases, the company will be 
charged fully for the actual cost. In other words, the expe­
rience rating plan gives greater weight to accident frequency 
than to accident severity. Thus, it can be understood that 
the elimination of the frequent but minor injuries could re­
sult in an almost equal, if not greater, reduction of future 
insurance premiums than by the elimination of a single major 
injury. This is especially true if the direct costs of the 
minor injuries exceed those of the major injury.
The indirect costs are hidden costs in the sense that 
they are costs related to the indirect consequences of acci­
dents. These costs consist of: (i) costs of decreased pro­
duction output due to interruptions by accidents, (ii) costs 
of man-hours lost due to the absence of the injured employee 
and others helping the injured at the time of the accident;
(iii) costs of man-hours used to train a replacement; and
(iv) costs of damaged materials and tools. The indirect costs 
are uninsured and their magnitude is in the range of two to 
thirteen times higher than the direct costs (Heinrich et al, 
1980; NSC, 1978, Simonds and Grimaldi, 1980; Robinson, 1979; 
Samelson, 1977). Thus, the value for indirect costs could be 
estimated by multiplying the direct costs with any factor 
between three and fourteen whichever is acceptable to the com­
pany. The problem, however, lies in the determination of the
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direct cost itself which may take quite some time; this is 
especially true for those costs related to a severe injury 
which needs prolonged medical treatment.
Recently, Robinson (1979) has developed a matrix method 
to estimate total accident costs. Its principal method of 
development, the resulting matrix, and an example of how to 
use this matrix are shown in Appendix A. To get the estimate 
of the total cost of an injury by this matrix, one needs to 
know only three variables of the injury: (i) the part of the
body injured; (ii) the nature of the injury; and (iii) whether 
the injury resulted in lost time (by OSHA definition). Once 
the values of these three variables are known, the total cost 
can be estimated in a few minutes by using the matrix. This 
matrix has been developed for the construction industry; 
it has been tested and used in several industries with suc­
cessful results (Robinson, 1979).
The above method of total cost estimation has made pos­
sible the communication of these costs to all desired levels 
of management in an organization that includes this information 
in their monthly cost reports. This monthly cost report is a 
basic medium of communication between levels of management; it 
is generally used to predict or evaluate whether the job or 
project will make money and how management can control costs 
to insure that it does. The inclusion of the total accident 
costs in these monthly reports can be useful in several ways, 
depending on the magnitude of the losses incurred: (1) it
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can be used in the accident cost accounting, i.e., the projects 
can now be charged with the reported total costs incurred;
(2) it can aid management in the evaluation of their person­
nel performance in safety; (3) it can help locate safety prob­
lems and needs in order to allocate resources accordingly;
(4) it can attract management interest in safety; and (5) it 
can create a situation that could motivate managers to actual­
ly prevent accidents and possibly reduce the magnitude of 
losses incurred by being utilized in the accident cost account­
ing.
2.3. Accident Prevention Models
Accident prevention models are developed based on acci­
dent causation models and sources of motivation. If the same 
causation models were taken as their basis, the prevention 
models would show some similarities in their step-by-step 
procedure of prevention. They might differ in their basic 
approaches if different sources of motivations were used.
The review on accident causation models suggests that only 
the system, the management, and the decision causation models 
are now acceptable as the basis for an accident prevention 
model. The decision model, however, is already included in 
the management causation model (see Sequence 2a and 4).
Hence, the review on the accident prevention models will be 
limited only to those based on the two aforementioned causa­
tion models. Most accident prevention models have also
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taken the system model, or the combination of the system and 
the management causation models as their basis for development, 
The legal source of motivation, to a certain extent, is al­
ways present in a model. It would therefore be appropriate 
if the accident prevention models be discussed by type with 
the use of some examples,
2.3.1. Examples of Accident Prevention Models
Examples of three types of models will be presented:
(i) two models that are based on the system causation model 
only; (ii) one model that is based on the combination of the 
system and the management causation models, and (iii) those 
models adapted for safety from management decision models.
The examples for those models based on the system causa­
tion model only are the models described by Brown (1976) and 
Peters (1980), the most important subsystems of which are il­
lustrated in Figures 1 and 2 respectively. Brown's model is 
called the Safety Control System; it defines accident as an 
uncontrolled condition of men, machine, and material to the 
point where physical damage or injury will result. The word 
"control" in this case is defined as an action that would 
bring the system up to standard and would lead toward a spe­
cified goal whenever measurements indicate that this goal is 
not being met. Hence, according to this model, there are 
three important elements necessary in the control of safety: 
(i) the goals or standards to be achieved, which are stated
32
inspection & 
investigation
standard
f— evaluation
development
special
equipment
procurement
design 
correction
personnel 
correction & 
motivation
training & 
education
hardware
subsystem
personnel
subsystem
Figure 1: Brown's Safety Control System
so as to comply fully to OSHA standards; (li) the methods of 
measurement to determine whether goals and standards are being 
met (the methods to be used, however, are not specified), and
(iii) the means of correction to get the system up to standard 
(in this model, they are specified as the hardware and the 
personnel subsystems).
As is shown in Figure 1, Brown's model starts with the 
setting of its goals and standards to be met; it then conti­
nues with the inspection and investigation subsystem for the 
identification of any existing safety problem. If any prob­
lem is identified, it should be evaluated to see whether cor­
rection is necessary, i.e., whenever standards are not being
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met. If it is decided that correction is necessary, the re­
spective correcting subsystem(s) is determined (there are three 
correcting subsystems). After the required remedy has been 
applied, the changed system may not be completely free from 
hazards and may need to be further monitored. The results 
of this monitoring procedure serve as feedback to the system 
for that particular correction and safety problem. It can be 
noted that the training and education subsystem is being sep­
arated from the choices for correction procedure because they 
are considered to be a routine activity as specified by OSHA. 
Hence, this model is solely based on the legal source of moti­
vation as expressed in its goal statement; it has also taken 
the system causation model as a basis since it has a feedback 
mechanism.
The Peters model differs from the Brown model in several 
ways. Firstly, it does not state its goal explicitly other 
than a general statement to achieve safety. Secondly, it 
shows different consecutive steps in the evaluation of a safe­
ty problem. Once a problem is identified and it is found 
that standards are not being met; a hazard exists, which ac­
cording to Brown's model should always be corrected. In 
this model, however, hazards will not be corrected unless 
they present risks that are not acceptable. Risk is defined 
as the probability that injury will occur, while danger de­
notes the acceptability of a risk. Finally, this model spec­
ifies explicitly the methods that should be used to evaluate
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a safety problem, a hazard, a risk, and a danger; namely, the 
comparison to the existing standards, the risk score calcula­
tion, the value judgement, and the study of the cost and ben­
efit respectively, as can also be seen in Figure 2. These 
stated differences show that this model uses another source 
of motivation besides legal requirements, namely, a cost ben­
efit factor, in the correction of a hazard. Otherwise, the 
general outline of investigation, evaluation, control, and 
monitoring procedures is the same as that described by Brown, 
indicating the use of the system causation model as its basis. 
This model suggests that not all safety problems presenting 
hazards should be corrected, which would make a user vulnera­
ble to legal citations. On the other hand, it tries to intro­
duce objective methods for the evaluation of hazards and for 
the selection of control procedures. The risk score calcula-
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tion used in the evaluation of hazards will not be discussed 
in detail, until later in this chapter. It suffices to say, 
that this method was developed by Fine (1980), whereby both 
the severity and the frequency of a hazard are taken into ac­
count in the risk score calculation.
The example for models based on the combined system and 
management causation models is the model developed by Heinrich 
(1980); its main subsystems are shown in Figure 3. This mod­
el explicitly specifies its basic philosophy (theorems of ac­
cident occurrence and prevention) and approach before going 
into its main activities. The word "approach" denotes ways 
and means for the reduction of accidents based on the existing 
and available knowledge and incentives for accident prevention. 
In the management causation model, poor safety management pol­
icies or practices are considered the underlying cause of ac­
cidents, hence, safety management is taken as the basic ap­
proach of this model. Its step-by-step procedure, however, is 
very similar to the previously described models, implying the 
use of the system causation model as its basis. This model 
ends by listing the long-term and the short-term safety activ­
ities. It can be concluded that this model introduces only 
its very basic ideas so that it is still not clear how the 
philosophy and approach are being integrated into the model.
It is also not clear what source of motivation is used to make 
sure that safety policies will be determined and enforced.
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The examples for models that are adapted for safety from 
management decision models are the Kepner-Tregoe and the 
Johnson human performance . models. The Kepner-Tregoe model, 
as illustrated in Figure 4, was cited by Heinrich et al (1980). 
This model was originally developed for the U.S. Air Force by 
the Rand Corporation, but is now widely used in other U.S. 
corporations. The subsystems described are very similar to 
the previously discussed models, only different terms are used 
for the same procedures. It is therefore self-explanatory.
Decision---------> Choose
analysis I1 1
Problem Potential
analysis problem
analysis
;ecu 
/
\
Problems Exec te
Measure
Figure 4: Kepner-Tregoe's model
Johnson (1973) in his Management Oversight Risk Tree (MORT) 
provides a model that closely approximates the accident pre­
vention steps and is known as the performance cycle model, as 
illustrated in Figure 5. This model was originally designed 
to improve human performance by the reduction of human error. 
Its basic steps are very much like the Kepner-Tregoe model 
and, again, different terms are used for the same procedures.
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Hence, this is also self-explanatory.
Decision
/
ActionAnalysis
Problem
Measurement
Figure 5: Johnson's Performance Cycle Model.
Based on the similarities of the Kepner-Tregoe and Johnson 
models to the basic procedures of a system prevention model, 
they are considered to have more value for safety than the 
other management models (Heinrich et al, 1980; Petersen, 1980) 
Actually the name "management model" does not denote the use 
of the management causation model as its basis, but rather 
that it originated in the business world.
Therefore, it can be concluded that most accident pre­
vention models are based on the system causation model and 
use the legal requirements as their source of motivation. 
Those adopting the management causation model are still 
deficient in the integration of their philosophy and their 
approaches into the model.
2.3.2. The Traditional Accident Prevention Activities
In general, traditional preventive activities have been 
motivated by legal requirements. The step-by-step procedures
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are very much like those described in the Brown model, but its 
applications have been limited to major injuries and the eli­
mination of unsafe acts and conditions. Hence, the underlying 
causes of accidents have not yet been addressed. Denton (1982), 
classifies these traditional activities into the work and the 
employee-centered or "people" approaches. The work-centered 
approach emphasizes the elimination of unsafe working condi­
tions, while the employee-centered approach stresses the eli­
mination of personal factors that would lead to unsafe acts.
It was further suggested that work-centered approaches have 
resulted in the production of safer machinery so that at the 
present time, there are fewer machines that would cause acci­
dents. The causes of accidents would, therefore, more like­
ly be due to unsafe acts. The fact that accidents are mostly 
caused by unsafe acts (80%) has been reported by others (NSC, 
1978; Heinrich et al, 1980; Surry, 1974; Levitt, 1975), but 
they differ from Denton in their opinion that unsafe acts have 
not been reduced as much as unsafe conditions because the 
underlying causes have not yet been addressed by this tradi­
tional practice.
From the preventive point of view, these traditional ac­
tivities could be better classified into retrospective and 
prospective practices. Retrospective activities are those ac­
tivities related to the prevention of accidents after an acci­
dent has occurred. These activities include accident inves­
tigation, analysis, evaluation, and control; they are meant to
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prevent similar accidents from occurring in the future. These 
activities could actually be used as a learning experience, 
but so far their application has been limited to major injuries. 
This limitation cannot be considered a good policy for several 
reasons: (i) accidents do not always result injuries; (ii)
major injuries occur only in one out of 600 injuries (Heinrich 
et al, 1980; Petersen, 1978; NSC, 1978); and (iii) severity 
and frequency of accidents are of equal importance in the e- 
valuation of safety. This limited activity also shows that 
the only source of motivation for preventing accidents is the 
legal requirements, which state that only those accidents re­
quiring more than first-aid treatment should be recorded.
Hence, the great potential of the learning experience has not 
been well utilized.
The prospective activities are those activities related 
to the prevention of accidents before they can occur. These 
activities are represented by routine hazard inspections, 
analysis and control, education and training, and supervision. 
Compared to the retrospective activities, the prospective 
activities are more positive in nature. The retrospective ac­
tivities, however, could be very useful as a source of expe­
rience and could provide input to the prospective aspect. 
Because of the existence of these retrospective and prospec­
tive activities, many terms in the field of safety need clari­
fication. The most important and most frequently used terms 
are: accident, injury, safety, hazard, and danger. A defi-
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nition for each one of them can be found in the glossary.
Despite the limitations of traditional safety practices, 
many industries are now considered to have outstanding safety 
records (Heinrich et al, 1980; Levitt, 1975). Heinrich is of 
the opinion that this outstanding record could not have been 
achieved solely by traditional safety activities. This 
statement has been supported by Levitt, (1975), who found 
that in the construction industry, distinctive accident records 
are achieved when top managers are well-informed about all as­
pects of safety of the company. These top managers know the 
company's safety organization and its performance. They also 
include safety in the detailed planning and implementation of 
their work, (i.e., the evaluation of their personnel and proj­
ects based on safety performance), the use of accident cost 
accounting to promote safety, (i.e., allocating resources for 
safety based on accident costs), and the training of new em­
ployees in safety methods. It can be deduced that if safety 
is integrated into management policies, accidents can be re­
duced. Hence, Levitt's findings support the relevancy of the 
application of the management causation model in the con­
struction industry.
However, the oil-field industries, together with the 
heavy construction, bituminous coal mining, and durable goods 
industries, are still classified as high-hazard industries.
For the period between 1972 and 1978, the accident frequency 
and severity rates were 20 per 100 employees per year and 200
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workdays per 100 employees per year respectively -(NIOSH, 1982). 
Oil-well drilling industries were responsible for 56% of the 
frequency and 50% of the severity rates of the oil-field in­
dustries. It can be noted that these frequency and severity 
rates within the same period were almost constant despite the 
existence of techniques, skilled man power, and information 
that could have been used for accident prevention. This con­
sistency denotes that the present accident rates can no longer 
be reduced by the existing safety practices.
From the above review it can be concluded that there is 
a need for a better model to prevent accidents in the high- 
hazard industries such as oil-well drilling. This improved 
model should have the following qualities :
(1) It should be based on the management causation mod­
el as supported by Levitt (1975).
(2) It should be able to eliminate or modify the under­
lying causes of accidents, i.e., poor management 
practices.
(3) It should have a feedback mechanism that would serve 
as part of a learning process; hence, it should be 
based on the system causation model.
(4) It should have the total accident cost as another
source of motivation besides the existing legal
requirements.
(5) It should be able to give equal weight to both the
frequency and the severity of accidents in the pro-
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cess of the determination of priorities for correct­
ions .
2.4. Qualities For a Better Model
Available literature on each of the aformentioned quali­
ties of the model will now be reviewed so that they can be 
integrated into a better model in the next chapter. However, 
qualities number one, three and four, i.e., the management 
model, the system causation model, and the total accident cost 
have been discussed previously and will therefore not be re­
peated. To be able to integrate quality number two into a 
model, a technique that can reveal the underlying causes of 
each accident is needed. These causes need to be specified 
as errors made by each level of management involved in a par­
ticular accident. These underlying causes are then reported 
to the respective management levels and to the top manager, 
to serve as feedback on how the existing management safety 
policy is being implemented and enforced. Based on these 
reports, evaluation and improvement of managers* safety per­
formances can be accomplished. In so doing, the underlying 
causes of accidents can be reduced and/or eliminated. Such 
a technique has now become available and is called the *'4x4 
problem-solving technique**. It is also referred to as the 
"reverse sequence investigation technique" developed by Jones 
(1981). The Jones technique and the Fine model which determines 
priorities for corrections as specified in quality number five.
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will be discussed in the next two sections.
2.4.1. The 4x4 Problem-Solving Technique
The 4x4 Problem-Solving Technique was developed by Jones
(1981). It is a technique that can be used as a tool to de­
termine the underlying causes of accidents as well as estab­
lish the correct organizational levels at which opportunities 
for correction lie and the area of correction. According to 
this technique, there are three levels in the organization 
where accident prevention can be accomplished; namely, the 
management's, the supervisor's, and the worker's level. There
are four corrective areas at each level of correction:
At the management's level:
(1) Establish and communicate policy/procedure.
(2) Apply policy/procedure consistently where 
applicable.
(3) Establish and communicate procedural monitoring.
(4) Enforce policy/procedure based upon procedural 
monitoring.
At the supervisor's level:
(1) Communicate what is wanted.
(2) Assure means to comply.
(3) Be consistent in setting a good example.
(4) Be consistent in enforcement.
At the worker's level:
(1) Remove obstacles to proper performance.
(2) Communicate what is wanted.
(3) Train/motivate/enforce.
(4) Recognize/reward improved performance.
The levels involved in the correction of a certain accident 
could be one, two, or all three levels. Thus, this form of 
accident prevention is not strictly limited to the activities 
accomplished by the safety staff, but rather involves the par­
ticipation of the,operational employees and the managers in'
45
the elimination of the underlying causes of accidents. The 
basic process of this technique is quite simple. It starts 
with the end result of an injury or hazard and asks "why?" 
until the causes, the proper levels of correction, and the 
area of correction are revealed. Appendix B shows the flow 
chart of the basic operational procedure, the basic rules, 
and the definitions of terms used in this technique.
In order to illustrate the effectiveness of this technique 
in the involvement of all operational, administrative and 
managerial resources, an example will be presented. Suppose 
that an accident occurred and resulted in an injury of the 
left eye of a worker. The supervisor investigating the acci­
dent should ask himself why that injury occurred and generates 
an ar.swer that shows permitting or generating influences such 
as: "He was not wearing his goggles." Then ask "why?" again,
and the best answer could be: "He disregarded instructions," 
or "He is used to doing this work without goggles." Then both 
answers should be checked separately to reveal the real cause 
of this accident. If the worker had disregarded instructions, 
the level of correction would be at the worker's level only, 
and the area of correction would be that area indicated as 
number three under the worker's level of correction; the under­
lying cause would then be expressed as "W3." If, instead, the 
second answer were right, then besides the worker, the super­
visor was also involved because of his lack of consistency in
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the enforcement of safe working procedure. Thus, the correct 
organizational level for correction would be at the super­
visor's and the worker's levels, while the areas of correc­
tion would be those indicated as number four and three under 
the supervisor's and the worker's levels, respectively. The 
underlying cause of this accident would then be expressed as 
"S4W3." The results of these investigations would then be 
reported to the appropriate levels so that similar accidents 
would not happen again in the future. The continous use of 
this technique will result in the involvement of all levels 
of the organization in accident prevention through the elimi­
nation of the underlying causes; it will also help monitor 
how the company's safety policies are being implemented and 
how they should be improved.
2.4.2. Models for Priority Determination
Models for the determination of priorities that closely 
resemble the above-mentioned quality are described by Smith
(1982) and Fine (1980); both models are designed to evaluate 
hazards and will be discussed separately.
Smith derived his model from Dr. V. L. Grose's system 
safety known for its application in the space programs. Smith, 
however, used the drilling hazards evaluation for application. 
This model uses three variables in its determination of pri­
orities: (i) the severity of the injury damage; (ii) the
probability that an accident will occur; and (iii) the cost
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effectiveness for correcting the hazards. For each hazard 
that is identified, the values for all three variables are 
obtained by rating them subjectively in a qualitative manner, 
i.e., expressed as high (H), medium (M), and low (L). Based 
on these rates, all hazards identified are then ranked so 
that the highest rank will have the highest priority to be 
corrected. The hazard that will have the highest rank is the 
one that has high (H) rates for all three variables. However, 
the exact procedure of ranking was not described. If there 
were only one variable involved, the ranking procedure would 
be easily understood. But, in this model three variables were 
used; the relationships among them should also be considered 
in the ranking procedure. The cost variable could perhaps be 
considered as independent from the other two, but the severity 
of an accident and its probability of occurring are known to 
be very dependent on each other (NSC, 1978; Heinrich et al, 
1980; Petersen, 1978). It is known that the less severe the 
injury, the more frequently it occurs. From a sample-ranked 
list shown, it is evident that Smith considered frequency as 
less important than severity; for instance, a hazard having 
rates of H, M, and L has a higher rank than another with M, H, 
and L rates for severity, probability, and cost respectively. 
Since it is required that both the frequency and the severity 
of accidents should be equally weighted in the process of pri­
ority determination, this model cannot be utilized.
Fine's model for priority determination of hazards differs
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from that of Smith in its basic concepts. In this model, pri­
orities are selected based on the relative risk caused by a 
hazard:;, the greater the risk it causes, the higher its pri­
ority for correction. Hence, cost for correction does not 
play any role in the priority determination. However, it will 
become important at a later stage when the best alternative 
for correction is being determined. The priorities are 
measured by the risk score, as calculated by the following 
formula:
RS = C X E X P
where RS = risk score,
C = consequence of a possible accident due to hazard, 
E = frequency of exposure to the cause, and 
P = probability that the complete accident sequence 
will occur.
The consequence of a possible accident represents the severity 
of an accident. The frequency of exposure (E) in this case 
does not represent the frequency of the accident, but rather, 
the exposure to the direct causes of an accident. P stands 
for a probability that identical causes will lead to similar 
accidents resulting in the same consequences. The values for 
each variable are obtained through a rating procedure using 
a pre-determined range of numbers. The calculated risk scores 
(RS) are then ranked according to their magnitude. The larger 
the number of the RS, the higher the priority of a hazard will 
be.
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The resulting risk score is then further used to decide 
on the best available alternative as expressed by the justifi­
cation factor "J", calculated by the following equation:
RS
J =
CF X  DC
where J = justification for correction,
RS = risk score,
CF = cost factor,
DC = degree of correction.
The risk score is the number acquired from the previous cal­
culation, while the cost factor (CF) and the degree of cor­
rection (DC) are, again, rated values based on the relative 
cost and degree of hazard elimination respectively. To be 
able to use this method, a critical justification rating (CJR) 
should be set, above which the expenditure for correction is 
justified. However, if the value of J is below the CJR then 
two possibilities exists; namely, the J value is very close to 
CJR, in which case all factors should be re-examined carefully 
or J is far below the CJR, in which case the expenditure cannot 
be justified. In this model, all values assigned to the vari­
ables in consideration are based on a rating procedure that 
depends heavily upon the available experts involved as is the 
determination of the CJR.
As compared to Smith's model, this model considers the 
severity and frequency equally important; it also provides a 
method for the selection of the best alternative and it is 
quantitative in nature.
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In summary, a model that will have the aforementioned 
qualities should eventually convert accident data into meaning­
ful information to support managers in making decisions. 
Managers will not be supplied with data of injuries, damaged 
materials, and equipment, but instead they will be presented 
with information to identify causes of accidents, how safety 
policies are being implemented and enforced, what kinds of 
safety problems exist, what alternatives are available for 
correction, and how to choose the best corrective procedure. 
This type of a model can be identified as a management infor­
mation system (MIS). The MIS originated from business prac­
tices where information has always been considered a resource. 
All levels in the organization need information in the per­
formance of their duties, even if the degree of accuracy or
the method of presentation may be different. As a business 
increases in size and in activities, the information needed 
from the inside as well as from the outside of the organization 
increases as well. To be able to provide this needed infor­
mation in a systematic, orderly manner, an MIS was developed 
to collect, process, communicate, and store information 
(Matthews, 1976).
In summary, the qualities and/or criteria for the MIS 
which will be carried over to the next chapter are as follows:
(1) The management and the system causation models will 
be used as the basis of the MIS.
(2) The MIS should reduce or eliminate the underlying
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causes of accidents as supported by the 4x4 problem­
solving technique.
(3) The total accident cost will be used as another 
source of motivation besides the existing legal 
source.
(4) The determination of priorities for correction will 
basically follow the model developed by Fine (1980).
(5) The MIS should be applicable to an oil-well drilling 
industry.
Chapter 3 
DESIGN OF THE MIS MODEL
A management information system is a system that provides 
information to all levels of management to help them make, 
carry out, and control decisions (Kanter, 1977). It consists 
of both the physical and the information systems so that it 
will show both the contents or "what" is going on as well as 
the means or "how" something is being accomplished. Defini­
tions for system, management, and information can be found in 
the glossary section.
An MIS generally has three subsystems: (i) the data base
management subsystem; (ii) the structured reporting subsystem; 
and (iii) the decision models subsystem (Sprague and Watson, 
1975). Due to the extremely broad scope of the MIS, this 
dissertation is limited in several ways:
(1) The data base management subsystem, is important, 
but since specialized knowledge is required for its 
discussion, it will not be presented in its entirety.
(2) The structured reporting subsystem which consists of 
the external and internal reports will be only par­
tially included, i.e., encompassing those reports 
required for communication within the organization
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only, and those which are eventually needed by a 
safety activity in a company.
(3) The MIS model will be concerned with safety activ­
ities only.
(4) The model should be applicable to a land-based 
oil-well drilling industry.
Hence, the model will focus mostly on the decision models 
subsystem.
The goal of this design phase is to get the MIS model on 
paper so that it can be tested in the next phase of its de­
velopment. The procedures that will be followed to achieve 
this goal are as follows:
(1) A description of a land-based oil-well drilling 
operation will be presented to provide sufficient 
background information for the design process.
(2) The goals and output of the model will be elaborat­
ed so that the type of decision models required can 
be identified.
(3) The processor element, which consists mostly of 
decision models can be determined.
(4) The input required by the processor element can be 
identified.
(5) The necessary subsystems of the MIS and their re­
lationships will be discussed, as defined by the 
input, the processor, and the output of the system.
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(6) The model will be illustrated through flow diagrams 
and drawings on paper.
3.1. Land-Based Oil-Well Drilling Operations
The purpose of the following description is to give suf­
ficient background information for the development of the MIS 
model. The description will be divided into two parts; namely, 
the management and the drilling operations.
3.1.1. Management of the Drilling Operation
The following description focuses on the functions of the 
different levels of management so that the right information 
can be addressed to the relevant level. In an oil-well drill­
ing industry, as in most other organizations, there are three 
levels of management; namely, the top, the middle, and the 
lower levels, as illustrated in Figure 6.
MG
r - X
R R R
MG : Management group
S : Superintendent
R : Rig Manager or Toolpusher
Figure 6 : Three Levels of Management
The top management is usually referred to as the manage­
ment group and consists of the executive committee. This 
management group determines the short-term and long-term ob­
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jectives (1-5 years) of the company, its personnel, monetary 
and physical resources needed to realize them, and the policies 
and strategies that best utilize the resources. They also im­
plement and control the decisions that have already been made. 
Hence, this top level of management will need information that 
relates to the determination of objectives, budgets, and pol­
icies .
The middle management, the superintendents, are those 
reporting to the top managers. Each of them supervises the 
operation of three rigs on the average, and their main func­
tions are to acquire and control the resources necessary to 
implement the company's plans so that the objectives can be 
achieved efficiently.
The lowest level of management is the operating manage­
ment, i.e., the rig managers or toolpushers who report to the 
superintendents. Each of them supervises the operation of 
one rig. They also direct the work crew. There are four to 
five work crew members in a tour or shift and there are three 
tours in a day with one additional relief crew. The crew 
members consist of a driller, a derrickman, a motorman, and 
one or two floorhands or roughnecks. These rig managers are 
the representatives of management who have daily contact with 
the employees so that they become the key people in a safety 
program. Their duties in safety include the inspection and 
observation of work practices, the orientation and training 
of employees in safe work methods, the investigation of ac-
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cidents, the administration of first aid, the maintenance of 
safety records, and the comnunication of safety rules and 
methods (Terry and Rue, 1982).
3.1.2. Drilling Operation*
The following process description summarizes the drilling 
operation with the use of a rotary rig. It should be noted 
that any drilling operation is always preceded by the erection 
of the derrick and its associated gear ("rigging up"), the con­
struction of the substructure supporting the drill deck and 
the derrick, and the angering of a starter hole ("spudding in"), 
After the drilling is completed, these structures are again 
disassembled ("rigging down"). All the hazards associated 
with these activities are not considered specific to a drill­
ing operation and are included in general construction hazards.
The rotary drilling rig consists of several functional 
components associated with the following activities/systems, 
as illustrated in Figure 7 and in the functional diagram in 
Figure 8 (NIOSH Report, 1982):
(1) Power generation and transmission.
(2) Hoisting the drill string.
(3) Rotating the drill string.
(4) Circulating fluid system.
(5) Material handling during drilling.
*The technical terms used in this description are ex­
plained in the glossary.
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3.1.2.1. Power Generation and Transmission
The primary power source is normally one or more internal 
combustion engines. These engines are usually mounted immedi­
ately next to the derrick. The most common fuel used is diesel, 
but gasoline, natural gas, and purchased electricity are also 
used. The power produced and used in a rig is several hundred 
horsepower.
The transmission may be mechanical or electrical. Mecha­
nical transmission is more common at older rigs; it employs a 
number of driving and driven shafts, clutches, chains and 
sprockets, and belts and pulleys. Electrical transmission used 
in newer rigs transmits the power to motors at the work points.
Exposures to hazards in the above activities occur during 
maintenance, fueling, and lubricating. Other hazards include 
high voltage, chemical bums or irritations, fires and explo­
sions, and noise.
3.1.2.2. Hoisting the Drill String
The primary functions of a hoisting apparatus are to raise 
and lower the drill string components during tripping and drill- 
stern lengthening, and to support the drill string at the de­
sired bit weight during drilling. It consists of the draw- 
works, the crown block, the traveling block, the anchor and 
reel, and the wire ropes, as illustrated in Figure 9. The draw- 
works is essentially a rotating spool located on the drill 
deck, which is controlled by a clutch and brake system operated
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Figure 9: Rotary Rig Hoisting System.
Source: Petroleum Extension
Service,1980.
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by the driller. The wire-rope drill line runs from the draw- 
works to the crown block at the top of the derrick and then 
to the traveling block and hook, which is attached to the drill 
string. The deadline anchor, located on the derrick substructure, 
serves as an adjustable terminal anchor point for the wire rope.
Exposure to hazards associated with hoisting should be 
slight unless structural defects or system overloading occurs. 
However, there are risks of falls, pinched fingers, and in­
jury from wire rope splinters when inspecting the elevated 
hoist mechanisms.
3.1.2.3. Rotating the Drill String.
The drill string consists of 30-foot sections of drill 
pipes, male and female-threaded, that weigh between 14-18 
pounds per foot. Several heavy thick-walled joints of pipe, 
called drill collars, are "made up" (see glossary) in the drill 
stem, just above the bit so that the bit will penetrate the 
formation being drilled. A single drill collar can weigh be­
tween 2,500 and 4,000 pounds. The rotary rig provides free 
vertical motion as well as rotation of the drill string so 
that the bit can penetrate the earth. To rotate the drill 
string, the power source is connected to the rotary table; 
torque is then transmitted from this rotary table to the drill 
by the kelly, which also conveys the drilling mud that is 
pumped into it through the swivel (see diagram in Figure 8).
The kelly is a 40-foot long conduit (four - six sides) that
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threads into the drill pipe and is connected to the hoist trav­
eling block by the swivel. The swivel supports the buoyed 
weight of the drill string while allowing the kelly to rotate 
and allowing pressurized drilling fluid to enter the drill 
stem. The kelly is rotated by the kelly bushing which trans­
fers rotational force without impeding the continuous downward 
movement of the kelly. During operations such as tripping, 
the kelly bushing must be easily removable to permit the drill 
pipe to be withdrawn from the well. When the kelly is hoisted 
and stored in the rathole during a trip, the kelly bushing is 
removed as an integral part of the kelly assembly. To facil­
itate this maneuver, the kelly bushing sits inside a four or 
six-sided master bushing that is a fixed portion of the rotary 
table. The rotary table turns at rates of 25-100 r.p.m. and 
the driller operates the rotary table clutch controls and 
hoist controls from the same station.
Exposure to the rotating parts of this system may create 
hazards such as slips, falls, bruising injuries, and there is 
a chance of being caught between stationary and rotating parts
3.1.2.4. Circulating System.
Drilling fluid or "mud" is typically a mixture of water 
and bentonite (an absorbent, gel-forming clay) and sometimes 
oil and other components. Presently, chemical as well as 
biopolymers are also used as drilling fluids (APT, 1969). It 
has four primary functions: (i) cooling, lubricating, and
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cleaning the bit; (ii) removing cuttings; (iii) providing 
hydrostatic pressure to support the well wall until casing is 
inserted; and (iv) reducing the risk of hazardous blowouts. 
This circulating fluid system, as illustrated in Figure 10, 
consists of pumps, a standpipe, a swivel, a mud return line, 
a shale shaker, mud pits and a mud mixing hopper. The mud 
pumps force the mud up the standpipe and through the flexible 
kelly hose to the swivel, where it enters the drill string via 
the kelly and eventually emerges at the bit in the well bore. 
Continuous pressure forces the mud up the well annulus and out 
the mud return pipe, where larger cuttings are screened at the 
shale shaker and then processed through a series of desanders 
and desilters prior to recycling.
Mixing the mud exposes workers to airborne respirable 
dust and chemical splashes. Mechanically stirred tanks re­
quire guarding and effective lockout procedures during main­
tenance operations. Walking surfaces nearby may be slippery 
especially in wet or icy weather. Pressure surges which cause 
line ruptures are also occasional hazards.
3.1.2.5. Material Handling During Drilling Operations.
Material handling equipment that is unique to the oil­
field consists of devices used in the working routines of 
raising and lowering the drill string, adding new sections of 
drill pipe, and tripping. This equipment and its operation 
are described in the operation of adding a joint to the drill
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Treatment on a Rotary Rig. Source: 
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string and tripping.
3.1.2.5.1. Adding a Joint to the Drill String
A joint is stored in the mousehole until extension of the 
length of the drill string is needed. It is hoisted from hor­
izontal pipe storage racks located at ground level to the drill 
floor, after which it is lowered into the mousehole. When the 
kelly is at the level of the kelly bushing, extension of the 
drill string is required. The rotary table and mud circulating 
pumps are stopped. The driller raises the drill stem until 
the bottom of the kelly-pipe joint connection is about two feet 
above the level of the rotary table. A set of "slips" is 
wedged into the space between the master bushing and the drill 
stem to maintain the drill pipe position. A large pair of 
tongs is then used to "break out" the torqued kelly-pipe joint 
connection. Once the tongs are clamped above and below the 
connection, mechanical force is applied to the handle of the 
tongs by a tong pull line originating from a mechanical cathead 
located on the drawworks. When the connection has been loos­
ened, the joints are "spun out." To spin out the pipe from 
the kelly, the tool joint is "broken" by the use of tongs, 
and the pipe is then spun out with the rotary table.
Once disengaged, the lower end of the kelly, suspended by 
the hoist, is pushed or pulled by the floorhands until it is 
centered over the pipe joint which has been temporarily stored 
in the mousehole. The kelly then, is "stabbed" into the pipe
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joint, spun up, and tong tightened. Next, the driller 
engages the drawworks and raises the kelly and pipe-joint 
assembly, which in turn is stabbed into the stem that is held 
by the slips. This connection is then spun up and tong 
tightened. The slips are then removed, the mud pumps and 
rotary table are reactivated, and the drilling operation pro­
ceeds .
3.1.2.5.2. Tripping
Tripping is a procedure that is performed to inspect a 
well bore and make the necessary bit changes. The entire drill 
string must be removed from the hole and later returned if the 
drilling is to proceed.
During a "round trip" (cycle of removal and replacement), 
the kelly is disconnected and stored in the "rathole." Ele­
vators , a set of clamps affixed to the bails on the swivel 
below the traveling block, are used to raise the drill string 
from the hole. Pipe tongs and the rotary table are used to 
disconnect the stands (90 feet of drill pipe) as one unit.
The derrickman, using a fall-arresting derrick climber, climbs 
the derrick and works from the monkey board, located at 90 
feet above the rig floor. His task is to coordinate the place­
ment of the stands between the fingers of the "finger board" 
for temporary storage during the trip and to disconnect the 
drill pipe from the elevators.
Once the bit has been removed from the hole, it is in-
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spected for wear and replaced as necessary. If the well drill­
ing operation is to continue, the above sequence is reversed, 
completing the round trip.
Workers are directly involved in moving equipment, while 
they also have to perform tasks that require substantial ex­
ertion and good coordination between individuals. Transfer­
ring drill pipe from the rack to the platform or mishandling 
suspended loads may result in crushing injuries. Handling of 
tongs requires well-coordinated efforts and proper body-1imb 
placement. Mistakes in "hands-on" spinning chain operations 
can lead to entanglement resulting in crushing, amputation, 
and death. Lifting and moving heavy items while standing on 
wet surfaces may lead to slips, falls, and overexertion. Eyes 
are at risk because of material falling off the drill pipe. 
Hazards in these operations can be increased if the drilling 
crew has not worked together very long, since teamwork is 
necessary to carry out these operations effectively and safely.
From the above descriptions, several conclusions can be 
made: (i) hazards associated with drilling operations are
numerous, ranging in severity from minor bruises 
to death,
(ii) drilling operations require good teamwork among 
workers,
(iii) mechanical errors could occur, but their proba­
bility is low.
The above facts support the relevancy of the use of the manage-
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ment causation models as a basis for the proposed MIS because 
it will provide the "people" approach in the prevention of ac­
cidents (see page 23).
3.2. Goals and Output of the MIS
3.2.1. Goals of the MIS
As was discussed in Chapter 2, a better accident prevent­
ion model is needed for high-hazard industries; the required 
model should have the following qualities:
(1) It should be based on the system and the management 
causation models.
(2) It should be motivated by the total accident costs 
as well as the legal requirements.
(3) It should be able to determine priorities for 
prevention.
(4) It should be applicable to oil-well drilling, one 
of the high-hazard industries.
(5) It should be able to convert data into meaningful 
and timely information to support decisions and
to involve managers in accident prevention activities
Other criteria should now be added in accordance with the 
previous discussion of the oil-well drilling operation:
(1) The MIS should be flexible enough so that informa­
tion can be presented to different organizational 
levels.
(2) The MIS should also be able to adapt to advancements
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in safety technology, i.e., updating or replacing 
the outdated technology should be made possible.
Thus, the goals of the development of the MIS are basi­
cally to set up communication channels in the organization 
and to convey information between people. The information 
transferred should become knowledge so that it can be used to 
support decision-making and to initiate, coordinate, and con­
trol activities (Methlie, 1978). Knowledge is defined as 
information existing in a human mind; additional knowledge 
can be obtained only if the information received can be re­
lated to the existing knowledge (Mehtlie, 1978). A general 
model of a communication process with its basic control ele­
ments is illustrated in Figure 11. It shows how knowledge is 
being accumulated as a result of learning by direct observa­
tions of the real world (accidents/hazards) and by communi­
cation using data. Whether a communicated message will convey 
information to the receiver depends very much on the receiver * s 
knowledge, beliefs, and expectations prior to the communication. 
Thus, reports for managers should be designed in such a way 
that the information contained will be received and become 
knowledge to aid managers in making decisions and coordinating 
activities. This general communication model explains why 
accident data needs to be converted into other parameters 
(costs, management errors, risk scores, cost-effectiveness) 
which can be related to the managers' previous knowledge.
For the purposes of this dissertation, the scope of the
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Figure 11 : MIS as a General Communication Process Model
o
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communication process model has been narrowed down, empha­
sizing the decision subsystem, which is the "interpretation" 
part of the receiver's subsystem of the communication process 
model. The MIS should convert accident data into other pa­
rameters which are useful and familiar to the receivers (manag­
ers). Thus, the components of the communication process mod­
el are simplified while still maintaining the basic elements 
of a system, i.e., the input, the processor, and the output, 
as illustrated in Figure 12.
<— Input Processor-
Decision
Models
Decisions
Actions
Reports &
Messages
Hazard & 
Accident 
Investiga­
tions
■ X ^ O u t p u t  ■
Figure 12; Main Components of the MIS to be 
Developed
3.2.2. Output of the MIS
The output of the MIS will be listed and/or discussed so 
that the decision models required in the processor element of 
the model can be identified. The output will be divided into 
two groups:
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(1) Output for motivation purposes.
(2) Output for managers' involvement to eliminate the
underlying causes of accidents.
3.2.2.1. Output for Motivation
The output for the purposes of managers' motivation is 
limited to only one, namely, motivation that is associated with 
the total accident cost; the legal requirements already in ef­
fect do not need to be discussed, but will be directly used 
in the assessment of safety problems. Their discussion will 
be included under the input of the system. It is then expected
that the MIS prepares the total accident cost reports and
includes them in the existing monthly cost reports for several 
reasons :
(1) Monthly costs reports are the single most valuable 
resource for the managers who are trying to predict 
whether the job will make money and how they can 
control costs to insure that it does. As total ac­
cident cost reports reveal losses due to accidents, 
they should be included in the calculation of pro­
fits. The traditional cost accounting however, 
charges a project manager for expenditure to pre­
vent accidents, but does not charge him if an acci­
dent should occur; this practice implies that the 
present cost accounting system does not encourage 
safety activities (Robinson, 1979). The existence
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of these total accident cost reports, however, re­
verses this condition and will, in turn, force manag­
ers to prevent accidents.
(2) Total accident costs also show the magnitude of loss­
es due to accidents by projects on a monthly basis 
as well as the monthly total for the company. The 
magnitude of these total accident costs for the oil- 
well drilling industry can be expected to be sig­
nificant as is the case in the construction industry, 
which is in the same high-hazard classification.
The significant magnitude of the total accident costs 
and the above accident cost accounting will create 
a situation that will motivate managers to prevent 
accidents.
Based on the above discussion the reports should then be 
expressed by rigs, superintendents, and month, as shown in 
Figure 13. The total costs are expressed in man-hours to make 
these numbers comparable among superintendents and rigs over 
a period time and in different geographic areas. The super­
intendents, and toolpushers are identified by code numbers 
(l...k, and l...n). These monthly total accident cost reports, 
as presented in Figure 13, are also useful for several reasons 
other than motivation (see Chapter 2, p. 30). Because of the 
aforementioned benefits, these reports should be conveyed to 
all levels of management.
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XYZ Drilling CO., Total Accident Cost Report in Man-hours
by Month, 19— .
Superintendent # Rig # Jan. Feb. ... Dec. Total
1
1
2
3
2
4
5
6
k n
Total —— — . . .  — —
Figure 13: Monthly Total Accident Cost Report
3.2.2.2. Output for Managers' Involvement in Safety
Once managers are motivated to prevent accidents, the MIS 
should be able to involve them in the real safety activities 
by providing them with other reports. These reports will be 
grouped in two ways, based on the following activities:
(1) Analysis of underlying causes of accidents which 
will involve all three levels of management.
(2) Priority determination and alternative selection 
for correction will be addressed to the management
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group (the policy and strategy developers) only.
3.2.2.2.1. Analysis of the Underlying Causes of Accidents
In this model, the underlying causes of accidents are 
considered to be poor management practices; hence, cause a- 
nalysis becomes the business of all levels of management.
The management group which determines safety policies in a 
company should also monitor how these policies are being en­
forced so that they can take the necessary actions to improve 
them. The superintendents and the toolpushers who enforce and 
implement these safety policies should also get feedback on 
their own and their workers' performance so that they can also 
sustain the effectiveness of management control. Thus, con­
tinuous causation analysis can reduce the underlying causes 
of accidents.
To be able to provide meaningful information to each le­
vel of management, the reports should contain information which 
is of interest to the managers. These reports should be dis­
tributed monthly so that enough cases have accumulated to make 
the reports significant. The above causation reports can only 
be prepared if accident cases and their respective underlying 
causes are available. These underlying causes can only be re­
vealed if accidents are being investigated with the use of the 
"4x4 investigation technique" (see Chapter 2). Since it is 
the toolpusher's duty to investigate accidents, this MIS re­
quires that special training in the above technique be given
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to toolpushers and the supervising safety experts.
Reports directed to the management group contain overall 
accident causations listed by superintendents and have a for­
mat similar to the one shown in Figure 14.
To : The Management Group
From : Safety Department
Subject; Accident cause analysis 
Period : January, 1983
Superintendent # Underlying causes at Levels of Correction
1
2
M M -S M -S -W M -W S s -w W
1 3 -4 0 -0 -0 1 -1 3 1 -1 2
0 0 -2 0 -0 -0 1 -3 1 2 -2 3
k
Total
"M" stands for only a management influence
"M-S" stands for the existance of a management and a
supervisor influences 
"M-S-W" stands for a management influence, a supervisor in­
fluence, and a worker influence 
"M-W" stands for a management influence, and a worker 
influence
"S" stands for only a supervisor influence
”S-W" stands for a supervisor influence and a worker in­
fluence
”W" stands for only a worker influence
Figure 14: Accident Causation Report
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The word "management*' in Figure 14 refers to the operat­
ing manager (superintendents) and "supervisor" to the tool­
pushers. The arabic numerals following "M" / "S" / "W", 
refer to the total corrective steps that should be taken at 
that particular level.
By examining these reports, the management group can 
assess the safety performance of the superintendents. For 
instance, in Figure 14, Superintendent 1 has to take a total of 
five corrective actions at his level while Superintendent 2 
is responsible for only one for the same month. The manage­
ment group, therefore, may want to know the reasons for these 
kinds of differences and may want to start an investigation 
and ask for more detailed information. The system is able to 
provide the required information; it is, in fact, the same 
information that will be distributed to the superintendents, 
as shown in Figure 15. If Superintendent 1 proves to be in­
consistent in safety enforcement most of the time; the manage­
ment group will know what measures to take to prevent further 
similar accidents from occurring.
Reports that will be addressed to the superintendents 
will use the same general format as those directed to the 
management group, except that they are more detailed; the re­
ports are made based on toolpushers and case numbers (see 
Figure 15). The arabic numerals following "M" / "S" / "W" 
refer to the corrective steps to be taken at the respective 
organizational levels.
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To : Superintendent #1
From : The Safety Department
Subject: Accident cause analysis 
Period : January, 1983
Case # M M - S  M - S - W
83 1 01 M4 0 -0 0 -0 -0
83 1 02 0 0 - 0  0 - 0  -0
at Level s of Correction
M -W S S -W W
0 -0 0 0 -0 0
0 -0 0 S3-W4 0
n
Total 1
Toolpusher #2 Underlying Causes at Levels of Correction
Toolpusher #3
To : Superintendent #2 ...p
Figure 15: Accident Causation Report for Superintendents
The superintendents can perform the same analysis as the manage- 
group, in respect to the toolpushers. In addition, the super­
intendents can use these reports as feedback about their own 
performance so that they can recognize their own weaknesses 
in the implementation of safety policies and make improvements 
accordingly. For the superintendents, these reports also
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summarize the previous individual reports they receive rou­
tinely after the completion of any accident investigation.
Reports made for the toolpushers will have a format and 
notations similar to those reports intended for the super­
intendents, except that they are based on case numbers and 
only those corrections/underlying causes at their levels and 
at the workers' level will be printed. An example of this 
report is shown in Figure 16.
To : Toolpusher #1  k
From : Safety Department
Subject : Accident Causation Analysis
Period : January 1983
Case # Underlying Causes at Levels of Correction
M ................ S S - W
83 109 0   S3 0 - 0
83 113 0   0 S3- W4
n
Total . . .
Figure 16: Accident Causation Report for Toolpushers
For the toolpushers, as for the superintendents, these reports 
are also summaries of the individual reports they receive rou­
tinely after the completion of any accident investigation. 
Based on the above reports, the toolpushers can do at least 
two things:
(1) They can evaluate the safety performance of the 
workers under their supervision, find the most 
troublesome causes existing among their workers, 
and try to eliminate their causes.
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(2) They can use these reports as feedback; e.g., to
determine which corrective steps at their level are 
required for all accident cases for that particular 
month and how to improve themselves accordingly.
3.2.2.2.2. Priority Determination and Alternative Selection 
for Correction
Accidents and hazards can happen anytime and anywhere 
within an organization. It has been also pointed out before 
that both frequency and severity of accidents are important 
in respect to cost reduction. It is therefore necessary to 
determine which underlying cause of accidents has a correc­
tion priority. An accident cause is said to have a correc­
tion priority when the consequences (severity) are great and/ 
or the probability that similar accidents will occur is high 
(frequency of exposure to cause and frequency of occurrence). 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, priorities can be expressed 
as risk scores.
Once the priorities have been determined, the alterna­
tives for correction can be determined and assessed so that 
the best alternative can be chosen and implemented. Priority 
determination and alternative assessment can be considered as 
activities that transform data into useful information to 
support decisions and to develop prevention strategy. Hence, 
this information should rightfully be addressed to the manage­
ment group periodically. The time period could be quarterly, 
semi-annualy, or yearly, depending on the frequency of acci-
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dents occurring within the company. For the oil-well drill­
ing industry, with an incidence of about 50 cases per month, 
a bimonthly or quarterly evaluation is recommended in the 
beginning.
To make the report significant, the risk scores should be 
presented by rig numbers so that management's attention can be 
drawn to some particular rigs only. Presentation by rig num­
ber is especially useful because priority determination is 
actually a process that evaluates which of the underlying 
causes or poor management practices should be corrected first. 
These corrections take place at the rig level being the 
smallest operational unit. Although similar accidents may 
occur in the non-prioritized rigs, priority is only assigned 
to rigs having accummulated high risk scores unacceptable . to 
the management group. These risk scores represent predicted 
long-term losses of the present management's performance in 
safety; they consist of risk scores assigned to accidents and 
hazards. The output of the system should contain a ranked list 
of rig numbers based on their respective risk scores, as shown 
in Figure 17. The rigs having priorities for corrections are 
those rigs ranked as number one to ten or one to five, de­
pending on the magnitude of the risk scores within a certain 
period of time.
To be able to reveal the causes of the high risk scores 
in a priority rig, further refinement of information becomes 
necessary. The causes should be known so that correction al-
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To : The Management Group
From : The Safety Department
Subject: Priorities by Rigs 
Period : January 1983
Priority Rank Rig Number Risk Scores
1 9 5800
2
n
Figure 17 : Priority Rank by Rig Number
ternatives to eliminate the underlying causes can be specified. 
The refinement of the information should be based on both the 
worker and the task variables. These two variables are chosen 
for several reasons:
(i) They are essentially the two groups into which the 
direct causes of accidents (the unsafe acts and con­
ditions) are classified.
(ii) The underlying causes can only be found by going
through the direct causes, as postulated by the ac­
cident sequence.
(iii) The direct causes of accidents are many, so they 
need to be grouped to make them manageable to the 
MIS.
(iv) The task is chosen as a basis for grouping the un­
safe conditions because a task is the smallest unit 
of work that is still considered meaningful from the
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management's point of view (Methlie, 1978).
Hence, the direct causes of accidents can be categorized by 
task. The other category for refinement of the information 
is chosen based on the worker so that personal influences in 
the causation of accidents can be accomodated. As was dis­
cussed in Chapter 2, studies using the human factor models 
are not applicable to the oil-well drilling industry. However, 
Siskind (1982) found that there is a link between work injury 
and job experience. He found that workers are more likely to 
experience injury during their first few months on the job 
than after longer periods, irrespective of age and skill.
These findings are very interesting because other researchers 
(Surry, 1974; Simonds and Grimaldi, 1956) are of the opinion 
that younger individuals are more apt to get injured than are 
the older workers. Siskind however, found that if the older 
and the younger age groups are compared based on the same 
length of employment, the older workers eventually experience 
more injury than the younger workers. Based on the above 
findings, the output of the information refinement will be 
categorized by task and length of employment which represent 
unsafe conditions and acts respectively. To accomodate the 
risk scores caused by hazards identified in that rig, a column 
will be provided in the output to show the risk scores caused 
by them. The report will have a format like shown in Figure 
18. From this report, the manager can find the most hazardous 
task and length of employment in a particular rig.
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To : The Management Group
From : The Safety Department
Subject: Priority Rig by Task, Length of Employment, and Hazards 
For Priority Rig #9
Risk Scores By Tasks and Length of Employment 
Task # Length of Employment Category Hazards
1 . . m
2
3
n
Figure 18: Priority Rig By Task, Length of Employment
and Hazards
If a report, like that shown in Figure 18, shows that the 
risk scores caused by hazards are significant, the management 
group should enforce the MOP (Maintenance Control Program) to 
decrease accident rates. If on the other hand the hazards do 
not constitute a significant problem, the most dangerous task 
and length of employment should be identified. The information 
can now be further refined for that particular task and length 
of employment to disclose the underlying causes. Hence, two 
steps of refinement procedure are necessary to reveal the 
underlying causes of accidents. This last step elaborates
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the task and employment category by case numbers, unsafe acts, 
unsafe conditions, and underlying causes. An example of the 
report can be seen in Figure 19. The cases are numbered by 
year, month, and frequency number within that month. Unsafe 
acts and unsafe conditions are coded by the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI) classification (1969); they are in­
cluded in Figure 19 for the purpose of providing insights for 
supportive actions in cases where the underlying causes cannot 
be eliminated completely. For this purpose, the management 
group should be supplied with information to decode them. The 
man-hours lost are also included for the purpose of showing 
that not only severity, but also frequency of accidents are 
included in the determination of priorities.
For Priority Rig # X 
For Task # Y
Length of Employment Category Z
Case# Unsafe Unsafe Underlying Man-hours
Act Code# Cond. Code# Causes Lost
1 300 100 M4W3 580
n
Figure 19: Priority Rig, Task, and Employment Category
by Case Numbers
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Analysis of this report by the management group should 
lead to the enumeration of alternatives for correction. For 
instance, if a report shows information for Length of Em­
ployment Category 1, and the underlying causes point to a need 
for better enforcement, training, and motivation, then the al­
ternatives for correction should be as follows:
(1) Enforce and motivate.
(2) Train the new employees.
(3) Combination of (1) and (2).
The next step is to assess the alternatives using the 
economic justification factor. Once the alternatives have 
been identified, the MIS should be able to produce another re­
port showing the economic justification factor for each alter­
native. For this purpose, the system will need some other in­
put from the management group and the safety experts concern­
ing the degree of correction and the cost factor for each al­
ternative. The resulting report will be similar to the il­
lustration in Figure 20.
Based on this type of report, the management group can 
decide on the best alternative and its corrective actions.
The management group, together with their safety experts, 
should then make a plan to implement the chosen course of ac­
tion. Messages containing information about the newly devel­
oped strategy for safety should also be distributed to the 
superintendents and toolpushers of that particular rig.
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For Priority Rig #X
For Priority Task #Y
For Employment Category #Z
There are three correction alternatives:
1. Enforce and motivate
2. Train new employees
3. Combination of (1) and (2)
Alternative # Degree of Correction Cost Factor "J" Factor
1 a
2 _ b
3 _ _ c
For J : , Consequence will be reduced b y  man-hours
For J:---JConsequence will be reduced b y  man-hours
For J:---,Consequence will be reduced b y  man-hours
Figure 20: Report for Alternative Assessment
In summary, the output of the MIS will be in the form of 
the following reports:
(1) The monthly total accident cost in man-hours, by 
superintendents and rigs, and by month, addressed 
to all levels of management (see Figure 13).
(2) The monthly accident causation report by super­
intendents, addressed to the management group (see 
Figure 14).
(3) The monthly accident causation report by toolpushers 
and by case numbers, directed toward the super­
intendents (see Figure 15).
(4) The monthly accident causation report by case num-
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bers, addressed to the toolpushers (see Figure 16).
(5) The priority rank of rigs, directed to the manage­
ment group (see Figure 17).
(6) The priority rig by task and length of employment, 
directed to the management group (see Figure 18).
(7) The priority rig, task, and employment category by 
case numbers, addressed to the management group (see 
Figure 19).
(8) The report for alternative assessment, addressed to 
the management group (see Figure 20).
3.3. Processor of the MIS
The processor of the MIS is that component which contains 
the decision models. A decision model can be defined as a mod­
el that processes data into information necessary to support 
decisions. Therefore, the type of the decision model is 
practically defined by the type of output required from the 
models, however, a brief review of decision and the decision­
making process will be presented to show how this decision­
making process will affect the requirements placed on the MIS.
Decision-making, one of the key roles of management 
(Radford, 1973), is a process whereby a specific course of 
action is selected among a set of alternative actions. Subse­
quently, action is the process by which changes can take place. 
Although decision-making processes usually differ with the 
nature of the problem, the situation, and the individual deci-
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sion maker, there are usually five steps in the decision proc­
ess: (1) defining the problem; (2) analyzing the problem;
(3) developing alternative solutions; (4) deciding on the best 
solution; and (5) converting the decision into a plan of ef­
fective action (Horton Jr., 1972). A general model of the 
decision-making process with its elements is shown in Figure 
21. This model shows that the nature of the problem may in­
fluence whether or not a decision maker moves through the proc­
ess slowly or quickly. If the problem is perceived as routine 
(by experience), the decision maker may go immediately to the 
selection of the best alternative solution. If the problem 
is familiar, little time is needed for its definition. If 
the problem is well-defined, the search for an alternative
Recognition of Problem or Opportunity
Definition of Problem
Search for Alternatives 
A
Human 
Cognitive 
Patterns
Past Experiences
Constraints
Limiting Factors
Psychological
Factors
Goals and _
Objectives
Information
Feelings and 
Sentiments
Evaluation of Alternativesn
Selection of "Best” Alternative Solution
Figure 21: Elements of Decision-Making Process.
Source: Wm E. Souder, 1980, pl3.
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solution may be brief. If the relative effectiveness of the 
alternatives are known, very little time may be spent in ana­
lyzing and evaluating the alternatives and choosing the best 
one. If the decision has been predetermined, the decision 
maker may skip the problem definition and the search for al­
ternatives. In a predetermined decision there are finite num­
bers of alternatives with known effectiveness, and the deci­
sion maker must match up the appropriate alternatives with 
the problem. If the problem is complex and poorly understood, 
the decision may be quite lengthy and deliberative.
In this MIS, the.routine problems are handled by the 
Maintenance Control Program (MOP), which has a definite for­
mat for work procedure:
Identify Problem--------►Solution Determined
------> Work Scheduled-------- >Agency Assigned Task
------ ► Activities Monitored ►Records Maintained
Hazards Assessed.
The processor of the MIS will aid management with the decision 
processes concerning complex and poorly-understood safety prob­
lems only. The MIS will aid management in defining problems, 
in providing information to enhance analysis, in calculating 
the relative effectiveness of each alternative, and in moni­
toring the implemented course of action. The decision-making 
process will require the participation of the managers. The 
MIS will provide as much relevant information as possible, 
but eventually the decisions will be made by the managers
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using their value judgements.
As was specified in the output element of the MIS, the 
decision models consist of two parts;
(1) Decision models that will process data into informa­
tion for the motivation of managers.
(2) Decision models that will process data into informa­
tion for the involvement of managers in safety acti­
vities .
3.3.1. Decision Model for the Motivation of Managers
The output required to motivate managers is a report that 
contains the total accident costs by superintendents, by rigs, 
and by month; the total costs are expressed as man-hours lost, 
as shown in Figure 13. As was discussed previously, this re­
port should be produced on a monthly basis, i.e., the total 
costs of all accidents occurring in a month should be reported 
at the beginning of the next month. The only model that is 
suitable to process accident data into total accident costs in 
a timely manner is the model developed by Robinson (1979) dis­
cussed in Chapter 2. The Robinson model however, was developed 
for the construction industry; it may or may not be applicable 
to the oil-well drilling industry. Also, the Robinson model 
used a ratio of 2 between the direct and indirect costs of ac­
cidents. If an industry adopts the Robinson model and the 
magnitude of the total costs is not significant, this conser­
vative ratio between the direct and the indirect costs may
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help explain the phenomena. Each type of industry, like the 
oil-well drilling industry, could actually develop such a mod­
el by using the methods described by Robinson, but it may take 
quite some time to do so. For the purpose of this dissertation, 
the Robinson model will therefore be adopted with notations 
mentioned.
To be able to produce the required report, accidents oc­
curring within one month are filed and processed by the Robinson 
model. As described in Appendix A, the process of total costs 
determination is very simple, but if many accidents occur in 
a month, processing by computer is preferred for two reasons :
(1) to prevent mistakes and (2) to reduce costs and time, es­
pecially since the reports will become a part of the monthly 
routine.
3.3.2. Decision Models for the Involvement of Managers in 
Safétÿ.------------------  -------------------------
Manager involvement in safety can be divided into two 
activities :
(1) The involvement in accident causation analysis.
(2) The involvement in priority determination and 
alternative assessment.
3.3.2.1. Accident Causation Analysis
The output required for the analysis of accident causa­
tions are reports illustrated in Figures 15, 16, and 17. To 
be able to present the above output, the processor component
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only has to arrange the input into the mentioned format; thus, 
there is no decision model needed for this activity. It is 
only necessary to feed relevant input into the processor. The 
technique used to collect this information is the 4x4 Problem- 
Solving Technique, which was discussed in Chapter 2 and will 
be referred to again under the input of this MIS. The appli­
cation of the above technique in each accident investigation 
will reveal the underlying causes of accidents and the cor­
rective steps to be taken at levels where correction opportu­
nities lie. These reports can be prepared easily; automation, 
however, is preferred because of the periodicity of the re­
ports, which can be prepared using the same program.
3.3.2.2. Priority Determination and Alternative Selection
Priority determination and alternative selection consists 
of four steps:
(1) Priority determination by rigs.
(2) Refinement of information by tasks, employment 
category, and hazards for each priority rig.
(3) Refinement of information by case numbers for each 
priority rig, task, and length of employment cate­
gory.
(4) Alternative selection.
3.3.2.2.1. Priority Determination by Rigs
As was discussed previously, it is preferable that priori­
ties be determined by the three following variables: (1) the
94
severity or consequences (C) of the accidents, (2) the proba­
bility (P) that similar accidents will occur in the future, and
(3) the frequency of exposure (E) to that particular cause of 
accidents. The model that determines priorities by these three 
variables is the Fine model (see Chapter 2). In this model, 
the priorities are expressed as risk scores (RS), whereby 
RS = C X P X E. The values for C, P, and E are determined by 
rating procedures, so the participation of experts is required 
to exercise value judgements. Hence, it is a subjective pro­
cedure; a more objective way, however, is available and will 
be discussed in the following sections.
An objective way to express the consequences of accidents 
is in terms of their total costs. The calculation of these 
total accident costs were previously performed for the moti­
vation of managers to prevent accidents. It is therefore ad­
vantageous if the same method is also used to express the con­
sequences of accidents so that one process can serve two pur­
poses.
The values for the probabilities (P) can also be deter­
mined objectively by using past accident experiences as shown 
in the accident records. For each type of accident, its pro­
bability (Pi) can be defined as follows:
fi
Pi =
N
where Pi = the probability that similar accidents will occur, 
resulting in the same consequences and having the 
same etiology.
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fi - the frequency of similar accidents occurring with­
in a period of time (one-two years),
N = the total number of accidents occurring within 
the same period of time.
The values for the frequency of exposure to the same 
etiology (E^) can also be derived objectively by using the 
past accident data.
The values of C, P, and E, as determined by the methods 
suggested above, are more realistic and relevant to the indi­
vidual company compared to the values obtained by value judge­
ments. Also, these values of C, F, and E will change over 
time; hence, their periodic assessment is necessary. Thus, 
having a model that will do all the necessary work periodi­
cally is very useful to the company. The decision model for
priority determination will use the above methods to obtain 
the values for C, P, and E.
Once the values for C, P, and E are obtained, the risk
scores for each accident can be calculated:
RSi = Ci X Pi X Ei
where RSi = risk scores for a particular accident.
Ci = consequences of that particular accident.
Pi = probability that similar accidents will occur 
resulting in the same consequences and having 
the same etiology, for the accident under con­
sideration,
Ej^ = frequency of exposure to the same direct causes.
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The risk scores for hazards can also be determined in 
the same way with the use of past accident data. For this 
method of calculation, hazards, as is also the case with acci­
dent causes, should be classified by tasks; the risk scores 
assigned to a hazard identified in a task category equals the 
average risk score value (ARS^^) :
RS i
ARS^i = ------ — ------
where ARS^^ = RS assigned to a hazard identified in task tj^,
RS_. = the sum of the risk scores of accidents 
occurring in task t^ ,^
N . = the total number of accidents occurring in
task
This method of risk score estimation for hazards is realistic 
because it is based on the actual accident data of the indivi­
dual company. Also, as accident rates change over a period of 
time, these risk scores can be adjusted using the same method. 
Figure 22 is an example of a chart which contains the average 
risk score values for each hazard in a task which is to be 
used as a reference.
To present the priorities by rig, two further steps are 
necessary:
(1) The step which adds up all RS^ occurring in each rig 
for all rigs.
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Task #
Rig# 1 . . .  m
1 ARS^^ . . .  .
n
Figure 22: Average^Risk Score for Hazard by Task
and by Rig ^
(2) The step that ranks the rigs based on their total
risk scores and prints out the report.
3.3.2.2.2. Refinement of Priority Rigs by Task and Length 
of Employment Category
Once the rigs are ranked according to their magnitude of 
risk scores, the "top ten" or the "top five" priority rigs 
will be presented in terms of tasks and length of employment 
category. The "top ten" or "top five" policy is taken in 
accordance with the rule of thumb suggested in the concept of 
management-by-exception (Radford, 1975). In the long run, 
however, as experiences accumulate, the management group will 
be able to decide what magnitude of risk scores is acceptable 
to the company for a certain time period. This ability to
assess the acceptability of risk scores for the company will
lead to a smoother operation of the MIS; i.e., a periodic
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guideline for the refinement of priority rigs by task and 
length of employment has been set.
The process of information refinement itself is very 
simple because it is a matter of presentation, but its repeti­
tiveness is very time-consuming. It is therefore preferable 
to have the process automated. A sample report is shown in the 
previous Figure 18.
3.3.2.2.3. Refinement of Priority Rig, Task, and Length of 
Employment Category by Case Numbers'
The report presenting priority rigs by task and length of 
employment category reveals the most dangerous tasks and 
employment category for the particular rig. Once these tasks 
and employment categories are identified, their refinement 
into case numbers is a matter of presentation. Again, because 
of its repetitiveness, automation is preferable. A sample 
report is presented in Figure 19.
3.3.2.2.4. Alternative Assessment
The refinement of information about the priority rig, task, 
and employment category into case numbers is meant to reveal 
the underlying causes of accidents. The resulting report should 
help the management group and the safety experts in the enum­
eration of alternatives for correction. Also for each alter­
native, values for their effectiveness (degree of correction) 
and cost of correction (cost factor) should be estimated. The 
information on alternatives, with their associated degree of
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correction and cost factor, should be fed back into the system 
so that the economic justification factor (J) for each alter­
native can be determined. As was discussed in Chapter 2, this 
"J" factor is calculated in the following way:
y _______RS
DC X CF
where J = the economic justification factor,
RS = the risk score,
DC = the degree of correction,
CF = the cost factor.
Since these "J" factors are used as criteria to assess the 
existing alternatives, it is necessary that they refect rela­
tive cost effectiveness among the alternatives. One way to 
satisfy this criteria/requirement would be to rate the above 
values of DC (degree of correction) and CF (cost factor). 
Rating is a method used to assign unique numerical values to 
each variable in such a way that the differences between the 
numbers become meaningful (Souder, 1980). In a rating proce­
dure, the highest and the lowest rating values could be deter­
mined arbitrarily. Fine (1980), however, suggested the use of 
0.5 and 10 as the lowest and the highest values, respectively, 
for rating the CF; the higher the cost, the higher the rating 
value :
Cost Rating
Over $50,000 ................................... 10
$25,000 to $50,000 ............................  6
$10,000 to $25,000 ............................  4
$1,000 to $10,000 .............................  3
100
$100 to $1,000 ................................  2
$25 to $100 ...................................  1
Under $25 .....................................0.5
As for the degree of correction, Fine suggested the following
ratings which are contrary to the CF: the higher the DC, the
lower the rating values :
Description Rating
Hazards eliminated 100% ......................  1
Hazards reduced at least 75% ................. 2
Hazards reduced by 50% to 7 5 % ...............  3
Hazards reduced by 25% to 5 0 % ...............  4
Slight effect on hazard (less than 25%) ......  6
The rated values of DC and CF for each alternative are then 
used to calculate the associated "J" factor.
The process of calculating the ”J" factor and presenting 
the report for alternative assessment, as shown in Figure 20, 
is simple, but since all processes in this MIS are automated, 
it would be easier to computerize this last report as well.
In summary, the decision models contained in the proces­
sor component are as follows :
(1) The Robinson model is used to calculate the total
accident costs, which at the same time represent 
the consequences of accidents.
(2) The Fine model is modified in terms of the methods
used for obtaining the values of the probability (P),
consequences (C), and exposure (E).
3.4. Input of the MIS
The input of the MIS is that element which provides
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relevant information to the processor component. It contains 
procedures for collecting, storing, retrieving, and treating 
information (Ackoff, 1967). These procedures are the func­
tions of the data-base management subsystem of an MIS, which 
this dissertation will not address. The discussion of the in­
put component in this MIS will therefore be limited to the 
discussion of the information required by the processor only. 
The decision models contained in the processor are well de­
fined, as is the other information needed to present reports 
on accident causations. Thus, the relevant information need­
ed by the processor can also be easily identified. The dis­
cussion on this input component will be divided into two sec­
tions :
(1) The information required by the decision models.
(2) The information required for the presentation of 
accident causations.
3.4.1. Information Required by the Decision Models
Since the decision models accomodate both the prospective 
and the retrospective accident prevention activities, the dis­
cussion on the information required will again be grouped into 
two parts:
(1) The information required from retrospective 
activities.
(2) The information required from prospective 
activities.
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3.4.1.1. Information Required from Retrospective Activities
Information from retrospective activities will be proc­
essed by both the Robinson and Fine models. The input re­
quired by both models can be deduced from the variables used 
in each one of them.
The Robinson model is used to calculate the consequences 
or total costs of accidents. Thus, besides the Robinson ma­
trix, the input needed by this model is the nature of injury, 
part of the body injured, and whether the injury resulted in 
lost time. The Robinson matrix can be obtained from his pub­
lication. This input can be easily obtained from both the 
OSHA 101 Form (to record accidents) or any Workers’ Compen­
sation Claim form (NIOSH, 1978; see Appendix C).
The Fine model is used to calculate the priorities and 
the relative effectiveness for each alternative for correction. 
The variables used to calculate priorities are the conse­
quences (C), the frequency of exposure (E), and the probabi­
lity (F) that similar accidents will occur. The consequences 
are already calculated with the use of the Robinson model.
The values for E and F can be obtained from the analysis of a 
one-year accident data. Once priorities are determined, the 
information will be refined by task and categories of em­
ployment; both categorizations will be discussed in the fol­
lowing sections. The relative effectiveness of alternatives 
can be calculated if input for degree of correction (DC) and
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cost factor (CF) are fed into the processor. Both values are 
obtained by value judgements exercised by the management group 
and their safety experts. Table 1 summarizes the information 
required by the decision models.
 Model description_________________Information required
Robinson model, Part of body injured
calculates total Nature of injury
accident costs. Whether injury results in
lost time 
Robinson matrix
Fine model
Priorities calculation: Consequences using Robinson
model
Exposure and probabilities 
from one-year accident data
Alternative assessment: Degree of correction
Cost factor
Both estimated by management 
group and safety experts.
Table 1: The Dacision Models and Their Required
Information
As was mentioned previously, there is a need to catego­
rize task and duration of employment. Task was previously 
defined as the smallest unit of work to be executed which still 
has meaning for the managers. In the oil-well drilling indus­
try, most of the tasks to be done require teamwork among the 
crew members (NIOSH, 1982). An observer on a well site, how­
ever, will immediately notice that even if the crew works as 
a team, each one of them has a specific task to do which would
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normally not be done by others. It might therefore be feasi­
ble to classify tasks based on the job descriptions of the crew. 
Hence, seven categories of tasks will be used in this MIS:
(1) The task of a toolpusher is to supervise the rig and 
the overall drilling operations, to direct the actual 
operations of the drilling rig and the work perform­
ed by the drilling crew, to authorize the employment 
of drillers and crewmen, and to coordinate the af­
fairs of the operating company and the drilling con­
tractor.
(2) The task of a driller is to supervise the actual 
drilling operations, to operate the drilling machin­
ery on the rig floor, and to give the actual in­
structions to the other crew members concerning work 
on the rig floor.
(3) The task of a derrickman is to work on the monkey- 
board, a small platform located up in the derrick at 
a level of the upper end of a stand of drill pipe 
(about 90 ft). During tripping, he handles the up­
per end of the stands, guiding it to and from the 
special equipment used to run pipe in and out of the 
hole. When drilling is going on, he is responsible 
for maintaining the drilling fluid and maintaining 
or repairing the pumps and other circulating equip­
ment.
(4) The task of a motorman is to keep the engines provid-
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ing the power for the drilling equipment on the rig 
in good working order. He is responsible for the 
engines, engine fuel, air compressor, water pumps, 
and accessories. He checks the lubricating oil and 
makes minor adjustments on the engines.
(5) The task of a floorman, known as the rotary helper 
or roughneck is to handle the lower end of the drill 
pipe when it is being tripped in or out of the hole, 
to handle tongs when making up or breaking out pipe, 
to maintain equipment by keeping it clean and paint­
ed, and to keep the rig in good working order.
(6) The task of a maintenance man is to keep equipment 
in good working order. He makes minor repairs on 
engines, small pumps, and various machinery on and 
around the rig (mechanic). Another maintenance man 
is the rig electrician who repairs and maintains the 
electrical generating and distribution system on the 
rig. He may make minor repairs on generators or 
electric motors, inspect and maintain the rig's elec­
trical wiring, and maintain the rig's lighting and 
other electrical appliances.
(7) The task of others not directly related to the dril­
ling operations, such as truck driving, rigging up 
and/or down.
(Baker, 1979)
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Duration of employment can be categorized based on 
Siskind's study (1982). He found that duration of employment 
rather than age is the factor that determines the frequency 
of injury incurred by workers. The results of his study show­
ed that there was a steady decline in risk as length of em­
ployment increased, as shown in Table 2.
Length of 
Employment
Percent 
Injury and 
Illness Cases* 
(1)
Distribution
All
Workers**
(2)
of
Incidence
Ratio
(l)/(2)
1 - 3 months 20.1 11.6 1.73
4 - 6 months 10.6 9.0 1.18
7 -12 months 14.4 9.8 1.47
2 - 3 years 20.9 20.7 1.01
4 - 5  years 9.9 12.3 .80
6 -10 years 12.5 15.7 .80
11 -25 years 9.9 16.0 .61
26 -35 years 1.4 3.9 .36
36 or more years .2 1.1 .18
* Data was taken from detailed injury and illnesses 
information from the Workers Compensation System, 
covering 23% of US Employment.
** Data was taken from unpublished tables for the January 
1978 Current Population Survey and relate to all workers 
age 16 and over, cover the same jurisdiction, except the 
Virgin Islands.
Table 2: Relative Injury Experience by Length of
Employment.'Source: Siskind,1982. .
Although it was not mentioned how the class-interval of em­
ployment duration was determined, it seemed that the catego­
rization was based on the prevalence of injuries incurred.
If the number of injuries were about equal, they were then
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grouped into the same class-interval. Thus far, Siskind's 
research is the only study available in the literature which 
provides employment categorizations and their associated in­
cidence ratio (see Table 2) important to this MIS for the 
normalization of the calculated risk scores. For an indivi­
dual company, where data of total workers by their respective 
length of employment is available, the incidence ratio can be 
determined specifically using the same method as shown in 
Table 2. In cases where the total workers data is not avail­
able, the Siskind ratios can be adopted because of the rela­
tively good sample (23% of US employment) used in this study.
The calculated risk scores (RS) need to be normalized 
so that the RS become comparable to each other and can be 
explained in the following way. By the categorization in 
Table 2, an injured employee who has worked for two months 
can be classified as category number one, and those already 
employed for five months when injured, fall into category two, 
etc. From Table 2 it can be seen that workers in category one 
incurred more injuries than any other workers in the rest of 
the category. In the processing of accident data, whereby 
only injury cases are used, category one employees will be 
found more often than any other category. If their risk scores 
are compared by length of employment, category one employees 
will have the highest number of risk scores. Thus, the risk 
scores are only reflecting the risk faced by the injured em-
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ployeesj which is not what was intended in this study. To show 
the risk faced by all workers in each category of employment, 
the risk scores should be normalized by multiplying them with 
their respective incidence ratios. Hence, the input collect­
ed should be appropriately categorized by the above task and 
employment category.
3.4.1.2. Information Required from Prospective Activities
Prospective accident prevention is mostly accomplished 
by performing what is known as continuous "hazards inspections" 
(NSC, 1978). This type of inspection is actually a procedure 
used to identify safety problems and are usually done by the 
toolpushers on a daily basis. If any problem is identified, 
its hazard should be assessed based on the existing standards, 
laws, and ordinances. If a safety problem is found to violate 
any of the standard or ordinance, a hazard is known to exist.
In case a hazard is identified, the MCE will be notified so 
that corrective action can be taken. These "hazards in­
spections" are routine procedures required by OSHA (Petersen,
1979). Hence, it is being performed in most companies, in­
cluding the oil-well drilling industry.
The input required by the processor from these prospective 
activities includes records containing the rig number, the date, 
the description of what constitutes a hazard, and the location 
of the hazard. From this data, the rig number, the task num­
ber, the unsafe act code number, and the respective risk
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scores for the hazard can then be assigned. The risk scores 
of these identified hazards could then be included in the proc­
ess of priority determination.
3.4.2. Information Required for the Presentation of 
Accident Causations
The processor component is also meant to present the ac­
cident causations to all levels of management, mainly to give 
feedback to their own safety performance. However, these re­
ports can also be used as basis to analyze and improve safety 
policies. This information can be collected with the use of 
4x4 problem-solving technique, the principles of which have 
been discussed in Chapter 2. The continuous use of this tech­
nique in each accident investigation will reveal the under­
lying causes of all accidents, which at the same time denote 
the corrective steps to be taken at each level in the organi­
zation. These underlying causes should then be recorded in 
addition to the form used to record accidents (see OSHA 101 
form item 13, in Appendix C). It should be noted that to be 
able to use the 4x4 Problem-Solving Technique, the toolpushers 
must have special training. Some oil-well drilling companies, 
such as the Delta Drilling Company, have been using this tech­
nique as part of the occupational injury data research project 
conducted by the Texas Safety Association (Texas Safety Assoc,
1980). However, this technique can be used as a routine ac­
cident investigation procedure to reveal the underlying causes
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of accidents.
3.5. Subsystems and Their Interrelationships
Subsystems are separate parts of a system. They perform 
some specific useful purpose, but are not by themselves of 
sufficient scope to be considered a system. Thus, a system is 
a collection of interrelated subsystems, which are unified by 
design to obtain one or more objectives (Luchsinger and Dock, 
1977). Therefore, the identification of the subsystems and 
their interrelationships will lead to the identification of 
the whole system. The procedure of identification of the 
subsystems will follow the three main components of the system, 
namely the input, the processor, and the output components.
As was mentioned before, the subsystems of this MIS will show 
"what" as well as "how" something is being done.
3.5.1. Subsystems of the Input Component
The input component should collect, store, retrieve, and 
transmit the information required by the processor. This in­
put component is basically a file containing the needed data, 
which should be easily retrieved and transmitted. There are 
two groups of information needed by the processor component:
(1) information about accidents and (2) information about haz­
ards .
Information about accidents that should be collected are 
basically included in the OSHA 101 Form or any Workers' Com­
pensation Claim forms, as shown in Appendix C. This informa-
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tion includes the date of accident, the rig number, the task 
of the injured, the date the injured started working, the na­
ture of the injury, the part of the body injured, whether the 
injury resulted in lost time, the unsafe act, and the unsafe 
condition. One other piece of information that is normally 
not recorded is the underlying cause accident, which in this 
case needs to be enclosed.
Information about hazards includes the date the hazard 
was identified, the description of the hazard, the rig number, 
and the task in which the hazard was found. This information 
is usually recorded in the hazard inspection sheet.
Thus, the input component contains three subsystems, 
namely, the hazard inspection and the accident investigation 
subsystem which investigates hazards and accidents, the re­
cords and reports subsystem, and the filing system sub­
system which files the reports and records. The reports and 
records should also be used to notify the MCP so that any pos­
sible corrections can be made immediately. At this time, the 
corrections taken are routine in nature, i.e., they do not 
constitute major changes. The MCP consists of the safety 
personnel, toolpushers, and other crew members. At this stage, 
there is no way of finding out which accident or hazard re­
sulted in the largest risk of loss. Severity of an injury 
might be impressive, but again, severity is not the only vari­
able that determines priority. Hence, the input subsystems 
and their interrelationships can be illustrated as follows :
112
Filing
system
Records
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Accident Investigations 
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Hazard Inspections
MCP
Figure 23: Input Subsystems and Their Inter­
relationships
3.5.2. Subsystems in the Processor Component
The processor component aids management in making deci­
sions concerning poorly understood problems. It receives in­
formation from the input component, processes, arranges, and 
reports the results to different levels of management. These 
reports are used mainly to support decisions upon which action 
plans can be made to implement major changes. The major func­
tions of this processor element as related to the input and 
the output components are illustrated in Figure 24.
Input
Processor Reports-
Actions f-
Management
Decisions
i
-Action Plan
Figure 24;
Basic f—  
changes
Main Functions of the Processor as 
Related to its Output
The subsystems which should be contained in the processor 
component depends on the processes necessary to produce the re-
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quired output:
(1) Reports on total accident costs (see Figure 13).
(2) Reports on accident causations (see Figures 14, 15,
and 16).
(3) Reports on priority rigs (see Figures 17, 18, 19).
(4) Reports on relative effectiveness of the alterna­
tives (see Figure 20).
To be able to present this output, the processor component 
will need several subsystems:
(1) A subsystem to present accident causations.
(2) A subsystem to calculate and report the total 
accident costs.
(3) A subsystem to calculate risk scores and present 
priorities for corrections.
(4) A subsystem where alternatives are enumerated and 
have their respective degrees of correction (DC) 
and cost factors (OF) estimated.
(5) A subsystem to calculate the relative effectiveness 
of each alternative using the "J" factor and to 
choose the best alternative.
The processor's subsystems and their interrelationships are il­
lustrated in Figure 25.
Subsystem 1 in Figure 25 receives information about acci­
dent causations, arranges, and presents reports to all three 
levels of management.
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Figure 25: Processor Subsystems and Their
Interrelationships
Subsystem 2 receives accident records containing injury 
variables, calculates the total accident costs, and present 
the reports to all three levels of management.
Subsystem 3 receives information about at least a one- 
year accident data set from the input component as well as the 
total accident costs from Subsystem 2. Based on this informa­
tion, Subsystem 3 can calculate the risk scores for each ac­
cident.
Subsystem 4 receives risk scores from Subsystem 3, uses 
them to determine the total risk scores for each rig, ranks 
the rigs by their respective scores, and presents the report 
to the management group.
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Subsystem 5 consists of two subsubsystems, namely, the 
SSub 1 and the SSub 2. SSub 1 receives information from Sub­
system 4 about priorities and with the help of the files, re­
fines these priorities by task and length of employment cate­
gories and reports them to the management group. SSub 2 re­
ceives feedback from the management group on the rig number, 
task number, and length of employment category that should 
further be refined by case numbers. Again, this task can be 
accomplished with the help of the files. Based on this latest 
refinement, the management group, together with their safety 
experts, enumerate alternatives for corrections and at the 
same time also estimate their respective DC and CF values. 
These activities are performed by Subsystem 6. These alterna­
tives, with their respective DC's and CF's, are fed into Sub­
system 7.
Subsystem 7 receives information from Subsystem 6 and 
processes it to provide the relative effectiveness of each al­
ternative. The results of these calculations are then report­
ed back to the management group so that the best alternative 
can be chosen.
3.5.3. The Subsystems in the Output Component
The output produced by the processor becomes the input 
for the output component. This output is essentially feedback 
to the implementation of the management safety policies, as 
shown in Figure 26.
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Superintendents
Figure 26 : Feedback to the Implementation of
the Management Safety Policies
The management group designs and controls the implemen­
tation of the management safety policy. The superintendents, 
toolpushers, and workers implement the safety policy. Acci­
dents and hazards occur because of the imperfections existing 
in the policy and its implementation. Data on accidents and 
hazards are collected for monitoring purposes. They are then 
fed back into the processor to be converted into other para­
meters and presented as reports addressed to the management 
group. These reports actually provide information of how well 
the mangement safety policy is functioning and how well it is 
being implemented by their personnel.
The subsystems in this output component consist of those 
subsystems receiving reports from the processor component.
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Since these reports are meant to support decisions, the sub­
systems are then the existing management levels: the manage­
ment group, the superintendents, and the toolpushers. The 
rest of this component comprises the decisions made to im­
prove the management safety policies and the implementation 
thereof. The subsystems and their interrelationships are 
shown in Figure 27.
Management Group Management
and (------ » Safety
Safety Experts Policies
T
Decisions 
Action Plan
i
Action
Superintendents
Toolpushers and /
Workers
Figure 27: Output Subsystems and Their Inter­
relationships
The management group receives reports from the processor 
concerning the underlying causes, total accident costs, prior­
ities by rig, priorities by tasks and duration of employment, 
and relative effectiveness of alternatives. Based on these
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reports, the management group can make decisions to improve 
the existing Management Safety Policy. The decisions are then 
followed by the preparation of the plans of action to be im­
plemented. Given the actual plans, the superintendents will 
put them into action by providing schedules to the tool­
pushers who implement the required action.
Finally, to complete the cycle of the total system.
Figure 28 shows the relationship between the output and the 
input components.
^ Output^ ProcessorInput
Action ^ Action
Plan
Altered
System
Accident.
Hazard
Investiga­
tions
Figure 28: Relationship Batween the Output
and the Input Components
As was discussed previously, the management group present 
plan of action to improve the safety performance of the company 
which is then implemented. These actions will result in an im­
proved or altered system. The altered system, however, is not 
quite foolproof and should be monitored through continuous in­
spections and accident investigations. The process and re­
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suits of these Investigation are part of the input component. 
Thus, the total system is completed by the one subsystem which 
contains the altered system.
3.6. MIS Model on Paper
The subsystems discussed under each component will now 
be presented as a whole system, the Management Information 
System for Accident Prevention.
Figure 29 shows the whole MIS, drawn as effectively as 
possible to show all subsystems in each component previously 
described. However, Subsystem 10 has been added to decide on 
the effectiveness of alternatives. There is a possibility 
that none of the alternatives will be considered worthwhile, 
that is, if the values of the "J" factors are all unaccepta­
ble. In such cases, a re-evaluation is warranted because the 
urgency for corrections has been previously determined. Also, 
the MCP is included to show the routine maintenance procedure. 
The management group and the management safety policies sub­
systems are included into one large subsystem with the con­
sideration that only the management group can alter the safety 
policies. The MIS as a total system consists of a total of 
18 subsystems.
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Figure 29: The MIS as a total system.
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Chapter 4 
TESTING OF THE MIS
In this chapter, an attempt is made to test the MIS model 
shown in Figure 29. The test is divided into two parts:
(1) Test using a hypothetical data set.
(2) Test using a real accident data set.
The hypothetical data set is designed to fulfill the 
exact input required by the MIS, while the actual accident 
data set represents accident data existing in an oil-well 
drilling company.
The use of these two data sets in the test is based on 
the following rationale:
(1) It is of the utmost importance to test a model to
see whether it can indeed perform its expected func­
tions :
(i) Motivating and involving managers in safety 
activities.
(Li) Converting data into information to support
management decisions for accident prevention. 
Both capabilities are expressed in the contents of 
the following reports:
(i) The total accident cost reports.
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(il) The accident causation reports.
(iii) The report on rigs having priorities for cor­
rections .
(iv) The reports on the refinement of information 
for each priority rig.
(v) The report on the relative effectiveness ("J” 
factor) for each alternative.
(2) The availability of a one-year actual accident data
set can be very useful, to a certain extent, in 
supporting the test with the hypothetical data set.
(3) The use of these two data sets may also reveal 
other important aspects of accident prevention with 
the use of the existing information system in the 
real world.
The description of the tests using both data sets will 
cover three basic areas for discussion:
(1) The data set itself.
(2) The procedures used in the tests.
(3) The results of the tests.
4.1. Test Using the Hypothetical Data Set
4.1.1. Hypothetical Data Set
Hypothetical data is the value of variables which are 
designed to serve as the required input to the MIS model.
This data set consists of both accident and hazard records. 
Each accident record contains the following variables:
123
(1) The case number, which is the year, the month, and 
the running number of accidents occurring in that 
month.
(2) The rig number, assuming that there are 30 rigs in 
operation, and that each superintendent supervises 
3 rigs.
(3) The task number.
(4) The nature of the injury incurred.
(5) The part of the body injured.
(6) The unsafe act, if applicable.
(7) The unsafe condition, if applicable.
(8) The underlying causes.
(9) Whether the injury resulted in lost time.
(10) The employment category of the injured.
Each hazard record contains only four variables; they are 
mentioned under (1), (2), (3), and (4) of the accident record.
The values assigned to the above variables are numerical 
with the exception of the underlying causes, which are expres­
sed in the form used by the 4x4 accident investigation tech­
nique (see Appendix B). The case numbers assigned consist of 
the two last digits of the year, the month, and the running 
number of the accident occurring in that month. For example. 
Case Number 820105 implies that the accident or hazard occur­
red in 1982, January, and it was the fifth accident/hazard
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occurring within the month of January. The rig number is the 
actual number assigned to each rig. The task number is the 
code number of the task in which the accident occurred and is 
assigned arbitrarily from one to seven (see Appendix E). The 
nature of injury, and the part of the body injured are coded 
in accordance with the numbers of rows and columns of the 
Robinson matrix respectively, which is 17 by 14 (see Appendix 
A). The unsafe acts and the unsafe conditions are coded by 
the ANSI classification (ANSI, 1969). The lost time variable 
is coded arbitrarily; it is assigned a value of one if there 
was no lost time and a value of two if there was lost time.
The length of employment categories are also arbitrarily cod­
ed from one to four as shown in Appendix E.
The accident and hazard cases contained in this data set 
are not exactly contrived, but are taken from reports describ­
ing accident cases (NIOSH, 1982 and NSC, 1979). The cases 
include both severe and minor cases. Based on the examples 
found in the reports, more accident cases were made up. Some 
minor cases were assigned to one rig while one severe accident 
was assigned to another rig, and still other rigs were assign­
ed combinations of severe and minor cases. The data set con­
tains a two-month record consisting of 50 and 40 accidents and 
hazards for each month respectively. This hypothetical data 
set can be found in Appendix F.l.
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4.1.2. Test Procedures
As was discussed in Chapter 2, the procedures used in 
the processor component of this MIS are computerized. Hence, 
these test procedures will also be computerized. The step- 
by-step manipulation will be explained by using algorithms 
which formulate the given problems in a list of manipulation 
to be performed (Friedman and Koffman, 1979). These algo­
rithms will further be elaborated into flow diagrams to show 
detailed operational procedures. The language used in the 
programs is Fortran 77 (Wagener, 1980); all the programs used 
in these tests can be found in Appendix D.
The test procedures will also be described in accordance 
with the required output of the MIS in the following order:
(1) The total cost report.
(2) The accident causation report.
(3) The report on priority rigs.
(4) The report on the refinement of information of the
priority rigs.
(5) The report on the relative effectiveness of each 
alternative.
4.1.2.1. Total Accident Cost Report
4.1.2.1.1. Data Set
To be able to prepare the total accident cost reports 
with the use of the Robinson model, the data fed into the 
program should consist of the retrospective data or the
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accident data only. The new data set required is formed by 
copying all accident data into a new file followed by a de­
letion of all the hazards cases.
4.1.2.1.2. Procedure
The sequence of manipulations to prepare the total acci­
dent cost report is shown in the following algorithm:
Step 1. Read in the Robinson matrix into the matrix
SM (17,14) and the accident records into the follow­
ing arrays:
CS(N) for case numbers, NI(N) for nature of injury, 
RG(N) for rig numbers, PB(N) for part of body injured, 
TK(N) for task numbers, UACT(N) for unsafe act code 
numbers, UCON(N) for unsafe condition code numbers, 
ULC(N) for underlying causes, LOT(N) for lost time 
code numbers, LEM(N) for employment category code 
numbers. Assign N = the number of cases.
Step 2. Look at the nature of injury, part of body, and lost 
time values of each record and find the total cost 
value in the SM matrix in accordance with the values 
of the above variables and store it in the array C(N). 
Step 3. Sum the total costs of the records having the same 
rig number and store in the array CRGOO).
Step 4. Print CRG array by superintendent and by rig number. 
The above algorithm is further elaborated in the flow diagrams 
illustrated in Figures 30 and 31. The actual program used to
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(Robinson* s matrix and accident re­
cords
Matrix SM and 
Arrays.
START
ead in
variables
Initialize
counter
20
Assign to­
tal cost to 
each case
— )
K=NI(I)+(NI(I)-1)
is^x. 
lost tim^-ûû— J C(I)=SM(PB(I),K)
Sum total 
costs by 
rig #
yes
L=(NI(I)*2 
C(I)=SM(PB(I),L)4Û
Print total 
costs by 
superinten­
dents, rig#
STOP
ves exit to Step 30
Repgat
Figure 30: Flow Diagram for Total Accident Cost Report
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From Figure 30
Initialize counters 
J=1 for rig #
K=1 for case #
Total
Cost of Rig(J)= CRG(J) 
+ C(K)
Rig(K)=J^^^!H.
no
K >84
yes
Total costs 
by superin­
tendents,_
:sTOP
no
Repeat
Figure 31: Flow Diagram for Total Cost Report (cont.)
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present this cost report can be found in Appendix D.l.
4.1.2.1.3. Results
The results of this test are shown in Figure 32, which 
is an example of the monthly total accident cost reports mana­
gers will receive. The report expresses the total costs in 
man-hours lost so that the costs become comparable among all 
rigs. This report also shows several facts about accident 
costs :
(1) The magnitude of the costs incurred vary by rig and 
by month. Since these costs are reported together 
and expressed as man-hours lost, comparisons can
be made among all rigs. Safety performance of dif­
ferent types of rigs can also be evaluated.
(2) The variation of these costs by month show that 
there are trends which indicate the superintendent's 
as well as the toolpusher's efforts to prevent 
accidents; hence, these are also safety performance 
trends.
(3) By multiplying the numbers of man-hours lost by the 
average wage per hour, the man-hours can be convert­
ed into dollar values. These dollar values can 
then be used to charge the respective projects in 
the process of predicting whether a project will 
make a profit so that necessary actions can be taken 
to ensure this.
XYZ DRILLING CO,r 
SUPERINTENDENT 
SUPERINTENDENT 1
SUPERINTENDENT 2
SUPERINTENDENT 3
SUPERINTENDENT 4
SUPERINTENDENT 5
SUPERINTENDENT 6
SUPERINTENDENT 7
SUPERINTENDENT 8
SUPERINTENDENT 9
SUPERINTENDENT 10
ACCIDENT REPORT IN MANHOURS 
RIG NUMBER
LOST,BY MONTH,
JAN FEB MCH
190:'
APR MAY .11 IN IIII AUG 1P.P ncr NOV IiFC TOT AI
RIO# 1 320 0 :i:* o
RIG# 2 265 300
RIG# 3 320 25
RIG# 4 455 240
RIG# 5 75 50 1:'!,
RIG* 6 20 0 JO
RIG# 7 40 70 110
RIG* 8 450 20 470
RIG# 9 2480 2420 4900
RIG* 10 300 0 W O
RIG* 11 150 0 150
RIG* 12 6635 0
RIG* 13 300 415 715
RIG* 14 18000 25 18075
RIG* 15 300 0 :300
RIG* 16 45 380 175
RIG* 17 20 75 95
RIG* 18 380 300 600
RIG* 19 6600 75 6/.75
RIG* 20 530 0 5.10
RIG* 21 14000 0 14000
RIG* 22 320 0 ITi
RIG* 23 770 0 7/0
RIG* 24 380 25 105
RIG* 25 720 400 1 i:.v)
RIG# 26 25 20 45
RIG* 27 150 0 150
RIG# 28 405 20
RIG# 29 300 0
RIG# 30 220 225
TOTAL : 55055 îf.OBS 1 !<-•
Figure 32: Total Accident Cost Report
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The situation created by the communication of this report 
will motivate managers to prevent accidents provided that:
(i) all superintendents and toolpushers are informed that 
their safety performance is being evaluated through these 
reports, and (ii) that these accident costs are being charged 
to their respective projects.
The report in Figure 32 also shows that in January, the 
two highest losses were incurred by Rigs 14 and 21. These 
high losses seemed to be due to one severe accident occurring 
in each rig and are not a regular phenomena as shown by the 
losses incurred in the next month by the same rigs, which are 
much lower compared to the month January.
Rig 9 on the other hand, shows a somewhat consistent 
losses for both months. This phenomena should be noticed 
because even if the losses are not impressive, the consisten­
cy of losses by month result in a greater total loss in the 
long run.
4.1.2.2. Accident Causation Report
4.1.2.2.1. Data Set
The accident causation report is a monthly report pre­
senting the underlying causes for each accident occurring 
during one month. The causes will be presented by rig , by 
superintendent, and by case number. The data set needed to 
present this report is then a one-month retrospective data 
set containing case numbers, rig numbers, and their respec-
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tive underlying causes. This data set can be obtained by 
taking out a particular month's data from the file and de­
leting all other variables except the case numbers, the rig 
numbers, and the underlying causes (see Appendix F.2).
4.1.2.2.2. Procedure
The procedure to present the underlying causes by rig 
and by superintendent are illustrated in general in the fol­
lowing algorithm:
Step 1. Read in variables: case numbers into array CS, rig
numbers into array RG, underlying causes into arrays 
Ml, M2, M3, 81, 82, 83, Wl, W2, W3.
Step 2. Print out headings.
Step 3. For each rig number, print out the case number and
its associated cause in the right column.
The above algorithm is then refined into a more detailed flow 
diagram as shown in Figure 33, which is self-evident.
The reports for the superintendents and the management 
group are made at the same time using the same program because 
the report for the management group actually contains the sum 
of the causes occurring under each superintendent. The pro­
gram for the above report is shown in Appendix D.2.
The report intended for the toolpushers, however, is 
made with another program because only the causes related to 
their own and their workers' levels are printed. The algo­
rithm and the flow diagram are the same as those used in the
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START
Read in 
variables
Print
headings
Print case#: 
associated 
cause by 
rig#,SPT#.
Initialize M=l, for Rig,, 
per superintendent
&
Initialize L=l, for case #
IS
Rig ( L) = 
M?
Case# and 
associated 
cause
no
L = L + 1
Total cause
>f
Superinten­
dent total= 
SPTOTL+Tool 
pusher total
/
M = M + 1
_na_ ve%»
Figure 33: Flow Diagram for Accident Causation Report
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previous program. The program for this toolpusher's report 
can be found in Appendix D.3.
4.1.2.2.3. Results
The results of this test are shown in Figures 34 and 35. 
Figure 34 consists of four examples of reports. Figure 34a, 
34b, and 34c show reports addressed to superintendents number 
three, five, and seven, respectively. These reports are se­
lected because they contain Rig 9, 14, and 21 discussed pre­
viously under the total cost report. These reports for super­
intendents show the number of cases occurring in each rig and 
their associated causes. Figures 34b and 34c show that Rigs 
14 and 21 contain only one accident per month, but as was men­
tioned previously, they incurred the highest losses for that 
month. Hence, the one accident must be a major accident, 
i.e., one resulting in severe injury. On the contrary. Rig 9 
contains several accidents for the same month but did not. 
show high total costs, therefore, they must be minor accident 
cases. The underlying causes and their respective corrective 
steps to be taken are also different. Rigs 14 and 21 require 
corrective steps at the toolpusher's and the workers' levels 
only, while Rig 9 reaches the superintendent's level also 
(see case 820137).
Figure 34d shows a sample report for the management group. 
It consists of the sum of the underlying causes existing at 
each superintendent level. This report shows several impor-
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TO tSUPERINTEHDE»n * 3
FROM (THE SAFETY DEPARTMENT
SUBJECT(ACCIDENT CAUSATION REPORT 
PERIOD (JANUARYr1983
TOOLPUSHER * 7
CASE # K
820120
820139
TOTAL
UNDERLYING CAUSES AT LEVELS OF CORRECTION
M -S M -S -W M -W S S -W 
M30-S20-W20
0 —  0 1 —  1 —  1 0 - 0 0-0
U30
1
TOOLPUSHER * 8
CASE * ¥
820105
UNDERLYING CAUSES AT LEVELS OF CORRECTION
M -S M -S -W M -W S S -U 
M20-S20
TOTAL 1 —  1 0 - 0 - 0  0 - 0 0 - 0
TOOLPUSHER * 9
CASE * ¥
820108
820121
820137
820143
820146
820148
820149
UNDERLYING CAUSES AT LEVELS OF CORRECTION
M -B M -S -U M -W S S -U W
S40
M30-840
U34
W30
U30
S40-U30
S40
TOTAL 1 —  1 0 - 0 - 0  0 - 0  2 1 - 1
Figure 34a; Accident Causation Report for 
Superintendent 3
TO JSUPOÎINTENDENT ♦ 5
FROM (THE SAFETY DEPARTMENT
subject:ACCIDENT CAUSATION REPORT 
PERIOD (JANUARY»1983
TOOLPUSHER * 13
CASE • M
820112
UNDERLYING CAUSES AT LEVELS OF CORRECTION 
M -S M -S -U M -W S S -U
U43
TOTAL 0 —  0 0 —  0 —  0 0 - 0 0 - 0
TOOLPUSHER ♦ 14
CASE • t
820123
UNDERLYING CAUSES AT LEVELS OF CORRECTION
M -S M -S -W M -U S 8 -U
S40
TOTAL 0 - 0  0 - 0 - 0  0 - 0 0 - 0
TOOLPUSHER # IS
CASE * K
820113
UNDERLYING CAUSES AT LEWLS OF CORRECTION 
M -S M -S -U M -W S S -U
U40
TOTAL 0 - 0  0 —  0 —  0 0 - 0 0-0
Figure 34b: Accident Causation Report for
Superintendent 5
U)CT»
TO :SUPERINTENDENT # 7
FROM SAFETY DEPARTMENT
subject:ACCIDENT CAUSATION REPORT 
PERIOD :.IANUARYfl983
TOOLPUSHER # 19
CASE # M
820104
UNDERLYING CAUSES AT LEVELS OF CORRECTION
M -S M -S -U M -W S S -U 
M20-S20-U30
TOTAL 0 - 0 1 - 1 - 1 0-0 0-0
TOOLPUSHER ♦ 20
CASE # 
820127
820135
TOTAL
M
MIO
UNDERLYING CAUSES AT LEVELS OF CORRECTION 
M -S M -S -U M -W S S -U
0 - 0 0 - 0 - 0 0-0 0 - 0
U
WIO
1
TOOLPUSHER ♦ 21
CASE * M
820116
UNDERLYING CAUSES AT LEVELS OF CORRECTION 
H -S M -S -U M -W S S -U 
S43-U10
TOTAL 0 - 0 0 - 0 - 0 0-0 2 - 1
Figure 34c: Accident Causation Report for
Superintendent 7 OJ
TO JTHE tWWQEHENT GROUP
FROM : THE SAFETY DEPARTMENT
SUBJECTÎACCIDENT CAUSATIONS REPORT 
PERIOD :JANUARY»1983
SUPERINTENDENT UNDERLYING CAUSES AT LEVELS OF CORRECTION
H H -!s M -!s -1LI M -W s s -w U
1 0 0 - 0 1 - 1 - 1 0 - 0 1 2 - 2 2
2 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 2 - 2 2
3 0 2 - 2 1 - 1 - 1 0 - 0 2 1 - 1 5
4 0 0 - 0 3 - 3 - 3 0 - 0 0 1 - 1 0
5 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 - 0 0 - 0 1 0 — 0 3
6 0 3 - 3 0 - 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 1 - 1 0
7 1 0 - 0 1 - 1 - 1 0 - 0 0 2 - 1 1
8 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 - 0 0 - 0 1 5 - 4 0
9 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 5 - 6 2
10 0 1 - 1 0 - 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 1 - 1 2
rOTAL 1 i>— 6 i»— 6 _ 6 0 - 0 5 20 -19 17
Figure 34d: Accident Causation Report for
the Management Group
U)
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tant facts about the underlying causes of accidents for this 
particular month:
(1) Under the supervision of Superintendent 3 the largest 
number of managerial errors occurred resulting in 
accidents.
(2) The underlying causes are mostly related to the 
toolpusher's and the workers' safety performance.
In general, this type of report can help management in lo­
cating problems, identifying problems, and evaluating safety 
performance. This report can also give insights to the so­
lution of the problems identified.
Figure 35 is an example of a report to be sent to Tool- 
pusher 9, which shows the underlying causes and the correct­
ive steps to be taken at this toolpusher's and his workers' 
levels only. By simply looking at this report, this toolpusher 
will know what problems exist at these two levels and what 
actions should be taken to prevent similar accidents from 
occurring in the future.
4.1.2.3. Priority Determination
4.1.2.3.1. Data Set
Two data sets are needed in the priority determination:
(1) the retrospective data set consisting of accident acci­
dent records for both months and (2) the complete data set 
consisting of both the accident and the hazard records.
The retrospective data set will be used to calculate the
TOOLPUSHER ♦ 9 UNDERLYING CAUSES AT LEVELS OF CORRECTION
CASE ♦ M M -S M -S -W M -U S S -W W
820108 S40
820121 W34
820137 -840
820143 W30
820146 W30
820148 S40-W30
820149 . S40
TOTAL - 1 - 0 - 0  - 0 2 1-1 A
Figure 35: Example of an Accident Causation Report for 
Toolpushers
■F>
O
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risk scores for each accident case and to calculate the aver­
age risk scores for each rig by task. The average risk scores 
are calculated so that each hazard identified within a task 
and rig can be assigned a number which represents the magni­
tude of risk imposed by the hazard. The complete data set 
will be used to actually determine the priorities for correc­
tions so that both accidents and hazards are taken into account.
4.1.2.3.2. Procedure
The following algorithm illustrates the sequence of steps 
to be taken to determine the priority for corrections by the 
Fine model:
Step 1. Determine the risk scores for each accident case 
and store them.
Step 2. Determine the average risk scores for each rig by
task.
Step 3. Sum up the risk scores by rig number.
Step 4. Rank the rigs according to their risk scores.
Step 5. Print out the list of rank, the associated rig
number and risk scores.
The flow diagram for the above algorithm is shown in Fi­
gure 36. Each of the steps shown in the flow diagram will be 
discussed separately because of the complexity of the process 
involved in each of these steps, except for Step 5 which will 
be described with Step 4.
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^  START ^
1 K
Determine 
risk score 
(RS) for 
each case#
2
Determine 
average RS 
by rig# and 
by task #
3 ,!
Sum t 
by ri; 
accidi 
hazar(
le RS 
g# for 
snts & 
Is
4 t
Rank rig# 
according 
to their 
risk scores
5 f
Print list 
of rank, 
rig#, RS
^  STOP ^
Figure 36: Flow Diagram of the Main Steps for Priority
Determination
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4.1.2.3.2.1. Determination of Risk Scores
Step 1 of the flow diagram shown in Figure 36 is the step 
that determines the risk score for each accident case. It is 
further refined into four other steps shown in Figure 37.
Step 1.1 of this flow diagram contains exactly the same manip­
ulation procedures as shown in Figure 30, so it will not be 
discussed again in this section. Step 1.2 is divided again 
into two substeps. Substep 1.2.1 is elaborated to show the 
principal procedure of computing the frequency of exposure to 
the same agent for each accident case, E(l). The value for 
Ed) can be obtained by adding all cases having the same direct 
causes, i.e., the same unsafe conditions and unsafe acts. Once 
the value of E(l) is found, all other cases having the same 
unsafe condition and unsafe act as case(l) should be assigned 
the same value of E(l) for their E(K), which is the procedure 
contained in Substep 1.2.2, illustrated in Figure 38.
The next Step 1.3 is the step whereby the probability 
that similar accidents will occur is computed. This step is 
used to find cases having the same unsafe condition (UCON) 
and the same unsafe act (UACT) which resulted in the same con­
sequences (C). These cases are then counted (SUMP) and the 
probability (?) is then defined as the total number of cases 
divided by the number of all accident cases (SUMP/84). The 
procedure is diagrammed in Figure 39. This Step 1.3 is 
actually divided into two substeps as is the case with E(l), 
but is not shown in Figure 39 because the same procedure is
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Risk Scores j----- > flow diagram
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(RS(D).
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Determine 
consequence 
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Determine 
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Determine 
risk score 
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Repeat until 
I = 84Initialize 
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1 . 2 .2 .
2,1'g
Assign Ed) 
to all cases 
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1=1, for case#, 
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Figure 37: Flow Diagram for the Determination of Frequency
of pxposure. Substep 1.2.1
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From Figure 37
Uact(K) = Uact(I) 
&
on(K) = Ucond
E(K) = E(I]
t
K = K + 1
ySS— oexlt 
to 
Substep 
1.3
Repeat 1.2.1 
until I = 84
Figure 38: Flow Diagram for the Determination of the
Frequency of Exposure, Substep 1.2.2
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From Figure 38
yes
no
no
Repeat
yes
yes
1.4
Repeat until 
L = 84
is
X  Uact(J )«Uact(
& Ucon(J)=Ucon(I)
Initialize
P(I) = SUMP/84.0
SUMP = SUMP + 1
RS(L)= C(L)*E(L)*P(L)
Determine
Initialize 
1=1, for case#
SUMP
Figure 39: Flow Diagram for the Determination of the
Probability, P and the Risk Score, RS
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used for P(I) as is shown for E(I). At the end of Step 1.3 
each case already has a consequence value C(I), a frequency 
value Ed), and a probability value P(I). Hence, the risk 
score value can easily be computed as follows:
RS(I) = C(I) X  Ed) X  P(I), which is also shown in Figure 39. 
All of these values of C(I), E(I), P(I), and RS(I) are stored 
on line to be used further in the following Steps 2, 3, 4, 
and 5 of Figure 36, to determine the priorities by rig numbers,
4.1.2.3.2.2. Determination of the Average Risk Scores by 
Rig and by Task
The average risk score for each task is defined as the 
sum of all the risk scores existing in that task divided by 
the number of cases occurring within that task. As was dis­
cussed in Chapter 3, there are seven tasks in each rig and 
the risk scores should be weighted before being totalled to 
make them comparable to each other.
The procedure to compute this average risk score by task 
is illustrated in the flow diagram of Figure 40, which is 
self-explanatory. The actual program used for this purpose 
is shown in Appendix D.4.
The result of executing Step 2 of the priority determi­
nation can be found in Figure 41, which is a table of 30 by 7, 
representing the 30 rigs and their respective seven tasks.
The calculation of the average risk score is based on a two- 
month data, which might not be considered reliable in the 
real world. This table is presented here as an example of
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From Figure 39
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by task#
— a
Initialize 
M=l,for task#
J=l,for case# 
RStask=0.0;
CCS=0.0 for cases/task
Initialize 
1=1,for rig#
Rig(J)=I & 
Task(J)=M
7
CCS = CCS+1
WEIGHT RS J
STASK(M )=RSTASK(M )+WEIGHTED RS(J )
AVG RSTASK 
RSTASK(M)
Repeat—  
until
M = M + 1
AVG RSTASK 
(M) = 
RSTASK(M)/ AVG RS/tasl 
for RIG(I
41' W  N3 H» P I
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
s s s s s(D ID (D (D Z
H* P -  P - T )
OQ OQ OQ OQ r *
3 ‘ 3 ‘ c r  p * q
r r  r t  r t  r f
(D (D (D (D z
0 .  O. CL 0 .
a
> 0  g o  >0 
W W W c/5
H
II II II II
>
go gd go go H
CA c/5 c/5 CA 5C5
C_i C_, 2g o
»!• St- >S- sf- H Î
ps P» p t  M p )
• • • • o
o ■P' P ^  ^ c
K  ■'J 00 w
r
CA
Figure 40: Flow Diagram for the Determination of the 
Average Risk Scores by Rig and by Task
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AVERAGE RISK SCORES BY RIG AMD BY TASK 
TASK NUMBER:
RIG* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 .00 .41 43.25 .00 .00 .00 .00
2 2.88 .00 .00 34.24 .00 .00 39.68
3 .00 .00 .00 .00 6.18 23.43 .00
4 .00 .00 .00 23.48 27.47 .00 .00
B 2.11 .00 .00 7.93 .00 .31 .00
6 .00 .00 .00 .00 4.21 .00 .00
7 .00 3.60 .00 7.93 .00 .62 .00
8 .00 18.54 .00 .00 6.18 .00 .00
9 .00 .00 12.64 42.86 73.24 .00 .00
10 .00 7.83 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
11 .00 .00 .00 33.98 .00 .00 .00
12 .98 271.86 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
13 .00 .00 .00 62.85 .00 .00 .00
14 .00 .00 .00 185.87 .00 .00 .00
IB .00 .00 .00 63.21 .00 .00 .00
16 .00 .00 .00 .51 117.39 .00 .82
17 7.37 .00 .00 .00 6.18 .00 .00
10 .00 .00 10.68 67.96 .00 .00 .00
19 .00 271.86 .00 23.17 .00 .00 .00
20 6.18 .00 .00 .00 117.39 .00 .00
21 .00 288.33 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
22 .00 .00 .00 15.75 6.18 .00 .00
23 .00 .00 .00 10.74 .00 .00 .00
24 .00 .00 .00 7.72 117.39 .00 .00
2B 4.21 .00 117.39 35.71 10.81 .00 .00
26 .00 .00 .00 .00 6.18 .00 .00
27 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 9.27 .00
28 .00 7.83 6.56 .00 6.18 .00 .00
29 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 18.54 .00
30 .00 13.59 2.67 7.93 .00 .00 .00
Figure 41; Table of Average Risk Scores by Rig 
and by Task
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the chart that can be used as reference to assign risk scores 
to each identified hazard. For example, if a hazard was iden­
tified in Rig 1 and Task 3, then the risk score that should 
be assigned to that hazard equals 43.25, as found in Column 
3, Row 1 of this table. This table also shows many zero val­
ues due to lack of data for that particular task and rig num­
ber. It is therefore desirable to have a data set represent­
ing a one-year operating data for each rig so that if a zero 
value appears in the result, it can be said that the zero 
value truly represents a low risk score value for that parti­
cular task and rig.
For the purpose of this testing procedure, the table in 
Figure 41 will be used as reference to assign risk scores to 
the identified hazards. These hazard cases are then added 
into the file of the restospective data to form the complete 
hypothetical data set.
4.1.2.3.2.3. Summation of Risk Scores by Rig Number
Step 3 in the priority determination is the summation of 
the risk scores by rig. To be able to execute this third 
step, the flow diagrams to compute risk scores for each case 
(see Figures 37, 38, 39) should be connected to the flow dia­
gram shown in Figure 42. As shown, the risk scores are again 
weighted because their magnitude will be compared to each 
other. The rest of the manipulation procedure describes a 
simple summation by rig which is self-explanatory.
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From Figure 39
Sum the RS 
by Rig# for 
accident & 
hazard cases
Initialize 
RSRIG(J)=0.0 
K=l, for case#
Initialize 
J=l,for rig#
WEIGHT RS(K)
Cnitialize 
1=1.for hazard#
^  CO K) (-* H
...... *0
s s s s s(0 (0 W  (0 3
p .  p .  p .  p . tJ
GQ OQ OQ OQ r*
5T 3“ 3* qrt rt rt rt *<(D (B (D (D 30.0. O. 0.
i^ Sd W SS 
W CO M V3
H
II II II II O
50 ?d td  >0 >CO CO CO CO H
CO
O
o
>!■ si- >{■ St- 
M M g
CO
O  -P- M -J oM 00 CO
;-, CO
RIG(L)= 
J?
RSRIG(J )=RSRIG(J )+RS(K )
J = J + 1
res
exit to Step 4
RSRIG(J )=RSRIG(J )+RSH(L)
Figure 42: Flow Diagram for the Summation of RS by Rig
for Accidents and Hazards
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4.1.2.3.2.4. Ranking of the Rigs by Their Risk Scores
The last steps to be executed are Steps 4 and 5 which 
are the ranking of the rigs based on the magnitude of their 
respective risk scores, and the printing steps. The detailed 
operational procedure for both steps is illustrated in Figure 
43, which is a continuation of the flow diagram shown in Fig­
ure 42. Both diagrams are then made into one program which 
is contained in Appendix D.5.
4.1.2.3.3. Results
The results of the test for the determination of pri­
orities is shown in Figure 44; it shows a list of rigs ranked 
according to their respective risk scores. It shows that the 
five highest ranks are taken by Rig 9, 25, 13, 24, and 20. 
Also, Rig 9 has a significantly high risk score value as com­
pared to the rest of the rigs. The magnitude of the risk 
scores of Rig 13 and 25 are somewhat comparable and so are 
Rigs 24, 20, and 16. As shown in the total cost report (Fig­
ure 31), Rig 9 did not incur high total losses for either 
month, but now has the highest priority for correction. On 
the other hand. Rigs 14 and 21 which show high total losses, 
only place tenth and twelfth at the rank list. These dis­
crepancies again show that the so-called major accidents are 
not automatically prioritized for correction.
The severity of the consequences of a major accident can 
be very dramatic and provides a psychological force to per­
form an accident investigation. On the contrary, minor acci-
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Rank Rigs Print list
by their --- ?of rank.
Risk Scores rig#, RS 1
From Figure 41
Initialize 
1=1,for rig#
EXCHANGE PLACE
HOLDER = RSRIG(I) 
RSRIG(I)=RSRIG(I+1 
RSRIG(I+1)=H0LDER
RSRIG(I)>  RSRIG(I+1) nn
yes
1X 30-1 )
List of rank 
rig#,assoc. 
RS ____
no es RSRIG . SORTED ">
.no
Figure 43: Flow Diagram for the Ranking and Printing
of the Rigs According to Their Risk Scores
154
PRIORITY RANK RIG NUMBER RISK SCORE
1 9 4696,5923
2 25 1670,7656
3 13 1302,7893
4 24 970,0358
5 20 945,3215
6 16 940,4816
7 19 566,8839
8 12 544,6976
9 2 419,3833
10 14 371,7440
11 15 316,0714
12 21 288,3333
13 4 226,1996
14 18 214,5691
15 3 143,1383
16 7 102,9762
17 1 87,3219
18 28 77,3262
19 26 74,1429
20 30 63,8369
21 8 61,7857
22 22 59,0000
23 5 49,9911
24 17 40,6607
25 11 33,9821
26 6 29,5000
27 23 21,4833
28 29 18,5357
29 27 9,2679
30 10 7,8262
Figure 44: List ûf Rigs Ranked According to
Their Risk Scores
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dents are often neglected for the opposite reasons. With the 
use of the Fine model, however, priorities are determined 
rationally based on the concept of loss control. It does not 
intend to eliminate the urge to investigate major accidents, 
in fact, the Fine model reveals that all types of accidents 
deserve equal attention and should therefore be investigated 
thoroughly as a regular procedure. Routinely, all unsafe 
acts and unsafe conditions occurring in each accident might 
already have been taken care of by the Maintenance and Control 
Program (MOP). Also, the underlying causes reported to all 
levels of management already help managers to better enforce 
or improve the management safety policies. The main value of 
this part of the MIS, however, is to point out that actions 
beyond the routine procedures are called for to actually im­
prove loss control and the management safety policies.
4.1.2.4. Refinement of the Information of the Priority Rigs 
To be able to improve the existing system by using the 
previous priority determination, information about the priori­
ty rigs needs to be refined to reveal the existing problems 
and to formulate plans of action for improvement. The re­
finement procedure consists of two major steps:
(1) The refinement of the information by task, by cate­
gory of employment, and hazards. This step is 
necessary to obtain the information about the task 
and the employment category that are causing prob­
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lems, and thus have the priority to be corrected. 
Tasks and category of employments are chosen as the 
variables into which the information should be re­
fined, based on the previous discussion in Chapter 
3 (see pp. 82-83).
(2) The refinement of the priority rig, priority task, 
and priority employment category by case numbers, 
unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, and underlying 
causes.
4.1.2.4.1. Refinement of information by Task and Category 
of Employment
4.1.2.4.1.1. Data Set
The data set used in this procedure of testing is the 
complete hypothetical data set, i.e., consisting of both the 
retrospective and the prospective data.
4.1.2.4.1.2. Procedure
The manipulation procedure of this first step of informa­
tion refinement is quite simple; it consists of the presenta­
tion of the existing file by the preferred variables. An al­
gorithm for this procedure is therefore unnecessary. The ma­
nipulation is directly illustrated as a flow diagram in Fig­
ure 45. It is a continuation of the one shown in Figure 39 
which calculates risk scores for each case. The risk scores 
are again weighted by category of employment so that they be­
come comparable to each other. Finally, the actual program 
used for this purpose is shown in Appendix D.6.
157
From Figure 39
Initialize 
L=priority rig #
RSTE(7,5)=0,matrix to store RS by task,employment 
category, and hazards 
1=1^ for task#; J~l. for case#
EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY EQUALS
RSTE(I,1)=RSTE(I,1)+RS(J)*1.73
RSTE(I,2)=RSTE(I,2)+RS(J)*1.18
RSTE(I,3)=RSTE(I,3)+RS(J)*1.47
RSTE(I,4)=R5TE(I,4)+RS(J)*1.01
RIG(J)=L
TASK(J)=I
RSTE(1,5)=RSTE(1,5)+RSH(JJ) 
yes
I S
I6(JJ)=L
& JJ=J
TASK(JJ)=I
7
Headings,
^  STOP ^ RSTE(I,J)
Figure 45: Flow Diagram for the Refinement of Informa­
tion of Priority Rigs by Tasks, Employment 
Categories, and Hazards
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4.1.2.4.1.3. Results
The results of this test can be seen in Figure 46. These 
results show that hazards do not play an important role in 
this priority determination. The risk scores which contrib­
ute the most to this priority come from the first category of 
employment (LE 1) and from Tasks. 3, 4, arid 5. These findings 
are somewhat consistent for all five priority rigs. These 
priority tasks (Tasks 3, 4, 5) and LE 1 then, will further 
be refined in the next procedure.
4.1.2.4.2. Refinement of Information by Case Numbers,
Unsafe Acts, Unsafe Conditions, and 
Underlying Causes
4.1.2.4.2.1. Data Set
As was the case with the previous elaboration of infor­
mation, this second step of refinement will also use the 
complete hypothetical data set.
4.1.2.4.2.2. Procedure
The procedure in this step is to take the selected cate­
gory of employment, task number, and rig number and feed them 
into a program which will print out the required variables 
associated with the above priority rig, task, and category of 
employment. An algorithm for this procedure is also unneces­
sary and the flow diagram is illustrated in Figure 47; the 
actual program used in this test can be found in Appendix D.7.
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Figure 46: Risk Scores of the Prioritized Rigs
by Task and Category of Employment
FOR PRIORITY RIG ♦ 9
RISK SCORES BY TASK AND LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY HAZARD 
TASK* 1 2  3  4
1 400 *00 «00 .00 «00
2 «00 «00 «00 «00 «00
3 «00 12.64 «00 «00 12.64
4 1802.80 «00 «00 «00 «00
5 2868.51 «00 «00 «00 «00
6 «00 «00 «00 «00 «00
7 «00 «00 «00 .0 0  «00
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Figure 46 (cont.)
FOR PRIORITY RIG * 25
RISK SCORES BY TASK AND I..ENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY HAZARD 
TASK=î- 1 2  3 4
:l. *00 12*64 *00 *00 *00
2 *00 *00 *00 *00 *00
3 939*14 *00 *00 *00 *00
4 686*54 *00 *00 *00 *00
5 32*44 *00 *00 *00 *00
6 *00 *00 *00 *00 *00
7  *00 *00 *00 *00 *00
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Figure 46 (cont.)
FOR PRIORITY RIG * 1:3
RISK SCORES BY TASK AND LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY HAZARD 
TASK* 1 2  3 4
1 *00 *00 *00 *00 *00
*00 *00 *00 *00 *00
3 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
4 986.72 316.07 .00 .00 .00
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00
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F i g u r e  46 ( c o n t . )
FOR PRXORIÏY RIO *  2 4
RISK SCORES BY TASK AND LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY HAZARD
TASK* 1 2  3  4
1 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
2 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
3  <00 .0 0  .0 0  .0 0  .0 0
4  3 0 .8 9  .0 0  .0 0  .0 0  .0 0
5  9 3 9 .1 4  .0 0  .0 0  .0 0  .0 0
6 .00 *00 .00 .00 *00
7  .0 0  *00 .0 0  .0 0  .0 0
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Figure 46 (cont.)
FOR PRIO RITY RIO t  2 0
RISK SCORES BY TASK AND LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY HAZARD 
TASK* 1 2  3  4
1 6 . 1 8  .0 0  .0 0  . 0 0  .0 0
<00 .00 .00 .00 .00
3  .0 0  .0 0  .0 0  .0 0  .0 0
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00
5  9 3 9 .1 4  .0 0  .0 0  .0 0  .0 0
6 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00
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From Figure 30
Headings
Cased) jUactd), 
Ucon(I),ULC{I),yes
no
no yes
STOP
/  is 
I > 8 4
y/RIG(I)=M^ 
& TASK(I)=T 
&  LE(I)=L
Initialize 
M = Priority Rig #
T = Priority Task#
L = Priority Employment Category
1 = 1 ,  counter tor # of cases
Figure 47 : Flow Diagram for the Refinement of Information
of the Priority Rig, Task, Employment Category, 
by Case Numbers and Their Associated Causes
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4.1.2.4.2.3. Results
The results of this test are shown in Figure 48. To be 
able to interpret the numbers shown on this report, the man­
agement group to whom this report is sent, is provided with a 
sheet containing the code numbers and their respective meanings. 
An example of such a decoding sheet can be found in Appendix 
E. Based on this report, the management group and their safety 
experts are expected to confer and develop some solutions for 
the existing problems shown in the report.
To this report is added a column of the total costs of 
cases to confirm the previous findings that the risk scores 
for Rig 9 are mostly attributed to minor but frequent accidents, 
as shown by the small man-hour values for each case. The un­
safe act and unsafe condition codes shown in this report aid 
management in searching for alternatives for corrections.
At this time, the MIS is awaiting further input from the man­
agement group to do the next step, i.e., the alternative as­
sessment. It should be noted also that Figure 48 only repre­
sents Rig 9 and serves as an example of this refinement proce­
dure.
4.1.2.5. Alternative Assessment
The discussion on alternative assessment will only be 
limited to one example, namely, the problem shown in Figure 48. 
Rig 9 is chosen as an example because it contains enough cases 
which enable analysis to be performed, thereby describing the 
principal procedure required by the MIS.
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Figure 48: Priority Rig, Task, and Category of
Employment by Case Numbers and Causes
FOR PRIORITY RIG* 9
FOR TASK* K
l£NGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY 1
WITH RISK SCORE OF 2868.51
CASE* UNSAFE ACT CODE# UNSAFE CONDITION CODE# LEVEL OF CORRECTION MANHOUR
82 148 100 399 84U3 380
82 215 100 399 M4S2U4 380
82 227 100 399 H4S2U4 20
82 2Ti 100 399 M4S2U4 380
82 231 100 999 M4S2U4 380
FOR PRIORITY RIG# 9 
FOP TASK* 4 
lENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY 1
WITH RISK SCORE OF 1802.80
CASF.* UNSAFE ACT CODE# UNSAFE CONDITION CODE# LEVEL OF CORRECTION MANHOUR
82 121 355 399 U3 750
82 143 350 999 U3 300
82 146 350 999 U3 300
82 149 993 520 84 300
82 2 1 993 520 84 300
82 2 2 993 520 84 25
82 2 3 993 520 84 300
82 2 4 400 30 W4 300
82 221 350 999 M4U3 35
82 232 993 520 84 300
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4.1.2.5.1. Data Set
The data set for this procedure of testing consists of 
input from the management group. The input should contain 
the alternatives enumerated and their respective degree of 
correction and cost factor. The cost factors can be expressed 
as dollar values or rated values. The degree of correction 
can also be expressed in percent or rated values.
This input can be obtained by analyzing the report shown 
in Figure 48, especially the column which contains the under­
lying causes of accident cases. For Rig 9, the underlying 
causes are mostly cited as M4, S24, and W34. These notations 
can be translated as follows (see Appendix B):
M4 : enforce policy/procedure based upon procedural monitoring,
S2 : assure means to comply.
S4 : be consistent in enforcement.
W3 : train/motivate/enforce.
W4 : recognize/reward improved performance.
All of these underlying causes generally point out to the need 
for better enforcement, motivation, and training of the new 
employees (LE 1). Based on the above information, alterna­
tives can be enumerated. The following alternatives can be 
used as an example :
Alternative 1 : Training of the newly-hired workers.
Alternative 2 : Better enforcement and motivation.
Alternative 3 ; The combination of both alternative one
and two.
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The cost factor and the degree of correction for each 
alternative can be obtained by the following means :
Alternative 1 : The training of the new employees, ir­
respective of their experience, may already be a routine pro­
cedure in a company, in which case the training need only be 
intensified. In cases where training of the newly-hired work­
ers are not yet established, a new procedural requirement 
should be implemented. In the latter case, some additional 
man-hours might be needed to set up a new procedure. In gen­
eral, however, this alternative requires almost no expense.
The degree of correction accomplished through this alter­
native might be quite significant. Levitt (1975) reported 
that training of the newly-hired workers can reduce accident 
rates by 25% in the first six months of employment, which 
exactly meets the need to reduce accidents within the first 
category of employment.
Alternative 2 : To be able to better enforce the existing 
safety policy and to motivate superintendents, toolpushers, 
and workers, may require some expense if a bonus and incentive 
plan is to be used. A bonus is an award of substantial mone­
tary value (greater than one month’s salary) made privately.
An incentive, on .the other hand, is of small monetary value 
and is given publicly. An incentive may also carry some 
prestige or status value. Levitt (1975) again reported that 
incentives given on any day a worker or foreman does not have 
accidents requiring first aid, medical attention, or near
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misses can improve safety. Also, if bonuses are given to 
superintendents for their overall performance during that 
year, which includes safety performance, then safety will im­
prove. If a bonus and incentive plan is used in the second 
alternative, then this alternative will be significantly more 
expensive than the first alternative.
The degree of correction attained by this alternative is 
reported as ranging from 50% to 55% (Levitt, 1975). Hence, 
compared to the first alternative, the second alternative is 
about twice as powerful in terms of the degree of correction.
Alternative 3 : This third alternative, consisting of 
both the first and the second alternatives, will be the most 
expensive of the three alternatives. The degree of correc­
tion for this alternative would also be the best compared to 
the other alternatives (both CF and DC assumed to be additive).
The resulting cost factors and degree of corrections for 
all three alternatives can then be rated as small (S), medium 
(M), and high (H), as follows:
Alternative # Cost Factor Degree of Correction
1 S(l) S(6)
2 M(4) M(4)
3 H(6) H(3)
The rating in the S, M, and H values can then be convert­
ed into numerical values between 0 and 10 (shown in parenthe­
sis behind S, M, H). The numerical rating is necessary so
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that the relative effectiveness or the "J" factor for each 
alternative can be computed. The converted rating values for 
Alternative 1, 2, and 3 can be like 1, 4, and 6 for cost 
factor, and 6, 4, and 3 for the degree of correction re­
spectively (see rating system suggested by Fine in Chmpre?" 3). 
This conversion can be effected by the management group and 
their safety expert® or by the MIS in accordance with a pre­
determined standard. The resulting rates and alternatives 
are then fed back into the MIS so that the report on the 
relative effectiveness of each alternative can be presented.
4.1.2.5.2. Procedure
The procedure to present a report on the relative ef­
fectiveness of each alternative is quite simple and is direct­
ly illustrated as a flow diagram in Figure 49." It calculates 
the "J" factor for each alternative and prints out the re­
sults in a report format. As discussed previously,
J = RS/(DC X CF). The actual program used can be found in 
Appendix D.8.
4.1.2.5.3. Results
The results of this test are shown in Figure 50. It 
presents all the input given and the resulting "J" factor.
The purpose of this report is to help management in the eval­
uation and selection of the best alternative. The numbers 
representing "J" may not be meaningful to those who have never
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Feed in
Priority Rig #
Priority Task #
Priority Employment Category
Risk Score for the Priority Rig
The Alternatives
The Degree of Correction,DC
The Cost Factor,CF
The Number of Alternatives,N
The "J" Factor, J(N)
Headings
Alternatives
Initialize 
coiinter 1=1
Alternative number, 
DC(I),CF(I),and 
J(I)= RS/DC(I)*CF(I)
REPEAT UNTIL 
I = N
STOP ^
Figure 49 : Flow Diagram to Present the Alternatives
with Their Associated "J" Factor for 
Management Decision
FOR PR IO R ITY  R IG *  : 9
FOR PR IO R ITY  TASK* Î 4
FOR EMPLOYMENT CATEGORYÎ 1
THE ALTERNATIVES FOR CORRECTION ARE:
1 TRAINING OF ><EU H IR ES
2  ENFORCE AND MOTIVATE
3  DOTH ONE AND TWO
DEGREE OF CORRECTION COST FACTOR ECONOMIC JU ST IFIC A T IO N
6.00
4 . 0 0
3 . 0 0
ALTERNATIVE
1 
2 
3
FOR 7 8 2 .7 6  C WILL BE REDUCED BY
FOR J«= 2 9 3 .5 4  C WILL BE REDUCED BY
FOR J «  2 6 0 .9 2  C WILL BE REDUCED BY
1 . 0 0  7 8 2 .7 6 5 0
4 . 0 0  2 9 3 .5 3 6 9
6 . 0 0  2 6 0 .9 2 1 7
: 6 1 2 .5 0  MONTHLY
: 6 1 2 .5 0  TO 1 2 2 5 .0 0  MONTHLY
: 1 2 2 5 .0 0  TO 1 8 3 7 .5 0  MONTHLY
Figure 50: Relative Effectiveness of the Enumerated
Alternatives
"J
ho
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used this method before. For this reason, additional infor­
mation is added within the report that can help management in 
the selection of the best alternative, i.e., the monthly re­
duction of the man-hours lost as related to each "J" factor. 
Depending on the situation of the company, the management 
group can then decide which alternative would be the best for 
the present condition. Once the alternative is decided upon, 
a plan to implement the alternative should then be made. The 
implementation of the plan of action should further be moni­
tored to see its effectiveness and whether changes are neces­
sary. In this way, the company will accumulate experiences 
and the decisions made by the management group may become more 
effective over time.
4.2. Test Using the Real Data Set
4.2.1. Real Data Set
The real data set used in this testing procedure is a 
one-year accident record of a well-drilling company, whose 
name will be kept confidential. The accident record is kept 
as Workers' Compensation Claim Forms; it therefore consists 
of all accident cases requiring medical costs. These forms 
were obviously completed with the objective of obtaining 
payments on medical costs incurred and disability benefits, 
they were certainly not intended to be used as input to the 
MIS; hence, for the purpose of testing, this data becomes 
limited in several ways:
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(1) They consist of retrospective data only.
(2) There is no recording on the causes of accidents. 
These limitations caused testing restrictions which will be 
discussed later.
As a whole, the data set consists of 475 cases and each 
form contains the following variables: the case number, the
rig number, the task number, the nature of injury, the part of 
the body injured, the lost time, and the length of employment. 
At the time the accident cases were collected, this oil-well 
drilling company possessed 30 operational rigs, but not every 
rig was active throughout the year. The codes used to assign 
numerical values to the above variables are exactly the same 
as those used in the hypothetical data set. This actual data 
set can be found in Appendix F.3.
4.2.2. Test Procedures
Because of the limitations found in this real data set, 
the test procedure was restricted to those tests which did 
not require the presentation of the causes of accidents, but 
the tests were performed to the point of maximum possibility. 
These tests include the following:
(1) The presentation of the total accident cost report.
(2) The presentation of a chart showing the average risk 
scores by rig and by task.
(3) The determination of priority rigs based on retro­
spective data only.
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(4) The presentation of refined information of the pri­
ority rig by task and length of employment.
(5) The presentation of refined information of the pri­
ority rig, task, and length of employment by case 
numbers.
The manipulation procedures took almost the same course 
as discussed previously when using the hypothetical data set. 
Some modifications, however, were necessary because of the 
absence of the accident causes. However, as discussed in Chap­
ter 3, the causes can be categorized by tasks so that in cases 
where causes were to be compared in the following procedures, 
the tasks were compared instead. The exact modifications will 
be discussed as necessary under the specific test procedures. 
The data set needed to perform the above tests remained the 
same at all times, hence there will be no more discussion of 
the data set used in each test.
4.2.2.1. Total Accident Cost Report
4.2.2.1.1. Procedure
The sequence of steps taken to present the total accident 
report with the use of the Robinson model are exactly the same 
as shown in the flow diagram of Figure 30. In the actual pro­
gram, however, the number of cases should be changed from 84 
to 475; this program is attached as Appendix D.9.
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4.2.2.1.2. Results
The results of this test can be seen in Figure 51, which 
shows that Rigs 2 and 12 incurred the highest losses for that 
year. These high losses were apparently due to a major acci­
dent occurring in each rig in the month of March and January 
respectively. Consistent losses incurred by Rig 5, however, 
indicate the existence of safety problems.
The zero values for Rigs 25 - 30, starting from the first 
month to the sixth month or tenth month, cannot be explained. 
The numbers can reflect a real zero value, meaning that there 
was not a single accident occurring during those periods or 
that the rigs were not in operation. Unfortunately, the actual 
circumstances cannot be verified. In the actual situation, 
however, these zero values would not pose any problem since the 
company would know exactly which rigs were not in operation at 
a certain time period.
The total estimated loss due to accidents for this parti­
cular year was 131,710 man-hours. If the average man-hours 
wage equals $10.00, then the loss for that year was about 
$1,317,100.00. This figure represents the very lowest estimate 
of loss because the Robinson matrix uses a very conservative 
ratio of 1:2 for the ratio between the direct and the indirect 
costs (total cost = 3 X  direct cost). Heinrich (1980) esti­
mated this ratio to be about 1:4 for the average industry (to­
tal cost = 5 X direct cost). When this estimate is used, the 
total loss for that year would be about 5/3 x $1,317,100 =
XYZ BRILLINB CO.. ACCTTiENT REPORT IN MANHOURR l OST.BY MONTH. 
SUPERINTENDENT 
SUPERINTENDENT 1
SUPERINTENDENT 2
SUPERINTENDENT 3
SUPERINTENICNT 4
SUPERINTENDENT 5
SUPERINTENDENT 6
SUPERINTENDENT 7
SUPERINTENDENT 8
SUPERINTENDENT 9
SUPERINTENDENT 10
G NUMBER JAN FEB MCH APR MAY HIM .1111 AI 111 SEP tICl NI IV DEE. rniAi.
RIG* 1 0 850 620 30 0 0 0 520 75 0 220 380 2695
RIG* 2 0 0 8000 190 520 35 380 1130 410 0 ”40 6”'. 12080
RIG* 3 0 0 0 190 0 0 0 O 0 380 220 0 790
RIG* 4 0 20 0 1130 820 1280 30 O 220 1095 245 95 4935
RIG* 5 300 30 450 750 380 960 395 240 190 360 710 630 5.395
RIG* 6 0 440 0 0 190 0 0 30 0 0 750 220 1630
RIG* 7 220 0 0 0 240 20 0 0 300 0 0 410 1190
RIG* 8 980 0 75 220 0 0 785 380 220 190 9.30 0 3780
RIG* 9 0 20 570 0 750 O 0 520 560 0 380 1360 4160
RIG* 10 20 660 940 300 740 380 190 0 640 20 100 750 4740
RIG* 11 0 0 0 220 O 1720 110 440 990 1050 265 300 5095
RIG* 12 0 600 0 190 440 0 455 0 300 645 440 1100 4170
RIG* 13 440 0 520 20 190 190 0 0 380 0 0 15 1755
RIG# 14 0 0 1265 O 0 1210 0 0 400 0 190 260 3325
RIG* IS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 20
RIG* 16 0 0 220 0 0 0 20 0 820 0 220 380 1660
RIG* 17 0 190 240 220 640 0 1050 0 0 0 760 1620 4720
RIG* 18 0 0 0 0 55 0 0 220 70 0 775 380 1500
RIB* 19 0 0 0 190 190 0 0 220 0 0 410 810 1820
RIG* 20 215 300 25 170 0 0 0 0 1005 825 0 300 2840
RIG* 21 380 25 220 190 465 220 220 220 220 0 0 0 2160
RIG* 22 6655 20 520 0 30 1120 210 75 410 1230 740 380 11390
RIG* 23 0 0 0 190 790 20 490 600 190 0 0 450 2730
RIG* 24 490 0 305 75 600 0 0 600 1280 740 0 22.0 4310
RIG* 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 325 70 0 1140 220 0 1755
RIG* 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 20
RIG* 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 300 0 0 0 0 300
RIG* 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 190 0 190
RIG* 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RIG* 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1135 415 1550
THE NA RIG n u m b e r : 2280 1445 1795 2690 2360 3310 4500 .3605 5905 50.35 4655 1425 .39005
TOTAL : 11980 4600 15765 6965 9400 10465 9160 9190 1 4585 12710 14295 12595 131.710
Figure 51: Total Accident Cost Report Based on the Real Data Set
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$2,195,166.67. The highest ratio found by Robinson was about 
1:13 in a construction company, a high-hazard industry (total 
cost = 14 X  direct cost). When this estimate is used, the to­
tal loss would be about 14/3 x $1,317,100 = $6,146,466.67.
Which of these estimates applies to this particular company is 
very difficult to say. But since the oil-well drilling in­
dustry is classified as one of the most hazardous industries 
in the United States, the estimated cost would be more likely 
between $2,195,166.67 and $6,146,466.67. It should be noted 
that this loss estimate does not include the losses due to 
first aid cases and all other cases which did not require med­
ical attention.
4.2.2.2. Average Risk Scores by Rig and by Task
4.2.2.2.1. Procedure
The manipulations required to compute the risk scores by 
rig and by task are almost the same as those shown in Figures 
36 and 40. The differences lie in the decision steps of Fi­
gures 36 and 37 whereby the unsafe act (UACT) and the unsafe 
condition (UCON) variables were used in the process. In the 
present procedure, instead of the unsafe act and the unsafe 
condition, the task variable will be used in the decision steps 
as follows:
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IS
UACT(J)=UACT(ir 
UCON(J)=UCON(i;
?
is
TASK(J) = TASK(I)
From Figure 36
UACT(J)=UACT(I) 
& UCON(J)=UCON(I) 
C(J) = C(I) 
?
TASK(J)=TASK(I 
C(J)=C(I)
From Figure 37
Again, the total number of cases should be changed from 84 to 
475. The detailed program used in this test can be found in 
Appendix D.IO.
4.2.2.2.2. Results
The results of this test are shown in Figure 52, which 
again shows some zero values in each rig for all rigs. These 
zero values can again be attributed either to no accidents oc­
curring during that period or the idleness of the rigs. IJhich 
of these reasons was true, again could not be verified. For 
the purpose of assigning risk scores to the identified hazards,
180
AVERAGE RISK SCORES BY RIG AND BY TASK 
TASK NUMBER:
RIG* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 191.94 113.44 741.79 2308.51 .00 .00 2.79
2 278.62 468.43 558.33 1826.93 3288.09 119.75 .00
3 .00 .00 707.22 1640.20 1141.41 .00 .00
4 80.83 430.22 626.13 1880.04 .00 232.70 .00
r, 99.28 282.00 897.77 1339.35 .00 .00 .00
6 .00 550.68 15.95 .00 .00 174.30 .00
7 .00 424.55 .00 1284.85 .00 .00 26.22
8 329.39 675.74 541.27 2654.45 7429.31 .00 .00
9 .00 714.74 21.27 1906.88 423.29 .00 15.31
10 34.48 562.73 .00 1963.80 .00 5.83 1.75
11 137.46 370.57 941.30 1300.23 .00 398.59 19.14
12 151.46 420.66 .00 2177.79 1141.41 .00 .00
13 .00 741.13 898.65 2158.66 .00 .00 1.75
14 30.87 469.52 757.74 1556.05 .00 .00 18.50
15 .00 27.53 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
16 .00 510.48 837.82 1857.95 .00 139.91 .00
17 252.28 689.06 465.50 1071.86 .00 89.13 .00
18 .00 325.52 188.05 124.66 .00 .00 .00
19 .00 380.61 1009.94 2550.19 .00 .00 .00
20 .00 353.71 353.61 821.84 .00 7.43 15.31
21 .00 424.55 824.94 2455.77 .00 .00 .00
22 7.43 736.37 431.49 1544.07 .00 .00 .00
23 99.96 318.32 61.47 1557.85 .00 .00 .00
24 164.67 284.23 677.98 1884.76 .00 .00 .00
25 .00 741.13 757.74 1264.05 .00 .00 .00
26 .00 .00 .00 .00 78.80 .00 .00
27 .00 .00 .00 .00 622.59 .00 .00
28 .00 .00 757.74 .00 .00 .00 .00
29 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
30 37.15 .00 707.22 1323.01 7429.31 .00 .00
FOR THE NA RIG NUMBER
31 55.90 .00 530.93 1278.29 3020.03 151.24 16.25
Figure 52: Average Risk Scores by Rig and by Task
Based on the Real Data Set
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it would be desirable to use a data set that covers at least 
one-year operational data for each rig rather than one-calen- 
dar-year data. In this way, if zero values are found, one 
could be certain that it is due to the non-occurrence of acci­
dents .
As a whole. Figure 52 shows consistently large risk score 
values for Task 4 for all rigs, which is the task assigned to
the floorhands. This indicates that this task is the most
injurious in well-drilling operations.
It should be noted that the claim forms used in this data 
set were not completely filled out. Some of the rig numbers 
are missing. For these cases, the rig number was labeled as 
number 31 and the rig shows high risk scores for Task 5, which
is a task assigned to the maintenance crew.
4.2.2.3. Priority Determination
4.2.2.3.1. Procedure
The manipulation steps used in this priority determination 
are the same as those shown in Figures 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, and 
43, with the same exceptions for the unsafe acts and conditions 
which are replaced by tasks variables. Also the number of 
cases are changed from 84 to 475. The actual program is at­
tached as Appendix D.ll.
4.2.2.3.2. Results
The results of this test are shown in Figure 53 which in-
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PRIORITY RANK RIG NUMBER RISK SCORE
1 31 345635,9063
2 5 25830,8027
3 4 24601,4160
4 10 23929,2676
5 12 22457,9180
6 2 21382,2246
7 8 20321,1582
8 21 18058,5430
9 19 16542,0020
10 13 14232,1455
11 9 14177,1982
12 24 14080,5068
13 22 13570,7070
14 11 13075,0820
15 30 12142,7061
16 25 11611,2695
17 17 10347,6719
18 23 8648,7910
19 14 7599,5493
20 20 7429,3364
21 16 6225,0737
22 7 6014,7310
23 1 5374,3105
24 3 3488,8306
25 6 2392,9802
26 18 1525,7903
27 28 757,7400
28 27 622,5852
29 26 78,7992
30 15 27,5343
31 29 , 0000
Figure 53: Ranked Rigs Based on the Real Data Set
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dicates that Rigs 5, 4, 10, 12, and 2 have the five highest 
ranks for correction. Rig 31 cannot be considered as having 
priority because in reality it does not exist. Rigs 2 and 22 
which show large losses in the total costs report place fifth 
and twelfth in the rank list. This fact again proves that 
severe accidents are not automatically prioritized for correc­
tions.
4.2.2.4. Refinement of Information of the Priority Rig 
by Task and by Length of Employment
4.2.2.4.1. Procedure
The manipulation sequence to present this report on the 
priority rigs is the same as that used when hypothetical data 
was used, with the same exception described under 4.2.2.3.
The actual program is attached as Appendix D.12.
4.2.2.4.2. Results
The results of this test can be seen in Figure 54 which 
shows a general trend of large risk score values in the first 
category of employment for Task 4 for all priority rigs. Thus, 
the employees within the first employment category doing Task 
4 are the high risk population in well-drilling operations.
It appears that Task 4 is especially hazardous as seen from 
the risk scores in Rigs 12 and 2 where workers in the third 
and second categories of employment still incur high risk 
scores.
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Figure 54: Refined Information of the Prioritized
Rigs by Task and by Employment Category
FOR PRIORITY RIG* 5
RISK SCORES BY TASK AND LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY 
TASK* 1 2  3
1 117,64 80,24 99,96 ,00
1409,99 ,00 ,00 ,00
3 2693,30 ,00 ,00 ,00
4 21429,67 ,00 ,00 ,00
,00 ,00 ,00 ,00
♦00 ,00 ,00
,00 ,00 ,00 ,00
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Figure 54 (cont.)
FOR PRIORITY RIG# 4
RISK SCORES BY TASK AND LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT 
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY 
TASK* 1 2 3 4
1 318,25 5,07 ,00 ,00
2 860,45 ,00 ,00 ,00
3 2504,53 ,00 ,00 ,00
4 20680,42 ,00 ,00 ,00
5 ,00 ,00 ,00 .00
6 ,00 ,00 ,00 232,70
7 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00
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Figure 54 (cont.)
FOR PRIORITY RIG* 10
RISK SCORES BY TASK AND LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT 
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY 
TASK* 1 2 3 4
37,15 ,00 .00 31,81
2250,93 ,00 .00 .00
3 ,00 .00 .00 .00
4 21601,80 .00 .00 ,00
,00 ,00 ,00 .00
5,83 .00 .00 ,00
1,75 .00 .00 ,00
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Figure 54 .(cont.) .
FOR PRIORITY RIG# 12
RISK SCORES BY TASK AND LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT 
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY
TASK* 1 2  3 4
366,54 87,84 ,00 ,00
2 1261,99 ,00 ,00 ,00
3 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00
4 17556,84 ,00 2043,30 ,00
,00 « 00 ,00 1141,41
,00 ,00 ,00 ,00
,00 ,00 ,00 ,00
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Figure 54 i,cont.)
FOR PRIORITY RIG* 2
RISK SCORES BY TASK AND LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT 
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY 
TASK# 1 2 3
1 278,62 ,00 ,00 ,00
2 775,55 ,00 629,75 ,00
3 1675,00 ,00 ,00 ,00
4 12975,26 1640,20 ,00 ,00
3288,09 ,<M) ,CW ,00
6 ,00 ,00 ,00 119,75
,00 ,00 ,00 ,00
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4.2.2.5. Refinement of Information of the Priority Rig,
Task, and Category of Employment by Case Numbers
4.2.2.5.1. Procedure
The sequence of steps taken to present the refinement of 
the information of the priority rig, task, and category of 
employment selected from the previous report (see Figure 54) 
are almost the same as those depicted in the flow diagram in 
Figure 47. The difference lies in the request of information 
to be printed. In this program, the request to print the 
causes of the cases is being omitted. The actual program used 
is attached as Appendix D.13.
4.2.2.5.2. Results
The results of this second refinement step are shown in 
Figure 55 which is a sample representing the refinement of 
Rigs 5 and 2. These examples are taken to show that this test, 
using an actual accident data set, supports the previous 
findings when using the hypothetical data set. Rig 5 contain­
ing minor but frequent accidents ranks first in the priority 
list. On the other hand. Rig 2 which has one major accident 
with a total cost of 7400 man-hours as well as other minor ac­
cidents, only places fifth at the rank list. Also, this major 
accident is not the major contributor of the high risk score 
of Rig 2 (RS = 3288.09). In fact, the minor accidents in Task 
4 contribute the most to the high risk score (RS = 12975.26) 
in this rig.
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Figure 55: Prioritized Rigs, Tasks, and Employment 
Categories by Case Numbers
FOR PRIORITY RIG* 5
FOR TASK* 4
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY 1
WITH RISK SCORE OF 21429.67
CASE* MANHOURS LOST
81 1 6 300
812 3 30
81 310 260
81 337 190
81 429 260
81 430 300
81 615 190
81 618 300
81 619 380
81 634 35
81 635 35
81 8 3 20
81 820 220
811026 150
811129 520
811211 220
FOR PRIORITY RIO* 5
FOR TASK* 3
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY 1
WITH RISK SCORE OF 2693.30
CASE* MMMOURS LOST
81 529 380
8111 7 190
811216 220
191
Figure 55 (cont.)
FOR PRIORITY RIO* 2
FOR TASK* 4
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY 1
WITH RISK SCORE OF 12975.26
CAGE* MANHOURS LOST
81 4 5 190
815 9 520
81 626 35
81 7 5 190
81 833 380
81 945 220
8111 5 550
FOR PRIORITY RIG* 2
FOR TASK* 5
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY 1
WITH RISK SCORE OF 3288.09
CASE* MANHOURS LOST
81 327 7400
FOR PRIORITY RIG* 2
FOR TASK* 3
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY 1
WITH RISK SCORE OF 1675.00
CASE* MMHOURS LOST
81 329 600
81 725 190
81 9 9 190
FOR PRIORITY RIG* 2
FDR TASK* 4
IXNGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY 2
WITH RISK SCORE OF 1640.20
CASE* MANHOURS LOST
Bill 6 190
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS
This conclusion chapter will be divided into two sections:
(1) A general section which discusses conclusions 
deduced from literature.
(2) A specific section which recapitulates the 
qualities and the results of testing the MIS.
5.1. General
The oil-well drilling industry is presently categorized 
into the high-hazard classification due to the consistently 
high accident rates incurred. It was therefore concluded that 
the safety activities practiced thus far could no longer re­
duce the present accident rates. Hence, the oil-well drilling 
industry needs to have a model which is better than the tradi­
tional safety practices if the accident rates are to be re­
duced .
An improved model should be based on the system and the 
management causation models, the two best and most acceptable 
causation models at this time. Both causation models are con­
sidered suitable to the oil-well drilling industry. It is the 
management causation model that can provide the "people" ap­
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proach to accident prevention, which is exactly what is need­
ed by this industry. According to the management causation 
model, inferior management practices are the underlying causes 
of accidents. To reduce or eliminate those underlying causes, 
management needs to monitor and control the implementation of 
the existing management safety policy (MSP). The monitoring 
procedure can be accomplished by also adopting the system causa­
tion model to provide the necessary feedback mechanism. The 
adoption of the management causation model is also supported 
by Levitt's findings (1975) which suggest that top managers in 
high-hazard industries should be knowledgeable about the safety 
aspects of the company and involve safety in their management 
duties. To assure the usefulness of feedback information, ac­
cident data must be presented as parameters which can be re­
lated to the managers' previous knowledge, such as costs and 
risk scores. In this way, the model supports management in 
making and carrying out safety decisions.
To ensure the functioning of the model, another source of 
motivation, in addition to the existing legal requirements, 
should be used as the foundation of the model. Accident costs 
were taken to be the most acceptable among the other existing 
sources of motivation. The drilling industry is too large to 
use humanitarian concern as a source of motivation. The com­
pany's safety image as a source of motivation is inadequate 
for accident prevention. The total accident costs, therefore, 
seems to be the most suitable; it was reported to be success-
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fully applied in the construction industry which, like oil- 
well drilling, is also classified as a high-hazard industry.
The model is then called the Management Information 
System (MIS) because besides having causation models and moti­
vation sources as its basis, it also has the special ability 
of transforming accident data into pertinent information to 
aid management in making, carrying out, and controlling safety 
decisions. The emphasis in the development of the MIS is to 
be only on the processor element which contains decision mod­
els. The incorporation of the models into this MIS is meant 
to be used for the transformation of data into information 
which assists management in the decision processes associated 
with poorly understood problems only.
It is also concluded that the MIS should be flexible as 
well as adaptable. An MIS is considered flexible if it can pro­
vide the required information to different levels of manage­
ment. Because of the constant advancement of technology in 
the field of oil-well drilling safety, it is desirable to have 
a MIS that is adaptive to the progress of safety technology.
5.2. Specific
The specific discussions of the conclusions will be cover­
ed in the following two sections:
(1) Conclusions on the basic qualities of the MIS.
(2) Conclusions draim from the results of the tests.
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5.2.1. Basic Qualities of the MIS
(1) The MIS dictates the need to continuously inspect the 
system for hazard identification and investigate acci­
dents, produce feedback, and therefore is based on a sys­
tem causation model.
(2) The conclusion that this MIS is based on the management 
causation model can be drawn from the following reports 
and procedures:
(i) The monthly accident causation reports presenting 
the underlying causes (faulty management practices) 
by accident case and by month is a report that helps 
management monitor, evaluate, control, and improve 
the management safety policies. Without these re­
ports, the management group will not be able to dis­
cern the causes of accidents; hence, no improvement 
of the existing safety conditions can be made.
(ii) The procedure of revealing the underlying causes of 
accidents is found in the prioritized rigs. It is 
a process which consists of two steps. The first 
step discloses the direct causes of accidents and 
the second reveals the underlying causes of each ac­
cident case. These steps are taken in accordance 
with the accident theorems or accident sequence (see 
Chapter 2).
(iii) The procedure of prioritizing rigs for correction,
as based on the magnitude of their risk scores, shows
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that it is the safety performance of the managers 
that is being investigated, rather than the causes 
of the accidents per se. The accidents and the haz­
ards contributing to the high risk scores in the pri­
ority rigs might or might not be the same as those 
occurring in the other rigs. In the prioritized 
rigs, however, accidents occur consistently over 
time and their frequency may also be high. Hence, 
the difference between the prioritized and the non­
prioritized rigs must lie in the safety performance 
of the managers associated to the rigs. And since 
the underlying causes of accidents are defined as 
inferior management practices, the prioritized rigs 
must be managed by those managers which perform 
poorly in safety. It can therefore be concluded 
that this procedure uses the basic principles of 
the management causation model in the prioritization 
of rigs for correction.
(3) The conclusion that this MIS uses legal requirements as 
a source of motivation can be drawn from the fact that 
evaluations of safety problems are based on existing legal 
requirements.
(4) The use of the total accident cost as another source of 
motivation in this MIS can be concluded from the fact 
that total accident cost report is included in the monthly
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costs report and used in accident costs accounting.
(5) The transformation of accident data into operational in­
formation is another basic quality this MIS should con­
tain. The quality of data transformation into informa­
tion and its resulting effects are reflected in the fol­
lowing reports produced by the MIS for different levels 
of management :
(i) The total accident cost reports, which are used for 
accident costs accounting and managers motivation, 
are prepared from injury data. This data would 
normally not reflect costs of accidents to any reader, 
especially if presented as individual accident re­
cords or forms.
(ii) The report on priority rigs is a report that is pre­
pared by transforming accident and hazard data into 
risk scores. The priorities are then determined in 
accordance with the magnitude of the total risk 
scores existing in the individual rigs. If these ac­
cident and hazard records were presented to any 
reader, they would not reflect the need for correc­
tion. But this MIS can transform this data into 
risk score figures which are further used to deter­
mine priorities.
5.2.2. Conclusions of the Tests Results
(1) The tests using both the hypothetical and the real acci-
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dent data sets, as presented in the total accident cost 
reports in Figure 32 and 51, show two important findings:
(i) The major accidents which create large total acci­
dent costs do not occur frequently and are therefore 
important only as a short-term loss.
(ii) The minor but consistent accidents create small to­
tal costs, but in the long run they will produce 
large losses for the company. The large losses pro­
duced by these type of accidents can later be shown 
in the priority determination reports (see Figures 
44 and 54).
Hence, it can be concluded that all types of accidents 
must be given equal attention.and should be investigated 
thoroughly.
(2) The total accident cost report as shown in Figure 51,
which was prepared from the real accident data set, may 
or may not reflect the real estimated costs incurred by 
the oil-well drilling company from which this data set 
was taken. Discrepancies that may have occurred can un­
fortunately not be verified at this time due to the ex­
isting time constraints. But if differences are found at 
a later time, the following two reasons are now offered 
for their solution:
(i) The direct to the indirect costs ratio used in the 
computation of 1:2 might be too conservative for 
this particular drilling company.
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(ii) The Robinson matrix used in these tests was designed 
for the construction industry which may or may not 
apply to this drilling company, even if both the 
construction and the drilling industries are in the 
same high-hazard classification.
Hence, a matter of future research would be to determine 
a matrix for the oil-well drilling industry like the one 
developed by Robinson for the construction industry.
Such a matrix can become a powerful tool in the estimation 
of the total accident costs incurred as well as the moti­
vation of managers to prevent accidents in the drilling 
industry.
(3) The accident causation report can help locate problem 
areas and their possible solutions. An example of this 
is the report shown in Figure 34d which indicates that 
Superintendent 3 has been most frequently involved in 
the occurence of accidents and that most of the poor safe­
ty practices are concentrated at the toolpusher's and 
the workers' levels. The same results are revealed in a 
later report of the refinement of priority rigs. Thus, 
this accident causation report can be used as a warning 
of future problems, prompting the need for change, and 
improvement.
On the other hand, the real data set does not con­
tain such underlying causes of accidents; therefore, the
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above report cannot be made with this data set. However, 
if one looks carefully at the forms provided by OSHA or 
other forms used by individual companies to record acci­
dents (see examples of forms in Appendix C), one can see 
that entries are available to document direct causes as 
well as to describe how the accident occurred. Unfortu­
nately, these forms are never completely filled out.
Not all data related to the causes of accidents exists. 
Hence, it can be concluded that companies, as the pro­
viders of data, will only record that data which will 
benefit the company, i.e., in the case of this data set, 
to obtain Workers' Compensation benefits.
(4) The test using the actual data set indicates consistently 
high risk scores for Task 4 and Length of Employment (LE) 
1. These findings can be seen in Figures 52 and 55, which 
show the average risk scores by task and by rig for all 
rigs, and the refinement of information of the priority 
rigs respectively. Task is defined to represent condi­
tion of work (see Chapter 3), hence, the above finding 
implies that Task 4, which is the task assigned to floor- 
hands, is the most unsafe condition found in this drill­
ing company. LE is defined to represent the human factor 
in the interaction with tasks (see Chapter 3), hence, LE 
1 is the most hazardous category of workers found in this 
drilling company. This test result supports Siskind's
201
findings which state that workers incur the most injuries 
within their first few months on the job. If Task 4 and 
LE 1 are combined, the risk scores become significantly 
higher compared to the other LE categories (see Figure 
55). The hazardousness of Task 4 can be seen also in 
Figure 54 which shows that it is still dangerous for 
workers categorized as LE 2 and LE 3.
Routine on-the-job training for all new employees, 
irrespective of their experience, may reduce the risk of 
accidents for the workers within LE 1 and constant mana­
gement attention to this group of workers may reduce these 
risks. As for the importance of Task 4 in accident occur­
rence, further research may be needed to eliminate the 
problem. Finally, the above findings can be considered 
an example of an additional advantage this MIS can pro­
vide, i.e., helping management find problem areas for 
further investigation or study.
(5) The tests using both the hypothetical and the real data 
sets indicate that frequency of accidents plays a very 
large role in the determination of priorities for correc­
tions . The priorities which are determined based on the 
total risk scores existing in a rig is, in turn, de­
pendent upon the consequences (C), the frequency of ex­
posure to the direct causes (E), and the probability that 
similar accidents will occur (P) for each individual ac-
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cident. Thus, for the minor but frequently occurring ac­
cidents, the P is high and so is the E; depending on the 
magnitude of the C, the risk scores for these accidents 
together may be very high. For a major injury case, the 
C is certainly high, but since it seldom occurs, the P 
is small and so is the E. Hence, major accidents will 
generally not generate a high risk score and are therefore 
of short-term importance only. For the above reasons it 
can be concluded that priority determination in this MIS 
is a measure of risk v;hich predicts long-term effects of 
the present managerial safety performance. Since the con­
sequences of a priority determination require that changes 
in the MSP be made, these prioritizing activities should 
only be done periodically.
Another conclusion that can be drawn from the pro­
cess of priority determination is that all types of acci­
dents (major, minor, first-aid, near misses) deserve equal 
attention from the managers and the safety experts; they 
should all be thoroughly investigated.
Finally, it can also be concluded that the changes 
made as a result of this priority determination and the 
consequent alternative assessment will benefit the com­
pany because this assessment is based on cost-effective­
ness .
(6) The tests reveal that various reports required by the
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different levels of the organization can be produced by 
using simple routine procedures (see Appendix D). The 
management group is presented with the total accident 
cost reports (Figures 32 and 51), a summary of the acci­
dent causation report (Figure 34d), a report on priori­
tized rigs (Figures 44 and 53), reports on refinement of 
information (Figures 46, 48, 54, and 55), and reports on 
alternative assessment (Figure 50). The superintendents 
receive the same total accident cost reports (Figures 32 
and 51), accident causation reports related to their own 
rig operations (Figures 34a, 34b, and 34c). Like the 
superintendents, the toolpushers receive the total acci­
dent cost reports (Figures 32 and 51) and reports on ac­
cident causation which contain feedback to their own and 
their workers' safety performance (Figure 35). The a- 
bove reports then show the flexibility of the MIS.
(7) This MIS is adaptable to the advancement of technology. 
The decision models (Robinson, Jones, and Fine) adopted 
in this MIS can be changed and improved without altering 
the basic concept of the MIS. Hence, this model is 
flexible; it can accomodate variables that management 
perceives important and maybe used on a relative basis 
(as the risk scores and the J factors are currently) to 
measure performance. The sequence of collecting accident 
and hazard data, transforming it into useful information, 
and presenting it in reports can be maintained. The
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change will affect only the process by which the data is 
collected, transformed, and presented. The same prin­
ciples apply to the categorizations of the direct causes 
used in this MIS.
(8) This MIS offers opportunities to achieve significant re­
duction of accident costs. This will be directly measur­
able through the reduced Workers’ Compensation insurance 
premium.
(9) Other findings resulting from the tests.
(i) From the quality differences existing between the 
hypothetical and the real data sets, the following 
conclusions can be drawn:
- Data should be collected only to fulfill certain 
purposes or objectives so that their high quality 
can be guaranteed.
- Since resources are necessary for the collection 
of data, the providers should also be the users 
of data so that the benefits of the information 
received justifies the costs of collecting the 
data which, in turn, will again maintain the high 
quality of the data assembled.
(ii) Safety reports which are sent to the different levels 
of management should contain only data which can be 
received as useful information. Managers should 
therefore not be presented with raw accident data or
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rates. This raw data should be converted into pa­
rameters such as costs and risk scores which can as­
sist management in the process of decision-making,
(iii) The continuous execution of this MIS will result in 
the accumulation of experience; hence, it is also 
a learning process. For example, managers can learn 
to evaluate the acceptability of risk scores, "J" 
factors, the effects of accident costs accounting, 
training, and bonus granting for accident prevention,
(iv) Inspite of all the above advantages, the execution 
of this MIS needs to be supported by the develop­
ment of a data base management subsystem and the 
utilization of the 4x4 Problem-Solving Technique 
(Jones, 1980) which can reveal the underlying causes 
of accidents.
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APPENDIX A 
TOTAL ACCIDENT COST ESTIMATION
A method to estimate the total accident cost by a matrix 
was developed by Robinson (1979) for the construction indus­
try. It has been tested and applied in several industries 
with succesful results. Its principal method of development, 
the resulting matrix, and an example of its use are discuss­
ed below.1
Method of Development
Basically, the matrix was developed based on the direct 
costs of accidents, and to get to the total costs, these di­
rect costs were multiplied by a factor of three, i.e., a ratio 
of two between the direct and the indirect.costs was decided 
upon. The matrix was developed in the following 
procedure :
(1) The direct costs of several thousands accidents result­
ing from various types of works in different parts of 
the country over a three year period were collected.
(2) These direct costs were then classified on the basis of
^Michal R. Robinson, Accident Cost Accounting as a Means 
of Improving Safety in Construction (California; Stanford 
University, 1979), pp. 26-32.
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the three following variables, namely
- the parts of the body injured (ANSI, 1969 classi­
fication)
- the nature of injury (ANSI, 1969 classification)
- whether or not the injury resulted in a lost time 
(OSHA definition).
(3) Adjustments for inflation were, made so that all costs 
were in the 1979 dollars.
(4) The three variables were arranged in a matrix schedule 
as shown on page 33.
(5) The direct cost data for each cell of the matrix were 
arranged in accordance to the above schedule and the 
mean values were calculated.
(6) The mean values were then multiplied by three.
(7) Finally, these ..total costs were converted into their 
equivalent labor hours so that the matrix became.
.universally useful.
ACCIDENT COST SCHEDULE, LABOR HOURS
Numbers on the left side are for no-lost-tlme accidents: numbers to right are fbr lost-tlme 
accidents; NA - Not Applicable. All costs are In equivalent labor hours; to obtain a dollar 
value, multiply by Job labor rata Including fringe benefits: then round off totals.
''V. Injury 
\ ^ v p a  
Body
Part \ Amputation
strain 
Sprain 
Crush, Mash 
Smash Fracture
Cut
Puncture
Laceration Burn
Bruise
Abrasion Other
Head. Face NA NA 56 6O0 26 226 25 556 26 75 25 450
Eye Is) 5,300 tl) 
18.000 12)
NA NA 20 226 15 366 26 "75 2o 380
Neck and 
Shoulder
■ RA ' 25 520 Il6 666 26 226 25 360 26 l5o 26 520
Arm Is) and 
Elbow Is)
14.000 II)
18.000 (2)
is 5oo 75 450 26 226 2o 360 26 22o 20 450
Mtlst Is) and 
Hand
3,èoo <li 
18.000 (2)
>0 1^ 50 656 20 2iO 25 380 26 356 25 456
Thumb Is) and 
FInqar Is)
600 ee.
UP to 2.800
26 — 166"” 25 386 26 226 15 560 15 22o T5 366
Bade ISO 250 NA 7.400 2o 220 25 550 25 360 25 756 '
Chest and 
Lower Trunk
NA 55 3oo Na 20 600 25 36o 26 226 2o £80
Ribs NA 25 75 J5 5o6 Na 25 3Ao "25 226 2o £bo
Mlp NA NA 266 35 906 15" 22<r 25 366 25 366 35 5oo
Leg Is) and 
Knees
6,600 (1) 
21.000 12)
30 300 35 l , l oo 20 220 25 360 20 220 20 600
Foot Ifeei) 
Ankle Is)
5,506 ri) 
6.600 12)
20 l90 35 656 15 190 26 226 26 75 25 l5o
Toe Is) 520 ee. 
up to 3,000
26 116 " 15 190 2o 226 25 156 15 75 26 156
Hernia
Runtura
T5 £66
Heart
Attack
2,2oo
Hearing
Loss
750
Death 6.£00
ro
U>
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An Example Of Using the Matrix
To illustrate the use of the matrix, consider a worker 
whose hand is injured by a piece of lumber dropped from a 
scaffold. The worker is unable to work the next day (there­
fore, it is a lost-time accident) and it is on the second day 
that the safety engineer learns that the hand was broken.
At this time, without waiting for a report from the insurance 
carrier, the cost of the accident can be assessed by using 
the matrix. Referring to the matrix, the safety engineer 
reads down at the left "hand" and across to the right to 
"fracture", to find the "cost on the right side of the column 
(for lost-time accident) of 650 hours. In most cases this 
should be converted to a dollar cost by multiplying the hour­
ly labor cost. If it were $10.00 per hour, for example, 
the resulting total dollar cost assigned to the accident would 
be $6500.00.
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APPENDIX B 
4x4 PROBLEM-SOLVING TECHNIQUE ;
The flowchart indicating the step by step procedure, the 
rules, and the definitions of terms used in this technique 
are all cited from Jones (1981).^
Rules for the Application of the 4x4 Technique
RULE 1
"Start at the end-result and keep asking why until 
you have established corrective opportunity at the 
worker, supervisor, and management level- or have 
eliminated one or more of these with your answer."
RULE 2
"Your answers must tend to raise the level of 
generating responsibility."
RULE 3
"Your answers at each sequential step must include 
only those generating and permitting influences 
necessary for the occurrence o£ that step."
RULE 4
"If your question requires more than one answer, 
each must be taken through the why sequence 
separately."
1 Charles [J. Jones, 4x4 Problem Solving Technique, 
(Austin: Texas Safety Association, i9Sl), pp. 3,11-14.
END-RESULT 
LOSS/PRELOSS
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 
4%4 INVESTIGATION
GENERATING/PERMITTING 
INTERNAL CAUSAL INFLUENCES
ORGANIZATIONAL 
CORRECTIVE LEVELS
APPROPRIATE 
CORRECTIVE STEP/ACTION
J
3.
4.
MANAGEMENT
Establish and communicate 
policy/procedure.
Apply policy/procedure consistently 
where applicable.
Establish and communicate 
procedural monitoring.
Enforce policy/procedure based 
upon procedural monitoring.
SUPERVISOR
1. Communicate what is wanted.
2. Assure means to comply.
3. Be consistent in good example.
4. Be consistent in enforcement.
WORKER
1. Remove obstacle to proper 
performance
2. Communicate what is wanted.
3. Train/motivate/enforce.
4. Recognize/reward improved 
performance.
DATA ANALYSIS
PREVENTION PLANNING
ro
CT>
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Definition of Terms
End-result is a hyphenated word with a special meaning. It is 
any selected point along a sequential flow of causal 
influences.
Corrective opportunity level refers to the lowest organi­
zational level with the ability and authority to correct 
the internal causal influence.
Generating responsibility is the agent or agency with the 
internal capability to prevent factors which produced 
the causal influence.
Generating influence is an active causal factor which pushes 
along the sequence toward an end-result. These in­
fluences are associated with a causal event at one point 
in time. Generating influences are avenues to prevent­
ion.
Permitting influence is a passive causal factor which allows 
or acts as the medium for the event sequence to evolve 
toward an end-result.
Acceptable performance is an activity within the organization 
which has not endangered disciplinary process.
Corrective steps are the specific activities necessary at
each organizational level to produce sustaining control 
effectiveness.
Occupational accident is an organizationally unacceptable 
end-result.
APPENDIX C
EXAMPLES OF FORMS USED 
TO RECORD ACCIDENTS
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OSKA No. 101 Form opproved
Ca.-e or File N o .....................  0MB No. 44 R 1453
S u p p le m e n ta ry  R e co ril o f O c c u p a tio n a l In ju r ie s  a n d  I l ln e s s e s
EMPLOYER
1. Name __________________________________ __________________________________________________
2. Mail address_______________________ _______________________________________________________
(No. and siml) (Cily or lo«n) (Stale)
3. Location, if different from mail address  _____ ____________________________________________
INJURED OR ILL EMPLOYEE
4. N am e_____________ . . . _____________ j . . ________________Social Security N o .----------------------------
(First bsik) (Middle n ^ e )  (Lett name)
5. Hr.-ne address _____________________ ________________________________________________________
(No. and street) (City or town) (State)
6. A g e   ______ 7. Sex; Male___________ F e m a l e . . . . . . .    (Clieck one)
8. O ccupation__________     . . . ____________ ____________________________________
(Ehter regular job title, not the tpceiSc aeiivily be was performing at lime of injuiy.)
9. D epartm ent_____________ . . . . ____:_______   . . . . . ______________________________
(Enter name cl department or division in vrhieb the injured person is regularly employed, even 
though he may have been temporarily working In another department at the time of injury.)
THE ACCIDENT OR EXPOSURE TO OCCUPATIONJU. ILLNESS
10. Place of accident or exposure . . . ___. . . . _____    . . . ______________________ . . . . . . .
(No. and street) _ (City or town) _ (State)
If accident or exposure occurred on employer's premises, give address of plant or establishment in which 
it occurred. Do not indicate department or division within the plant or establishment. If accident oc> 
curted outside employer’s premises at an identifiable address, give that address. If it occurred on a pub­
lic highway or at any other ^ lace which cannot be identified by number and street, please provide place 
references locating the place of injury as accurately as possible.
11. Was place of accident or exposure on employer’s  premises? . . . . __________  (Yet or Ko)
12. What was the employee doing when in ju re d ?  _____ . . . . . _______   . . . . ----------------------
(Be ipecific. If he wai wring toolt or equipment or htodiing ihtterisl,
name them and tell what he wut doing with them.)
13. How did the accident occur?
(Describe fully the events which resulted in  the injury or oeeupstioosi illneu. Tell wbst 
happened and how it happened. Name any objects or suhtlsnees involved and tell how they weie involved. Give 
lull details on all laetois which led or eoatrihuted to the aecident Use separate sheet (or additional space.)
OCCUPATIONAL INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS
14. Describe the injury o r illness in detail and indicate the part of body affected. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(e  g.: amputation of right index finger
a t second jo in t; fracture of ribs; lead poisonhig; denaatiiis of left hand, etc.)
15. Name the object o r substance which directly injured the employee. (For example, the machine or thing 
he struck against or which struck him; the vapor or poison he inhaled or swallowed; the chemical or ra­
diation which irritated bis skin; o r in cases of strains, hernias, etc., the thing he was lifting, pulling, etc.)
16. Date of injury o r  initial diagnosis of occupational iUneas
17. Did employee die? . . . . ___  (Yea or No)
OTHER
18. Name and address o f physician  ____ . . . . . ____. . . . .
19. If hospitalised, name and address of hospital . . . ___ . . . .
(Date)
Date of report . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  Prepared hy ,
Official position . . . . . . . . . . ____. . . . . . . . . . . .
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EMPLOYER’S FIRST NOTICE O F INJURY
To: WORKERS'COMPENSATION COURT Send copin  to:
JIM THORPE BUILDING I lo W .C .C o u n
OKLAHOMA CITY. OK 7310S 1 to Imurance C tiiie r
We have been informed that one of our employen contend» that he waa injured on the job aa the m u ll of an accidental injuiy oi 
occupational diieaie. The information regarding thia alleged htjuiy aa reported to  ua ia aa follows:
EMPLOYEE
K-’-"» Soeial Seeuriry 0
lmi f tm  unea
Addmt.
(MWUW m
N K R W r  »  S i m i  C M ?  S u a
T .i.j't'n»»  Age_Sex — Length of employment or aervice.
Occupation or job description.
.. pa Mk - Ml N» a o i w r  In ■
Average weekly wage I _________ Was employment agreement made in Oklahoma? _
I t t t m w i ü t  II
INJURY
Dale of accident (or last haiardous exposure) T i"
T a m
Place of accident: C ity____________ . County — — Stat e .
Date employee reported injuiy to employer___________________________________________________
4 s  the empliiyee likely to  lose more than 3 calendar daya?_
Last date employee w orked  Tim» his work shift began _
Was employee paid full wages for that last day?____________________________________
V Has employee returned to  work? ÜS If so, on what d a te? .
• ••
Did employee die’  If so, on what date?__________________________________
Treating physician .
Nature of injuiy   L.
CuNiM Wm. «WI.
Lit; parts of body injured .
L u A p tc  m
How did the accident occur.
i D r w ? i » i  u : i »  i h r r w H U m i i i c t i i B M i i i M i M i i a i a i w T s a r  d M t w  1» li  w l n i  h e » » m < e i i d  H e w  » * f » f n e
• » « p P t t , ' i c  t u r n # *
-
•
EMPLOYER
Ncrr.e_________________________ :____________:_____________________________________ Telephone .
A s : -e s i---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tvni' c ’ I" • f» m i SIC N um ber.
t*t nft»w ».
Type s '  ownership: Kr»i, Cmvl _ Caunrv - . _ o rL o e a ! -----------------
I n  j r i - .:r  Carrier (NOT YOL-R AGE-ST) 1
hbwosfb w«p#Mtw*#p CBrrv* — w  satS'.Ms n?*iv’
Po: S u x b e-   „ , , Carrier Numbe-m—.
1 her::,, tieelorc untier penal:» ef perjury that I have examined this notice, and all statements contained herein, and tc t'.r  r t : • 
rr.. kne.-. ccfv t r s  be:.:!, they ore true, corrcet and-complcte.
Sifti'n* ta.» A», »r ■ _ _  ■ 10 _ _  ■
Prenai-es K .
SL'ftMtSSOx or THIS FOr»; i s  .not as .admis?!.'”.' C-r LI aBILITj
APPENDIX D
ACTUAL PROGRAMS USED IN THE 
TEST PROCEDURES
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D.l. Program for the Monthly Total Accident Cost Report 
Using the Hypothetical Data b>it
c program reports monthly manhours lost due to accidents by 
c superintendents and rig number. 
c input: stanford matrix and injury records
c injury records in this order : case#,rig#,task#, nature of 
c injury code#,part of the body code#,unsafe act code#, unsafe 
c condition code#,level of correction,length of employment 
c category, losttime code#,
INTEGER CSY (84),CSM(84),CSN(84),RG(84),TK(84),NI(84), 
:PB(84),UACT(84),UC0N(84),LEM(84),L0T(84),C(84),SM(17, 
:14), CRGOO) ,TCRG,CM(30,2) ,TCM(2)
CHARACTER*6 ULC(84)
N=84
DO 10 1=1,N 
C(I)=0 
10 CONTINUE 
DO 15 1=1,17 
READ*,(SM(I,J),J=1,14)
15 CONTINUE 
DO 20 1=1,N
READ*,CSY(I),CSM(I),CSN(I),RG(I),TK(I),NI(I),FB(I), 
:UACT(I),UCON(I),ULC(I),LEM(I),LOT(I)
20 CONTINUE 
DO 30 1=1,N 
IF(LOTd) .EQ.2)THEN 
L=(NI(I)*2)
C(I)=C(I)+SM(PB(I),L)
ENDIF
IF(LOTd) .NE.2) THEN 
K=NI(I)+(NI(I)-1)
Cd)=Cd)+SM(PB(I),K)
ENDIF 
30 CONTINUE 
K=1
DO 95 1=1,N 
85 IF(CSMd) .EQ.K) THEN 
J=1
88 IF(RGd) .EQ.J) THEN 
CM(J,K)=CM(J,K)+C(I)
ENDIF
J=J+1
IF(J.GT.30) GOTO 95
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GOTO 88
ELSE
K=K+1
IF(K.GT.2) GOTO 96
GOTO 85
ENDIF
95 CONTINUE
96 DO 98 K=l,2 
DO 97 L=l,30 
TCM(K)=TCM(K)+CM(L,K)
97 CONTINUE
98 CONTINUE 
PRINT*,(TCM*K),K=1,2)
TCRG=0
DO 100 1=1,2 
TCRG=TCRG+TCM(I)
100 CONTINUE
DO 120 J=l,30 
CRG(J)=0 
DO 110 K=l,2 
CRG(J)=CRG(J)+CM(J,K)
110 CONTINUE 
120 CONTINUE
PRINT'(//T2,A//T2,A,T25,A,T50,A/)',
:'XYZ DRILLING CO., ACCIDENT REPORT IN MANHOURS LOST, 
:BY MONTH,1982',
:'SUPERINTENDENT',' RIG NUMBER ','JAN FEB MCH APR MAY 
:JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC TOTAL'
L=1
DO 200 1=1,10
PRINT'(T2,A,I3)' SUPERINTENDENT',I 
DO 150 J=l,3
PRINT'(T30,A,I3,T47,2(I6,)60X,I7)','RIG#',L,(CM(L,K), 
:K=1,2),CRG(L)
L=L+1
IF(L.GT.30) GOTO 200 
150 CONTINUE 
200 CONTINUE
PRINT'(//T39,A,2(16,),60X,I7)','TOTAL :',(TCM(K), 
:K=1,2),TCRG 
STOP 
END
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D.2. Program for the Accident Causation Report by Superinten­
dents, Toolpushers, and Case Numbers
c program presents reports on accident causations by super- 
c intendants, toolpushers, and by case numbers, 
c input: one month injury records: case#,rig#,underlying
c causes.
INTEGER CS(50), RG(50),M2(50),M3(50),52(50),33(50), 
:W2(50),W3(50,TOTL(3,12),SPTOTL(10,12),C0T0TL(12)jSUBTL 
CHARACTER Ml(50),51(50),Ul(50)
DO 10 1=1,10 
DO 5 J=l,12 
5PTOTL(I,J)=0 
5 CONTINUE
10 CONTINUE
DO ll'K=l,12 
COTOTL(K)=0
11 CONTINUE 
5UBTL=0
50 15 1=1,50
READ*, C5(I),RG(I),M1(I),M2(I),M3(I),51(1),52(1), 
:53(I),W1(I),W2(I),U3(I)
15 CONTINUE 
M=1
DO 200 1=1,10
PRINT'(//T2,A,I3,3(/T2,A))',
:'/f TO :5UPERINTENDENT #',I,
:'FROM :THE SAFETY DEPARTMENT',
:'SUBJECT:ACCIDENT CAUSATION REPORT',
:'PERIOD : JANUARY,1983'
DO 19 11=1,3 
DO 17 IJ=1,12 
TOTL(II,IJ)=0 
17 CONTINUE 
19 CONTINUE
DO 150 J= 1,3
PRINT'(///T2,A,13, A//T2,A)',
:'T00LPU5MER #',M,' UNDERLYING CAUSES AT LEVELS
:0F CORRECTION',
: ' CASE # M M -S M -S -W M -W 5 5
:-W W '
L=1
20 IF(RG(L).EQ.M) THEN
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)) GOTO 80 
).AND.(U1(L).NE.
).AND.(W1(L).EQ.
).AND.(W1(L).NE.
).AND.(W1(L).NE.
).AND.(U1(L).EQ.
)) GOTO 86
LL=CS(L)
IF( (MKL) .EQ." ") .AND. (SKL) .WQ."
IF( (MKL) .EQ." ") .AND. (SKL) .NE."
" ")) GOTO 81
IF((MKL).WQ." ").AND.(SKL).NE."
" ")) GOTO 82
IF((MKL) .NE." ") .AND. (SKL) .EQ."
" ")) GOTO 83
IF((MKL) .NE." ") .AND. (SKL) .NE."
" ")) GOTO 84
IF((MKL).NE." ") .AND. (SKL) .NE."
:" ")) GOTO 85
IF( (SKL) .EQ." ") .AND.(WKL) .EQ."
80 PRINT*(T6,I6,63X,A,2I/)',LL,W1(L),W2(L),W3(L)
K=W3(L)
CALL TTL(K,T0TL(J,12))
GOTO 90
81 PRINT' (T6,I6,52X,A,2I,2A,2I/)' ,LL,SKL) ,S2(L) ,S3(L),
: ,W1(L),W2(L),W3(L)
K=W3(L)
CALL TTL(I(,T0TL(J,11))
K=S3(L)
CALL TTL(K,TOTL(J,10))
GOTO 90
82 PRINT’(T6,I6,46X,A,2I/)',LL,S1(L),S2(L),S3(L)
K=S3(L)
CALL TTL(K,T0TL(J,9))
GOTO 90
83 PRINT'(T6,I6,36X,A,2I,2A,2I/)',LL,M1(L),M2(L),M3(L), 
: '-' ,UKL) ,W2(L),W3(L)
K=W3(L)
CALL TTL(K,T0TL(J,8))
K=M3(L)
CALL TTL(I(,T0TL(J,7))
GOTO 90
84 PRINT'(T6,I6,22X,A,2I,2A,2I,2A,2I/)',LL,M1(L),M2(L), 
:M3(L), ,S1(L),S2(L),S3(L), ,W1(L),W2(L),W3(L)
K=W3(L)
CALL TTL(K,T0TL(J,6))
K=S3(L)
CALL TTL(K,T0TL(J,5))
K=M3(L)
CALL TTL(K,T0TL(J,4))
GOTO 90
85 PRINT'(T6,I6,12X,A,2I,2A,2I/)',LL,M1(L),M2(L),M3(L), 
: '-' ,SKL) ,s2(L),S3(L)
K=S3(L)
CALL TTL(K,T0TL(J,3))
K=M3(L)
CALL TTL(K,T0TL(J,2))
GOTO 90
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86 PRINT'(T6,I6,6X,A,2I/)',LL,M1(L),M2(L),M3(L)
K=M3(L)
CALL TTL(K,T0TL(J,1))
90 ENDIF 
L=L+1
IF(L.GT.50) GOTO 99 
GOTO 20 
99 DO 100 L=l,12
SPTOTL(I,L)=SPTOTL(I,L)+TOTL(J,L)
100 CONTINUE
PRINT'(/T2,A,7X,I2,2(4X,I2,1X,A>I2),1X,A, 
I2,4X,I2,1X,A,I2,2(4X,I2),1X,A,I2,4X,I2)',' TOTAL', 
T0TL(J,1),T0TL(J,2),'-',T0TL(J,3),T0TL(J,4),TOTL 
(J,5),,T0TL(J,6),T0TL(J,7), ,TOTL(J,8),TOTL(J,9), 
TOTL(J,10), ,T0TL(J,11),T0TL(J,12)
M=M+1 
150 CONTINUE 
200 CONTINUE
DO 220 11=1,12 
DO 210 JJ=1,10
COTOTL(II)=COTOTL(II)+SPTOTL(JJ,II)
210 CONTINUE 
220 CONTINUE
PRINT"(4(/T2,A)/)',
:'/f TO :THE MANAGEMENT GROUP',
:'FROM : THE SAFETY DEPARTMENT',
:'SUBJECT:ACCIDENT CAUSATIONS REPORT',
:'PERIOD : JANUARY,1983'
PRINT'(//T2,A//T20,A//)',
:'SUPERINTENDENT UNDERLYING CAUSES AT LEVELS
:'0F CORRECTION,
:'M M -S M -S -W M -W S S -W W '
DO 300 1=1,10
PRINT'(T7,I2,11X,2(I2,4X,I2,1X,A),2(I2,1X,A,I2,4X),I2, 
:4X,I2,1X,A,I2,4X,I2/)',I,SPT0TL(I,1),SPT0TL(I,2), ,  
:SPT0TL(I,3),SPT0TL(I,4),'-',SPTOTL(I, 5 ) , ' ,SPTOTL(I, 
:6),SPT0TL(I,7),'-',SPTOTL(1,8),SPTOTL(I,9),SPTOTL(I,1 
:0),'-',SPT0TL(I,11),SPT0TL(I,12)
300 CONTINUE
PRINT'(/T2,A,9X,I2,2(3X,I2,A,I2),1X,A,I2,4X,I2,1X,A,I 
;2,2(4X,I2),1X,A,I2,4X,I2)',
' TOTAL',COTOTL(1),COTOTL(2),'-',COTOTL(3),COTOTL
(4),'-',C0T0TL(5), ,C0T0TL(6),C0T0TL(7), , COTOTL
(8),C0T0TL(9),COTOTL(10),'-',COTOTL(11),COTOTL(12)
STOP 
END
SUBROUTINE TTL(L,SUBTL)
INTEGER L,SUBTL 
IF(L.EQ.O) THEN 
SUBTL=SU3TL+1 
ELSE
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SUBTL=SUBTL+2
ENDIF
RETURN
END
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D.3. Program for the Accident Causation Report by Toolpushers 
and by Case Numbers
c program presents reports on accident causations by toolpush- 
c erSj and by case numbers.
c input: one month injury records: casein,rig#,underlying
c causes.
INTEGER CS(50),RG(50),M2(50),M3(50),52(50),83(50),U2 
:(50),U3(50),TOTL(30,12),SUBTL 
CHARACTER MK50) ,51(50) ,W1(50)
5UBTL=0 
DO 14 1=1,50
READ*,C5(I),RG(I),M1(I),M2(I),M3(I),51(1),52(1),53(1), 
:W1(I),W2(I),W3(I)
15 CONTINUE 
M=1
DO 19 11=1,30 
DO 17 IJ=1,12 
TOTL(II,IJ)=0 
17 CONTINUE
19 CONTINUE
DO 150 J=l,30
PRINT'(///T2,A,13, A//T2,A)',
:'/f T00LPU5HER #',H,' UNDERLYING CAU5E5 AT LEVEL5
:0F CORRECTION',
: ' CA5E # M M -5 m -5 -W M -W 5
: 5 -W W '
L=1
20 IF(RG(L).EQ.M) THEN 
LL=C5(L)
IF( (MKL) .EQ." ").AND.(51(L).EQ." ")) GOTO 80 
IF( (MKL) .EQ." ") .AND.(5KL) .NE." ") .AND. (Wl(L) .NE.
"  ")) GOTO 81
IF((MKL).EQ." ") .AND.(5KL).NE." ") .AND. (Wl(L) .EQ.
" ")) GOTO 82
IF((MKL) .NE." ") .AND.(5KL).EQ." ") .AND. (Wl(L) .NE.
" ")) GOTO 83
IF ((MKL).NE." ").AND.(51(L).NE." " ) .AND. (U1 (L) .NE.
")) GOTO 04
IF((OKL).RE." ").AND.(SKL).NE." ") :#DTW1CL) .EQ. 
rO:i'mi GOTO 85
IF((5KL).EQ." ").AND.(WKL).EQ." ")) GOTO 90 
80 PRINT' (T6,I6,62X,A,2I/) ' ,LLVJ1(L) ,W2(L) ,W3(L)
K=W3(L)
CALL TTL(K,T0TL(J,12))
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GOTO 90
81 PRINT'(T6,I5,52X,A,2I,2A,2I/)',LL,S1(L),S2(L),S3(L), 
:'-',Wl(L),W2(L),W3(L)
K=W3(L)
CALL TTL(K,T0TL(J,1D)
K=S3(L)
CALL TTL(K,TOTL(J,10))
GOTO 90
82 PRINT'(T6,I6,46X,A,2I/)',LL,S1(L),S2(L),S3(L)
K=S3(L)
CALL TTL(K,T0TL(J,9))
GOTO 90
83 PRINT'(T6,I6,39X,2A,2I/)',LL,'-' ,W1(L),
:W2(L),W3(L)
K=W3(L)
CALL TTL(K,TOTL(J,8))
GOTO 90
84 PRINT'(T6,I6,25X,2A,2I,2A,2I/)',LL,'-',
:S1(L),S2(L),S3(L), ,W1(L),W2(L),W3(L)
K=W3(L)
CALL TTL(K,T0TL(J,6))
K=S3(L)
CALL TTL(K,T0TL(J,5))
GOTO 90
85 PRINT'(T6,I6,15X,2A,2I/)', L L , ,
:S1(L),S2(L),S3(L)
K=S3(L)
CALL TTL(K,T0TL(J,3))
GOTO 90 
90 ENDIF 
L=L+1
IF(L.GT.SO) GOTO 99 
GOTO 20
99 PRINT'(/T2,A,16X,A,I2,8X,A,
:I2,A,I2,7X,A,I2,2(4X,I2),A,I2,4X,I2)',' TOTAL', 
,T0TL(J,3),'-',T0TL(J,5),'-',
:TOTL(J,6), ,TOTL(J,8),TOTL(J,9),TOTL(J,10),'-', 
:T0TL(J,11),T0TL(J,12)
M=M+1 
150 CONTINUE 
STOP 
END
SUBROUTINE TTL(L,SUBTL)
INTEGER L,SUBTL 
IF(L.EQ.O) THEN 
SUBTL=SUBTL+1 
ELSE
SUBTL=SUBTL+2
ENDIF
RETURN
END
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D.4. Program for the Average Risk Scores by Rig and by Task 
Using the Hypothetical Data set
c program calculates risk scores prospectively 
c prints out risk scores by rig# and by task 
c input: stanford matrix and injury records
INTEGER CSY(84),CSM{84),CSN(84),RG(84),TK(84),NI(84), 
:PB(84),UACT(84),UC0N(84),LEM(84),L0T(84),C(84),SM(17, 
:14),E(84)
REAL P(84),RS(84),RSTK(1),MRSTK(31,7),SUI1P,CCS 
CHARACTER*6 ULC(84)
N=84
DO 10 1=1,N 
C(I)=0 
E(I)=1 
P(I)=0.0 
10 CONTINUE 
DO 15 1=1,17 
READ*,(SM(I,J),J=1,14)
15 CONTINUE 
DO 20 1=1,N
READ*,CSY(I),CSM(I),CSN(I),RG(I),TK(I),NI(I),PB(I), 
rUACTd) ,UCON(I),ULC(I) ,LEM(I) ,LOT(I)
20 CONTINUE 
DO 30 1=1,N 
IF(LOT(I).EQ.2)THEN 
L=(NI(I)*2)
C(I)=C(I)+SM(PB(I),L)
ENDIF
IF(L0T(I).NE.2) THEN 
K=NI(I)+(NI(I)-1)
C(I)=C(I)+SM(PB(I),K)
ENDIF
30 CONTINUE
DO 40 1=1,N 
IF(E(I).GT.l) GOTO 40 
J=I+1
IF(J.GT.N) GOTO 32
31 CONTINUE
IF((UACT(J).EQ.UACT(I)).AND.(UCON(J).EQ.UCON(I))) THEN 
E(I)=E(I)+1 
ENDIF 
J=J+1
Î31
IF(J.GT.N) GOTO 32 
GOTO 31
32 K=I+1 
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 40
33 IF((UACT(K).EQ.UACT(I)).AND.(UCON(K).EQ.UCON(I))) THEN
E(K)=E(I)
ENDIF
K=K+1
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 40 
GOTO 33 
40 CONTINUE 
J=0
DO 60 1=1,N 
SUI1P=1.0
IF(P{I).GT.0.0) GOTO 60 
J=I+1
IF(J.GT.N) G0T049 
45 IF((UACT(K).EQ.UACT(I)).AND.(UCON(K).EQ.UCON(I)).AND. 
:(C(K).EQ.C(I))) THEN 
SUMP=SUMP+1 
ENDIF 
J=J+1
IF(J.GT.N)GOTO 49 
GOTO 45
49 Z=SUMP/84.0 
P(I)=P(I)+Z 
K=I+1
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 60
50 CONTINUE
IF((UACT(K).EQ.UACTd)).AND.(UCON(K).EQ.UCON(I)).AND. 
:(C(K).EQ.C(I))) THEN 
P(K)=P(I)
ENDIF
K=K+1
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 60 
GOTO 50 
60 CONTINUE 
DO 80 1=1,N
RS(I)=C(I)*E(I)*P(I)
80 CONTINUE
DO 100 1=1,31 
M=1
83 RSTK(M)=0.0 
CCS=0•0 
J=1
85 IF((RG(J).EQ.I).AND.(TK(J).EQ.M)) THEN 
CCS=CCS+1.0
L=LEM(J)
GOTO(86,87,88,89),L
86 RSTK(M)=RSTK([I)+RS(J)*1.73 
GOTO 90
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87 RSTK(M)=RSTK(M)+RS(J)n.l8 
GOTO 90
88 RSTK(M )=RSTK(M )+RS(J )*1.47 
GOTO 90
8 9 RSTK(M )=RSTK(M )+RS(J )*1.01
90 ENDIF 
J=J+1
IF(J.GT.N) GOTO 91 
GOTO 85
91 IF(CCS.EQ.O.O) THEN 
MRSTK(I,tl)=RSTK(M)
ELSE
MRSTK(I,M )=RSTK(M )/CCS
ENDIF
M=M+1
IF(M.GT.7) GOTO 100 
GOTO 83 
100 CONTINUE
PRINT'(////T20,A/)'AVERAGE RISK SCORES BY RIG AND BY 
:TASK'
PRINT'(/T30,A/)','TASK NUMBER: '
PRINT'(T2,A,2X,7(2X,I3,5X)/)','RIG#',1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
PRINT' (T2,A/) ' , '_______ _^_______________________________
DO 2ÛÜ 1=1,30
PRINT'(T2,I3,1X,7(1X,F8.2,1X)/)',I,(MRSTK(I,J),J=1,7) 
200 CONTINUE 
STOP 
END
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D.5. Program for the Priority Determination of Rigs Using 
the Hypothetical Data siet
c program calculates c,e,p, and rs=cxexp retrospectively 
c program prints out risk scores by rig number 
c input: stanford matrix and injury records
c injury record in this order: case#,rig#,task#,nature of in- 
c jury code#,part,of the body code#,unsafe act code#,unsafe 
c condition code#, level of correction,length of employment, 
c category,lost time code#.
INTEGER CSY(90),CSM(90),CSN(90),RG(90),TK(90),NI(90), 
:PB(90),UACT(90),UC0N(90),LEM(90),L0T(90),C(84),SM(17, 
:14),E(84),PNT(30)
REAL P (84),RS(84),SUMP,RSRG{30),RSH(90)
CHARACTER*6 ULC(90)
N=84
DO 10 1=1,N 
C(I)=0 
E(I)=1 
P(I)=0.0 
10 CONTINUE 
DO 15 1=1,17 
READ*,(SM(I,J),J=1,14)
15 CONTINUE 
DO 20 1=1,90
READ*,CSY(I),CSM(I),CSN(I),RG(I),TK(I),NI(I),PB(I), 
:UACT(I),UCON(I),ULC(I),LEM(I),LOT(I),RSH(I)
20 CONTINUE 
DO 30 1=1,N 
IF(LOTd) .EQ.2)THEN 
L=(NI(I)*2)
C(I)=C(I)+SM(PB(I),L)
ENDIF
IF(LOTd) .NE.2) THEN 
K=NI(I)+(NI(I)-1)
C(I)=C(I)+SM(PB(I),K)
ENDIF
30 CONTINUE
DO 40 1=1,N 
IF(Ed).GT.l) GOTO 40 
J=I+1
ÏF(J.GT.N) GOTO 32
31 CONTINUE
IF((UACT(J) .EQ.UACTd) ) .AND. (UCON( J) .EQ.UCON(I) ) ) THEN
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E(I)=E(I)+1
ENDIF
J=J+1
IF(J.GT.N) GOTO 32 
GOTO 31
32 K=I+1 
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 40
33 IF((UACT(K).EQ.UACT(I)),AND.(UCON(K).EQ.UCON(I))) THEN
E(K)=E(I)
ENDIF
K=K+1
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 40 
GOTO 33 
40 CONTINUE 
J=0
DO 60 1=1,N 
SUMP=1.0
IF(P(I).GT.0.0) GOTO 60 
J=I+1
IF(J.GT.N) GOTO 49 
45 IF((UACT(J).EQ.UACTd)).AND.(UCON(J).EQ.UCON(I)).AND. 
:(C(J).EQ.C(I))) THEN 
SUMP=SUMP+1 
ENDIF 
J=J+1
IF(J.GT.N)GOTO 49 
GOTO 45
49 Z=SUMP/84.0 
P(I)=P(I)+Z 
K=I+1
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 60
50 CONTINUE
IF((UACT(K).EQ.UACT(I)).AND.(UCON(K).EQ.UCON(I)).AND. 
;(C(K).EQ.C(I))) THEN 
P(K)=P(I)
ENDIF
K=k+1
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 60 
GOTO 50 
60 CONTINUE 
DO 80 1=1,N
PvS(I)=C(I)*E(I)*P(I)
80 CONTINUE
DO 89 J=l,30
PNT(J)=J
K=1
RSRG(J)=0.0
81 IF(RG(K).EQ.J) THEN 
M=LEM(K)
GOTO(82,83,84,85),M
82 RSRG(J)=RSRG(J)+RS(K)*1.73 
GOTO 86
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83 RSRG(J)=RSRG(J)+RS(K)*1.18 
GOTO 86
84 RSRG(J)=RSRG(J)+RS(K)*1.47 
GOTO 86
85 RSRG(J)=RSRG(J)+RS(K)*1.01 
ENDIF
86 K=K+1 
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 87 
GOTO 81
87 MM=K
DO 88 11=1,6 
IF(RG(mi) .EQ.J)THEN 
RSRG(J )=RSRG(J )+RSH(MM)
ENDIF
MM=MM+1
88 CONTINUE
89 CONTINUE
CALL SORT(PNT,30,RSRG)
PRINT'(////T2,A,I5///2(T2,A,T20,A/))',
'RISK SCORES BY RIG NUMBER ', 1982,
' RIG NUMBER ',' RISK SCORES ’,
I f I Î
DO 9u 1=1,30 ’
PRINT'(T2,I5,T20,F12.4)',I,RSRG(I)
90 CONTINUE
PRINT'(//T2,A/)','/f PRIORITY RANK RIG NUMBER 
:RISK SCORE'
DO 95 J=l,30
PRINT'(T2,I10,12X,I3,7X,F12.4)',J,PNT(J),RSRG(PNT(J)) 
95 CONTINUE 
STOP 
END
SUBROUTINE SORT(P,N,RRG)
INTEGER P(N),HOLDER 
LOGICAL SORTED 
REAL RRG(N)
K=N
3 SORTED =.TRUE.
K=K-1
DO 5 1=1,K
IF(RRG(P(D) .GE.RRG(P(I+1))) GOTO 5 
HOLDER=P(I)
P(I)=P(I+1)
P(I+1)=H0LDER 
SORTED=.FALSE.
5 CONTINUE
IF(.NOT. SORTED) GOTO 3
RETURN
END ■
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D.6. Program for the Refinement of Information of the Priority 
Rigs by Task and by Length o£ Employment
c program calculates c,e,p, and rs=cxexp retrospectively 
c program prints out risk scores by task and length of employ- 
c ment for each priority rig#, 
c input : stanford matrix and injury records
c injury record in this order : case#,rig#,task#,nature of 
c injury code#,part of the body code#,unsafe act #,unsafe 
c condition #,level of correction, length of employment code#, 
c lost time code#.
INTEGER CSY(90),CSM(90),CSN(90),RG(90),TK(90),NI(90), 
:PB(90),UACT(90),UCON(90),LEM(90),LOT(90),0(84),E(84), 
:SM(17,14)
REAL PC84) ,RS(84),SUI1P,RSTL(7,5) ,RSH(90)
CHARACTER*6 ULC(90)
N=84
DO 10 1=1,N 
C(I)=0 
E(I)=1 
P(I)=0.0 
10 CONTINUE 
DO 15 1=1,17 
READ*,(SM(I,J),J=1,14)
15 CONTINUE 
DO 20 1=1,90
READ*,CSY(I),CSM(I),CSN(I),RG(I),TK(I),NI(I),PB(I), 
:UACT(I),UCON(I),ULC(I),LEM(I),L0T(I),RSH(I)
20 CONTINUE 
DO 30 1=1,N 
IF(L0T(I).EQ.2)THEN 
L=(NI(I)*2)
C(I)=C(I)+SM(PB(I) ,L)
ENDIF
IF(LOT(I).NE.2) THEN 
K=NI(I)+(NI(I)-1)
C(I)=C(I)+SM(PB(I) ,K)
ENDIF 
30 CONTINUE 
DO 40 1=1,N 
IF(E(I).GT.l) GOTO 40 
J=I+1
IF(J.GT.N) GOTO 32
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31 CONTINUE
IF(UACT(J).EQ.UACT(I).AND.UCON(J).EQ.UCON(I)) THEN 
E(I)=E(I)+1 
ENDIF 
J=J+1
IF(J.GT.N) GOTO 32 
GOTO 31
32 K=I+1 
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 40
33 IF(UACT(K).EQ.UACT(I).AND.UCON(K).EQ.UCON(I)) THEN
E(K)=E(I)
ENDIF
K=K+1
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 40 
GOTO 33 
40 CONTINUE 
J=0
DO 60 1=1,N 
SUI4P=1.0
IF(P(I).GT.0.0) GOTO 60 
J=I+1
IF(J.GT.N) GOTO 49 
45 IF((UACT(J ).EQ.UACT(I)).AND.(UCON(J ).EQ.UCON(I)).AND. 
:(C(J).EQ.C(I))) THEN 
SUMP=SUMP+1 
ENDIF 
J=J+1
IF(J.GT.N)GOTO 49 
GOTO 45
49 Z=SUI'1P/84.0 
P(I)=P(I)+Z 
K=I+1
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 60
50 CONTINUE
IF((UACT(K).EQ.UACT(I)).AND.(UCON(K).EQ.UCON(I)).AND. 
:(C(K).EQ.C(I))) THEN 
P(K)=P(I)
ENDIF
K=K+1
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 60 
GOTO 50 
60 CONTINUE 
DO 80 1=1,N
RS(I)=C(I)*E(I)*P(I)
80 CONTINUE 
M=9
CALL RSTLPR ( RG, TIC, LEM, 84, M , RS, RSTL, RSH )
M=25
CALL RSTLPR(RG,TK,LEM,84,M ,RS,RSTL,RSH)
M=13
CALL RSTLPR(RG,TK,LEM,84,M ,RS,RSTL,RSH)
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M=24
CALL RSTLPR(RG,TK,LEM,84,M ,RS,RSTL,RSH)
M=20
CALL RSTLPR(RG,TK,LEM,84,M ,RS,RSTL,RSH)
M=16
CALL RSTLPR(RG,TK,LEM,84,M ,RS,RSTL,RSH)
M=19
CALL RSTLPR(RG,TK,LEM,84,M ,RS,RSTL,RSH)
M=12
CALL RSTLPR(RG,TK,LEM,84,M ,RS,RSTL,RSH)
M=2
CALL RSTLPR(RG,TK,LEM,84,M ,RS,RSTL,RSH)
M=14
CALL RSTLPR(RG,TK,LEM,84,M ,RS,RSTL,RSH)
STOP
END
SUBROUTINE RSTLPR(RI,TS,LP,N,M,RR,RST,RH) 
INTEGER RI(N),TS(N),LP(N)
REAL RR(N),RST(7,5),RH(90)
L=M
K=N
DO 50 1=1,7 
DO 40 J=l,5 
RST(I,J)=0.0 
40 CONTINUE 
50 CONTINUE 
DO 120 1=1,7 
J=1
85 IF((RI(J).EQ.L).AND.(TS(J).EQ.D) THEN 
M=LP(J)
GOTO(86,87,88,89),M
86 RST(I,1)=RST(I,1)+RR(J)*1.73 
GOTO 90
87 RST(I,2)=RST(I,2)+RR(J)*1.18 
GOTO 90
88 RST(I,3)=RST(I,3)+RR(J)*1.47 
GOTO 90
89 RST(I,4_=RST(I,4)+RR(J)*1.01
90 ENDIF 
J=J+1
IF(J.GT.K) GOTO 100 
GOTO 85 
100 JJ=J
DO 110 11=1,6
IF( (RKJJ) .EQ.L).AND.(TS(JJ).EQ.I) ) THEN 
RST(I,5)=RST(I,5)+RH(JJ)
ENDIF 
JJ=JJ+1 
110 CONTINUE 
120 CONTINUE
PRINT'(///T2,A,I3/)',7 f  FOR PRIORITY RIG # ',L
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PRINT'(/T2,A/)'RISK SCORES BY TASK AND LENGTH OF 
: EMPLOYMENT'
PRINT'(/T15,A/)'LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY HAZARD' 
PRINT'(/T2,A,6X,I3,6X,I3,6X,I3,6X,I3/)','TASK# ',1,2,
: 3,4
PRINT'(A/)','•    — ,
D0“200 1=1,7
PRINT'(/T3,I5,F8.2,4(1X,?8.2)//)',I,(RST(I,J),J=1,5) 
200 CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END
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D.7. Program for the Refinement o£ the Priority Rig, Task, 
Length of Employment by Case Numbers
c program calculates c,e,p, and rs=cxexp retrospectively 
c program prints out UACT,UCON,ULC for each task by each 
c pririty rig.
c input: stanford matrix and injury records
c injury record in this order : case#,rig#,task#,nature of in- 
c jury code#,part of the body code#,unsafe act code#,unsafe 
c condition code#, level of correction code#,length of employ- 
c ment code#,lost time code#
INTEGER CSY(84) ,CSI1(84) ,CSN(84) ,RG(84) ,TK(84) ,NI(84), 
:PB(84),UACT(84),UCON(84),LEM(84),L0T(84),SM(17,14), 
:C(84)
CHARACTER*6 ULC(84)
N=84
DO 10 1=1,N 
C(I)=0 
10 CONTINUE 
DO 15 1=1,17 
READ*,(SM(I,J),J=1,14)
15 CONTINUE 
DO 20 1=1, N
READ*,CSY(I),CSM(I),CSN(I),RG(I),TK(I),NI(I),P3(I),UA 
:CT(I),UCON(I),ULC(I),LEM(I),LOT(I)
20 CONTINUE 
DO 30 1=1,N 
IF(LOTd) .EQ.l) THEN 
L=(NI(I)*2)
C(I)=C(I)+SM(PB(I),L)
ELSE
K=NI(I)+(NI(I)-1)
C(I)=C(I)+SM(PB(I),K)
ENDIF 
30 CONTINUE 
MRG=9
RSRG=2868.51
MTK=5
LEMP=1
CALL PUACUL( IIRG,MTK,LEMP,RSRG,RG,TK,LEM,UACT,UCON,ULC, 
:CSY,CSM,CSN,N,C)
MRG=9
RSRG=1802.80
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MTK=4
LEMP=1
CALL PUACUL(MRG,MTK,LEMP,RSRG,RG,TIC,LEM,UACT,UCON,ULC, 
:CSY,CSM,CSN,N,C)
MRG=25
RSRG=939.14
MTK=3
LEMP=1
CALL PUACUL ( MRG, MTK, LEMP, RSRG, RG, TIC, LEM, UACT, UCON, ULC, 
:CSY,CSM,CSN,N,C)
MRG=25
RSRG=686.54
MTIC=4
LEMP=1
CALL PUACUL(MRG,MTK,LEMP,RSRG,RG,TK,LEM,UACT,UCON,ULC, 
:CSY,CSM,CSN,N,C)
MRG=13
RSRG=986.72
MTIC=4
LEMP=1
CALL PUACUL(MRG,MTK,LEMP,RSRG,RG,TK,LEM,UACT,UCON,ULC, 
:CSY,CSM,CSN,N,C)
MRG=13
RSRG=316.07
MTIC=4
LEMP=2
CALL PUACUL(MRG,MTK,LEMP,RSRG,RG,TK,LEM,UACT,UCON,ULC, 
:CSY,CSM,CSN,N,C)
MRG=24
RSRG=939.14
MTK=5
LEMP=1
CALL PUACUL(MRG,MTK,LEMP,RSRG,RG,TK,LEM, UACT,UCON,ULC, 
:CSY,CSM,CSN,N,C)
MRG=20
RSRG=939.14
MTK=5
LEMP=1
CALL PUACUL(IIRG,MTK,LEMP,RSRG,RG,TK,LEM,UACT,UCON,ULC, 
:CSY,CSM,CSN,N,C)
MRG=16
RSRG=939.14
MTK=5
LEMP=1
CALL PUACUL(MRG,MTK,LEMP,RSRG,RG,TK,LEM,UACT,UCON,ULC, 
:CSY,CSM,CSN,N,C)
MRG=19
RSRG=543.71
MTK=2
LEMP=1
CALL PUACUL(MRG,MTK,LEI IP,RSRG,RG,TK,LEM,UACT,UCON,ULC, 
:CSY,CSM,CSN,N,C)
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MRG=12
MTK=2
RSRG=543.71
CALL PUACUL(MRG,MTK,LEMP,RSRG,RG,TK,LEM,UACT,UCON,ULC, 
:CSY,CSM,CSN,N,C)
MRG=2
RSRG=337.14
MTK=4
LEMP=2
CALL PUACUL(MRG,MTK,LEMP,RSRG,RG,TK,LEM,UACT,UCON,ULC, 
:CSY,CSM,CSN,N,C)
MRG=14
RSRG=371.74
MTK=4
LEMP=1
CALL PUACUL(MRG,MTK,LEMP,RSRG,RG,TK,LEM,UACT,UCON,ULC, 
:CSY,CSM,CSN,N,C)
STOP
END
SUBROUTINE PUACUL (MR,MT,LEP,RSR,RI,TS,LM,UAC,UCO,UL, 
:CASY,CASM,CASN,N,CC)
INTEGER MR,MT,LEP,RI(N),TS(N),LM(N),UAC(N),UCO(N),CA 
:SY(N),CASM(N),CASN(N),CC(N)
REAL RSR
CHARACTER*6 UL(N)
PRINT'(/3(T2,A,I3/))',
FOR PRIORITY RIG# ',MR,
FOR TASK# ',MT,
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY',LEP 
PRINT'(T2,A,F8.2)',
:'WITH RISK SCORE OF ',RSR
PRINT'(//T2,A,A,A,A/)','CASE# ',' UNSAFE ACT CODE# ', 
: ' UNSAFE CONDITION CODE# ' , ' LEVEL OF CORRECTION I4AN 
:HOURS LOST'
DO 90 1=1,84
IF( (RKI) .EQ.MR) .AND. (TS(I) .EQ.MT) .AND. (LM(I) .EQ.LEP) ) 
:THEN
PRINT'(/T1,3(I2,)I13,I23,17X,A,12X,I4/)',CASY(I),CASM 
:(I),CASN(I),UAC(I),UCO(I),UL(I),CC(I)
ENDIF 
90 CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END
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D.8. Program for the Presentation of the Relative Effective­
ness of Alternatives
c program calculates economic justification for each alterna- 
c tive for correction (j).
c input : rig#,task#,length of employment category,risk score, 
c for each rig#, alternatives are specified & printed 
c for each alternative degree of correction and cost factor 
c are specified; j=rs/dcxcf,
REAL RS,COF(3),ECJ(3),DEC(3),MC 
CHARACTER*25 AL(3)
MRI=9
MTK=4
MLEP=1
DEC(1)=6.0
DEC(2)=4.0
DEC(3)=3.0
RS=4696.59
C0F(1]=1.0
COF(2)=4.0
C0F(3)=6.0
MC=.5*4900
AL(1)=' TRAINING OF NEW HIRES '
AL(2)=' ENFORCE AND MOTIVATE'
AL(3)=' BOTH ONE AND TWO '
PRINT'(/3(T2,A,I3/))',
;'FOR PRIORITY RIG# :',MRI,
: 'FOR PRIORITY TASK# : ' ,iîTK,
:'FOR EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY:',MLEP
PRINT'(/T2,A)','THE ALTERNATIVES FOR CORRECTION ARE:' 
DO 3 1=1,3
PRINT'(T2,I3,5X,A)',I,AL(I)
3 CONTINUE 
DO 5 1=1,3
ECJ(I)=RS/(DEC(I)*COF(I))
5 CONTINUE
PRINT'(T2,A/)','ALTERNATIVE DEGREE OF CORRECTION
:COST FACT OR ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION'
DO 7 1=1,3
PRINT'(I9,15X,F5.2,13X,F5.2,10X,F12.4)',I,DEC(I),COF 
:(I),ECJ(I)
7 CONTINUE
PRINT'(/T2,A,F8.2,2X,A,F8.2,A) ' ,'FOR J= ',ECJ(D,
:'C WILL BE REDUCED BY : ',.25*MC,' MONTHLY'
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PRINT'(/T2,A,F8.2,2X,A,2(F8.2,A))','FOR J= ',ECJ(2), 
:'C WILL BE REDUCED BY : ',.25*MC,' T0',.5*MC,
:' MONTHLY'
PRINT'(/T2,A,F8.2,2X,A,2(F8.2,A))','FOR J= ',ECJ(3), 
:'C WILL BE REDUCED BY : ',.5*MC,' TO ',.75*MC,
:' MONTHLY'
STOP
END
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D.9. Program for the Monthly Total Accident Cost Report
Using the Real Data Set
c program reports monthly manhours lost due to accidents by 
c superintendents and rig number, 
c input: stanford matrix and injury records 
c injury records in this order : case#,rig#,task#nature of in- 
c jury code#,part of the body code#,length of employment,lost 
c time code#.
INTEGER CSY(475),CSM(475),CSN(475),RG(475),TK(475),NI 
: (475) ,PB(475),LEÎi(475) ,LOT(475),C(475),811(17,14),CRG(3 
:1),TCRG,CM(31,12),TCM(12)
N=475
DO 10 1=1,N 
C(I)=0 
10 CONTINUE 
DO 15 1=1,17 
READ*,(SM(I,J),J=1,14)
15 CONTINUE 
DO 20 1=1,N
READ'SCSY(I),CSM(I),CSN(I),RG(I),TK(I),NKI) ,PB(I), 
:LEM(I),LOT(I)
20 CONTINUE 
DO 30 1=1,N 
IF(LOTd) .EQ.2)THEN 
L=(NI(I)*2)
C(I)=C(I)+SM(PB(I),L)
ENDIF
IF(LOTd) .NE.2) THEN 
K=NI(I)+(NI(I)-1)
C(I)=C(I)+SM(PB(I),K)
ENDIF 
30 CONTINUE 
K=1
DO 95 1=1,N 
85 IF (CSM(I).EQ.K) THEN 
J=1
88 IF(RGd).EQ.J) THEN 
CM(J,K)=CM(J,K)+C(I)
ENDIF
J=J+!
IF(J.GT.31) GOTO 95
GOTO 88
ELSE
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K=K+1
IF(K.GT.12) GOTO 96
GOTO 85
ENDIF
95 CONTINUE
96 DO 98 K=l,12 
TCM(K)=0
DO 97 L=l,31 
TCM(K)=TCM(K)+CM(L,K)
97 CONTINUE
98 CONTINUE 
TCRG=0
DO 100 1=1,12 
TCRG=TCRG+TCI1(I)
100 CONTINUE
DO 120 J=l,31 
CRG(J)=0 
DO 110 K=l,12 
CRG(J)=CRG(J)+CM(J,K)
110 CONTINUE 
120 CONTINUE
PRINT'(//T2,A//T2,A,T25,A,T50,A/)',
:'XYZ DRILLING CO., ACCIDENT REPORT IN I4ANH0URS LOST,BY 
: MONTH,1981',
:'SUPERINTENDENT',' RIG NUMBER ','JAN FEB MCH APR 
:KiAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC TOTAL' 
L=1
DO 200 1=1,10
PRINT'(T2,A ,I3)','SUPERINTENDENT',I 
DO 150 J=l,3
PRINT'(T30,A,I3,T47,12(I6,)I7)','RIG# ',L,(CM(L,K),K= 
:1,12),CRG(L)
L=L+1
IF(L.GT.30) GOTO 200 
150 CONTINUE 
200 CONTINUE
PRINT'(//T25,A,12(16,)I7)','FOR THE NA RIG NUMBER:',
:(CMC 31,K),K=1,12),CRG(31)
PRINT' (//T39,A,12(16, )I7) ', 'TOTAL : ' ,(TCM(K) ,IC=1,12), 
:TCRG 
STOP 
END
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D.IO. Program for the Average Risk Scores by Rig and by Task
UsitTfe ttie Real Data Set
c program calculates risk scores prospectively 
c prints out risk scores by rig# and by task 
c input: stanford matrix and injury records 
c injury record in this order : case#,rig#,task#,nature of in- 
c jury code#,part of the body code#,length of employment 
c category,lost time code#
INTEGER CSY(475),CSM(475),CSM(475),RG(475),TK(475),NI 
:(475),FB(475),LEM(475),L0T(475),C(475),SM(17,14),E(475) 
REAL P(475) ,RS(475),RSTK(1) ,MRSTK(31,7) ,SUtIP,CCS 
K=473
DO 10 1=1,N 
C(I)=0 
E(I)=1 
P(I)=0.0 
10 CONTINUE 
DO 15 1=1,17 
READ*,(SM(I,J),J=1,14)
15 CONTINUE 
DO 20 1=1,N
READ*,CSY(I),CSM(I),CSN(I),RG(I),TK(I),NI(I),PB(I),LEll 
:(I),LOT(I)
20 CONTINUE 
DO 30 1=1,N 
IF (LOT(I).EQ.2)THEN 
L=(NI(I)*2)
C(I)=C(I)+SM(PB(I) ,L)
ENDIF
IF(L0T(I).NE.2) THEN 
K=NI(I)+(NI(I)-1)
C(I)=C(I)+SM(PB(I),K)
ENDIF
30 CONTINUE
DO 40 1=1,N 
IF(E(I).GT.l) GOTO 40 
J=I+1
IF(J.GT.N) GOTO 32
31 CONTINUE 
IF(TK(J).EQ.TK(I)) THEN
E(I)=E(I)+1
ENDIF
J=J+1
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IF(J.GT.N) GOTO 32 
GOTO 31
32 K=I+1 
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 40
33 IF(TK(K).EQ.TK(I)) THEN
E(K)=E(I)
ENDIF
K=K+1
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 40 
GOTO 33 
40 CONTINUE 
J=0
DO 60 1=1,N 
SUMP=1.0
IF(P(I).GT.0.0) GOTO 60 
J=I+1
IF(J.GT.N) GOTO 49 
45 IF((TK(J).EQ.TK(I)).AND.(C(J).EQ.C(I))) THEN 
SUMP=SUMP+1 
ENDIF 
J=J+1
IF(J.GT.N)GOTO 49 
GOTO 45
49 Z=SUMP/475.0 
P(I)=P(I)+Z 
K=I+1
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 60
50 CONTINUE
IF((TK(K).EQ.TK(I)).AND.(C(K).EQ.C(I))) THEN 
P(K)=P(I)
ENDIF
K=K+1
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 60 
GOTO 50 
60 CONTINUE 
DO 80 1=1,N
RS(I)=C(I)*E(I)*P(I)
80 CONTINUE
DO 100 1=1,31 
M=1
83 RSTK(M)=0.0 
CCS=0.0 
J=1
85 IF((RG(J).EQ.l).AND.(TK(J).EQ.M)) THEN 
CCS=CCS+1.0 
L=LEM(J)
GOTO(86,87,88,89),L 
8 6 RSTK(M )=RSTK(M )+RS(J )*1.7 3 
GOTO 90
87 RSTK(M)=RSTK(M)+RS(J)*1.18 
GOTO 90
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88 RSTK(M)=RSTK(M)+RS(J)*1.47 
GOTO 90
89 RSTK(H)=RSTK(M)+RS(J)*1.01
90 ENDIF 
J=J+1
IF(J.GT.N) GOTO 91 
GOTO 85
91 IF(CCS.EQ.O.O) THEN 
MRSTK(I,Ii)=RSTK(M)
ELSE
MRSTK(I,M )=RSTK(M )/CCS
ENDIF
M=M+1
IF(M.GT.7) GOTO 100 
GOTO 83 
100 CONTINUE
PRINT'(////T20,A/)'AVERAGE RISK SCORES BY RIG AND BY 
:TASK'
PRINT ' ( /T30, A/ ) ', ' TASK NUI'ÎBER: '
PRINT'(T2,A,2X,7(2X,I3,5X)/)','RIG#',1,2,3,4,5,6,7
PRINT'(T2,A/)','
.   1-------------------------------
‘d o 200 1=1,30----------
PRINT'(T2,I3,1X,7(1X,F8.2,1X)/)',I,(MRSTK(I,J),J=1,7) 
200 CONTINUE
PRINT'(//T2,A/)','FOR THE NA RIG NUMBER'
PRINT'(T2,13,IX,7(IX,F8.2,IX))' ,31,(MRSTK(31,J),J=1,7)
STOP
END
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D.ll. Program for the Priority Determination of Rigs Using
the Real Data Set
c program calculates c,e,p, and rs=cxexp retrospectively 
c program prints out risk scores by rig number 
c input: stanford matrix and injury records 
c injury record in this order : case#,rig#,task#,nature of in- 
c jury code#,part of the body code#,length of employment 
c category,lost time code#.
INTEGER CSY(475),CSH(475),CSN(475),RG(475),TK(475),NI 
:(475),PB(475),LEM(475),L0T(475),C(475),SM(17,14),E(475 
:),PNT(31)
REAL P (475) ,RS(475),RSRG(31),SUI'iP 
N=475
DO 10 1=1,N 
C(I)=0 
E(I)=1 
P(I)=0.0 
10 CONTINUE 
DO 15 1=1,17 
READ*,(SM(I,J),J=1,14)
15 CONTINUE 
DO 20 1=1,N
READ*,CSY(I),CSIUI),CSN(I),RG(I),TK(I),NI(I),PB(I), 
:LEM(I),LOT(I)
20 CONTINUE 
DO 30 1=1,N 
IF(LOTd) .EQ.2)TKEN 
L=(NI(I)*2)
C(I)=C(I)+SM(PB(I),L)
ENDIF
IF(LOTd) .NE.2) THEN 
K=NI(I)+(NI(I)-1)
C(I)=C(I)+SM(PB(I),K)
ENDIF
30 CONTINUE
DO 40 1=1,N 
IF(Ed).GT.l) GOTO 40 
J=I+1
IF(J.GT.N) GOTO 32
31 CONTINUE 
IF(TK(J).EQ.TK(D) THEN
E(I)=E(I)+1
ENDIF
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J=J+1
IF(J.GT.N) GOTO 32 
GOTO 31
32 K=I+1 
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 40
33 IF(TK(K).EQ.TK(I)) THEN
E(K)=E(I)
ENDIF
K=K+1
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 40 
GOTO 33 
40 CONTINUE 
J=0
DO 50 1=1,N 
SUMP=1.0
IF(P(I).GT.0.0) GOTO 60 
J=I+1
IF(J.GT.N) GOTO 49 
45 IF((TK(J).EQ.TK(I)).AND.(C(J).EQ.C(I))) THEN 
SUMP=SUMP+1 
ENDIF 
J=J+1
IF(J.GT.N)GOTO 49 
GOTO 45
49 Z=SUMP/475.0 
P(I)=P(I)+Z 
K=I+1
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 60
50 CONTINUE
IF( (TK(K) .EQ.Tiai) ) .AND. (C(K) .EQ.C(I) ) ) THEN 
P(K)=P(I)
ENDIF
K=K+1
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 60 
GOTO 50 
60 CONTINUE 
DO 80 1=1,N
RS(I)=C(I)*E(I)*P(I)
80 CONTINUE
DO 90 J=l,31
PNT(J)=J
K=1
RSRG(J)=0.0
81 IF(RG(K).EQ.J) THEN 
M=LEM(K)
GOTO (82,83,84,85),M
82 RSRG(J)=RSRG(J)+RS(K)*1.73 
GOTO 86
83 RSRG(J )=RSRG(J)+RS(K)*1.18 
GOTO 86
84 RSRG(J )=RSRG(J )+RS(K )*1.47
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GOTO 86
85 RSRG(J )=RSRG(J )+RS(K )*1.01 
ENDIF
86 IC=K+1 
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 90 
GOTO 81
90 CONTINUE
CALL SORT(PNT,31,RSRG)
PRINT'(////T2,A,I5///2(T2,A,T20,A/))',
:'RISK SCORES BY RIG NUMBER ', 1981,
:' RIG NUMBER ',' RISK SCORES ',
. I I I  f
DO 100 1=1,30’
PRIHT"(T2,I5,T20,F12,4)',I,RSRG(I)
100 CONTINUE
PRINT'(//T2,A,F12.4)','FOR THE NA RIG NUMBER, THE RISK 
:SCORE= ',RSRG(31)
PRINT'(//T2,A/)','/f PRIORITY RANK RIG NUMBER 
:RISK SCORE'
DO 95 J=l,31
PRINT'(T2,I10,12X,I3,7X,F12.4)',J,PNT(J),RSRG(PNT(J)) 
95 CONTINUE 
STOP 
END
SUBROUTINE SORT(P ,N ,RRG)
INTEGER P(N),HOLDER 
LOGICAL SORTED 
REAL RRG(N)
K=N
3 SORTED=.TRUE.
K=K-1
DO 5 1=1,K
IF(RRG(P(I)).GE.RRG(P(I+1))) GOTO 5 
HOLDER=P(I)
P(I)=P(I+1)
P(I+1)=H0LDER 
SORTED=.FALSE.
5 CONTINUE
IF(.NOT.SORTED) GOTO 3
RETURN
END
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D.12. Program for the Refinement of Information of the 
Priority Rigs by Task and by"Length of Employment
c program calculates c,e,p, and rs=cxexp retrospectively 
c program print out risk scores by task and length of employ-
c ment for each priority rig#,
c input: stanford matrix and injury records
c injury record in this order : case#,rig#,task#,nature of in-
c jury code#, part of the body code#,length of employment 
c category,lost time code.
INTEGER CSY(475) ,CSI1(475) ,CSN(475) ,RG(475) ,TK(475) ,NI 
:(475),PB(475),LEH(475),LOT(475),C(475),SM(17,14),E(475) 
REAL P(475),RS(475),SUMP,RSTL(7,4)
N=475
DO 10 1=1,N 
C(I)=0 
E(I)=1 
P(I)=OjO 
10 CONTINUE 
DO 15 1=1,17 
READ*,(SM(I,J),J=1,14)
15 CONTINUE 
DO 20 1=1,N
READ*,CSY(I),CSM(I),CSN(I),RG(I),TK(I),NI(I),PB(I), 
:LEM(I),LOT(I)
20 CONTINUE 
DO 30 1=1,N 
IF(L0T(I).EQ.2)THEN 
L=(NI(I)*2)
C(I)=C(I)+SM(PB(I),L)
ENDIF
IF(LOTd) .NE.l) THEN 
K=NI(I)+(NI(I)-1)
C(I)=C(I)+SM(PB(I),K)
ENDIF
30 CONTINUE
DO 40 1=1,N
IF(E(I).GT.l) GOTO 40
J=I+1
IF(J.GT.M) GOTO 32
31 CONTINUE 
IF(TK(J).EQ.TK(D) THEN
E(I)=E(I)+1
ENDIF
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J=J+1
IF(J.GT.W) GOTO 32 
GOTO 31
32 K=I+1 
IF(K.GT.IÎ) GOTO 40
33 IF(TK(K).EQ.TK(I)) THEN
E(K)=E(I)
ENDIF
K=K+1
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 40 
GOTO 33 
40 CONTINUE 
J=0
DO 60 1=1,N 
SUMP=i.0
IF(P(I).GT.0.0) GOTO 60 
J=I+1
IF(J.GT.N) GOTO 49 
45 IF((TK(J).EQ.TK(I)).AND.(C(J).EQ.C(I))) THEN 
SUI'1P=SUMP+1 
ENDIF 
J=J+1
IF(J.GT.N)GOTO 49 
GOTO 45
49 Z=SUI1P/475.0 
P(I}=P(I)+Z 
K=I+1
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 60
50 CONTINUE
IF((TK(K).EQ.TK(I)).AND.(C(K).EQ.C(I))) THEN 
P(IC)=P(I)
ENDIF
IC=K+1
IF(K.GT.N) GOTO 60 
GOTO 50 
60 CONTINUE 
DO 80 1=1,N
RS(I)=C(I)*E(I}*P(I)
80 CONTINUE 
M=31
CALL RSTLPR(RG,TK,LEM,47 5,M,RS,RSTL) 
M=5
CALL RSTLPR(RG,TK,LEM,47 5,M ,RS,RSTL) 
M=4
CALL RSTLPR(RG,TK,LEM,47 5,M ,RS,RSTL) 
M=10
CALL RSTLPR(RG,TK,LEM,47 5,M ,RS,RSTL) 
M=12
CALL RSTLPR(RG,TK,LEM,47 5,M ,RS,RSTL) 
M=2
CALL RSTLPR(RG,TK,LEM,475,M ,RS,RSTL)
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M=8
CALL RSTLPR(RG,TK,LEM,475,M ,RS,RSTL)
M=21
CALL RSTLPR(RG,TK,LEM,47 5,M ,RS,RSTL)
M=19
CALL RSTLPR(RG,TK,LEM,475,M,RS,RSTL) .
M=13
CALL RSTLPR(RG,TK,LEM,47 5,M ,RS,RSTL)
STOP
END
SUBROUTINE RSTLPR(RI,TS,LP,N ,M ,RR,RST)
INTEGER RKN) ,TS(N) ,LP(N)
REAL RR(N),RST(7,4)
K=N
L=M
DO 12 ï==i,7 
DO 11 J=l,4 
RST(I,J)=0.0
11 CONTINUE
12 CONTINUE
DO 100 1=1,7 
J=1
85 IF((RI{J).EQ.L).AND.(TS(J).EQ.I)) THEN 
M=LP(J)
GOTO(86,87,88,89) ,M
86 RST(I,1)+RST(I,1)+RR(J)*1,73 
GOTO 90
87 RST(I,2)=RST(I,2)+RR(J)*1.18 
GOTO 90
88 RST(I,3)=RST(I,3)+RR(J)*1.47 
GOTO 90
89 RST(I,4)=RST(I,4)+RR(J)*1.01
90 ENDIF 
J=J+1
IF(J.GT.K) GOTO 100 
GOTO 85 
100 CONTINUE
PRINT'(///T2,A,I3/)’,7 f  FOR PRIORITY RIG# ',L 
PRINT'(/T2,A/)','RISK SCORES BY TASK AND LENGTH OF 
: EMPLOYMENT'
PRINT' ( /T15,A/) ' , 'LENGTH OF EMPLOYtûENT CATEGORY'
PRINT'(/T2,A,9X,I3,9X,I3,9X,I3,9X,I3/)','TASK# ',1,2,3,4 
PRINT'(A/)','
I
DO 200 1=1,7
PRINT'(/T2,I5,F12.2,1X,F12.2,1X,F12.2,1X,F12.2//)',1, 
:(RST(I,J),J=1,4)
200 CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END
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D.13. Program for the Refinement of the Priority Rig,Task,
and Length of Employment by Case Numbers
c program calculates c,e,p, and rs=cxexp retrospectively 
c program prints out case numbers for each priority rig and 
c task
c input: stanford matrix and injury records
c injury record in this order:case#,rig#,task#,nature of in- 
c jury code#,part of the body code#,length of employment code#, 
c lost time code#
INTEGER C5Y(475) ,CSti(475) ,CSN(475) ,RG(475) ,TK(475) ,NI 
:(475),PB(475),LEM(475),LOT(475),SM{17,14),C(475)
K=475
DO 10 1=1,N 
C(I)=0 
10 CONTINUE 
DO 15 1=1,17 
READ*,(SIX I,J),J=1,14)
15 CONTINUE 
DO 20 1=1,N
READ*,CSY(I),CSM(I),CSN(I),RG(I),TK(I),NI(I),PB(I), 
:LEM(I),LOT(I)
20 CONTINUE 
DO 30 1=1,N 
IF(L0T(I).EQ.2) THEN 
L=(NI(I)*2)
C(I)=C(I)+SM(PB(I).L)
ELSE
K=NI(I)+NI(I)-1)
C(I)=C(I)+SM(PB(I),K)
ENDIF 
30 CONTINUE 
MRG=5
RSRG=21429.67
MTK=4
LEHP=1
CALL PUACUL(HRG,MTK,LEMP,RSRG,RG,TK,LEM,CSY ,CSM, 
:CSN,N,C)
MRG=5
RSRG=2693.30
MTK=3
LEMP=1
CALL PUACUL ( MRG,MTK,LEMP, RSRG, RG,TIC, LEM, CSY, CSM, 
:CSN,N,C)
MRG=4
RSRG=20680.42
MTK=
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I1RG=4
RSRG=20680.42
MTK=4
LEMP=1
CALL PUACUL ( MRG, MTK, LEtlP, RSRG, RG, TK, LEM, CSY, GSM, 
;CSN,N,C)
MRG=4
RSRG=2504.53
MTK=3
LEMP=1
CALL PUACUL(MRG,MTK,LEMP,RSRG,RG,TK,LEM,CSY,CSM, 
:CSM,N,C)
MRG=10
RSRG=21601.80
MTK=4
LEMP=1
CALL PUACUL(MRG,MTK,LEMP,RSRG,RG,TK,LEM,CSY,CSM, 
:CSN,K,C)
MRG=10
RSRG+2250.93
MTK=2
LEMP=1
CALL PUACUL(MRG,MTK,LEMP,RSRG,RG,TK,LEM,CSY,CSM, 
:CSN,N,C)
MRG=12
RSRG=17556.84
MTK=4
LEMP=1
CALL PUACUL(MRG,MTK,LEMP,RSRG,RG,TK,LEM,CSY,CSM, 
:CSW,N,C)
MRG=12
RSRG=2043.30
MTK=4
LEMP=3
CALL PUACUL ( MRG, MTK, LEMP, RSRG, RG, TK, LEM, CSY, CSlî, 
:CSN,K,C)
MRG=2
RSRG=12975.26
MTK=4
LEMP=1
CALL PUACUL(MRG,MTK,LEMP,RSRG,RG,TK,LEM,CSY ,CSM, 
:CSN,N,C)
MRG=2
RSRG=3288.09
MTK=5
LEMP=1
CALL PUACUL(MRG,MTK,LEMP,RSRG,RG,TK,LEM,CSY,CSM, 
:CSN,N,C)
MRG=2
MTK=3
RSRG=1675.00
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LEMP=1
CALL PUACUL ( MRG,MTK, LEMP, RSRG, RG, TK,LEIÎ, CSY, CSM, 
:CSU,U,C)
MRG=2
RSRG=1640.20
MTK=4
LEMP=2
CALL PUACUL(MRG,MTK,LEMP,RSRG,RG,TK,LEM,CSY,CSM, 
:CSU,U,C)
STOP
END
SUBROUTINE PUACUL(MR,TM,LEP,RSR,RI,TS,LM,CASY ,CASH, 
;CASH,N,CC)
INTEGER MR,MT,LEP,RI(N ),TS(N ),LM(N ),CASY(N ),
:CASM(N),CASN(N),CC(M)
REAL RSR
PRINT'(/3(T2,A,I3/))',
:'FOR PRIORITY RIG# ',MR,
FOR TASK# ',MT,
:'LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY',LEP 
PRINT'(T2,A,F8.2)',
:'WITH RISK SCORE OF ',RSR
PRINT'(//T2,A/)','CASE# MANHOURS LOST'
DO 90 1=1,N
IF ((RKI) .EQ.MR) .AND.(TSd) .EQ.MT) .AND. (LM(I) .EQ.LEP) ) 
:THEN
PRINT'(/Tl,3(12,)lOX,18/)',CASY(I),CASM(I),CASN(I), 
:CC(I)
ENDIF 
90 CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END
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APPENDIX E 
EXAMPLE OF A DECODING SHEET •
TASKS
task l=taslc of a driller 
task 2=task of a motorman 
task 3=task of a derrickman 
task 4=task of a floorhand
task 5=task of maintenance men: welders, mechanics, electricians 
task 6=task of others not directly related:truck drivers», yard 
workers 
task 7=task of a toolpusher
LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY
1 = one to three month
2 = four to six months
3 = seven to twelve months
4 = more than one year
UNSAFE ACTS CODES
100 = failure to use available personal protective equipment
350 = improper use of hands and body parts
355 = taking wrong hold of objects
400 = inattention to footings and surroundings
500 = operating or working at unsafe speed
558 = unnecessary exposure to moving materials or equipments
993 = no unsafe act
UNSAFE CONDITION
30 = slippery
399 = hazardous methods or procedures
520 = inadequately guarded (mechanical/physical)
999 = no hazardous condition
LEVEL OF CORRECTION
Ml = establish and communicate policy or procedure
M2 = apply policy or procedure consistently where applicable
M3 = establish and communicate procedural monitoring
M4 = enforce policy or procedure based upon procedural monitor­
ing
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SI = communicate what is wanted 
32 = assure means to comply
53 = be consistent in setting a good example
54 = be consistent in enforcement
vJl = remove obstacle s to. proper performance
W2 = communicate what is wanted
VJ3 = train / motivate / enforce
W4 = recognize /reward improved performance
DZGHEE OF CORRECTION
% rating
100 1
>75 2
50-75 3
25-50 4
<25 6
COST FACTOR
$ rating
>50.000 10
25-50.000 6
10-25.000 4
1-10.000 2
100-1000 1
<100 0.5
APPENDIX F
DATA SETS USED IN THE 
■ TEST PROCEDURES
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F.l. Hypothetical Data Set
0,0,0,0,50,600,20,220,25,550,20,65,25,450
3300.10000.0.0.0.0.20.220.15.380.20.75.20.380 
0,0,25,520,110,600,20,220,25,380,20,150,20,520
14000.18000.25.200.75.450.20.220.20.380.20.220.20.450
3800.18000.20.190.50.650.20.220.25.380.20.200.25.450 
600,2800,20,190,25,280,20,220,15,380,15,220,15,380 
0,0,150,750,0,7400,20,220,25,550,25,380,25,750 
0,0,35,300,0,0,20,600,25,380,20,220,20,680 
0,0,25,75,35,300,0,0,25,300,25,220,20,680 
0,0,0,260,35,900,15,220,25,380,25,380,25,380,35,300 
6600,21000,30,300,35,1100,20,220,25,380,20,220,20,600
3300.6600.20.190.35.650.15.190.20.220.20.75.25.150
520.3000.20.110.15.190.20.220.25.150.15.75.20.150 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,15,600 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,2200
9.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.750 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,6500
82 1 1,1,3,2,4,353,30,'VJl ' ,1,2,0.00
32 1 2,30,2,4,3,502,999,'VJ2 ' 1,2,0.00
32 1 3,12,2,7,17,440,999,'IÎ2A4U3 ,1,2,0.00
32 1 4,19,2,7,17,558,999,'Ii2S2lJ3 ,1,2,0.00
82 1 5,8,2,3,4,100,320,'M2S2 ',1 ,2,0.00
02 1 6,4,4,5,2,500,30,'S4U3 ',1 2,0.00
32 1 7,5,1,6,1,205,999,'VJl ' ,2 2,0.00
82 1 8,2,7,4,4,400,30,'S2VJ3 ' ,4 2,0.00
02 1 9,3,6,2,4,353,30,'S2U3 ',1 2,0.00
82 1 10,1,2,4,3,353,510, 'H4S4VJ3' 1,1,0.00
82 1 11,10,2,5,2,353,100,'M434VJ3 ,1,2,0.00
82 1 12,13,4,3,4,400,30,'VJ4 ' 2,2,0.00
82 1 13,15,4,2,4,400,30,'U4 ' 2,2,0.00
82 1 14,11,4,5,3,350,999,'S4VJ3 ,1,2,0.00
32 1 15,25,3,5,4,100,399,'S2V-J3 ,1,2,0.00
32 1 16,21,2,1,4,205,205, 'S4VJ1 ,1,1,0.00
82 1 17,22,4,2,4,500,30,'S4VJ1 ' 3,2,0.00
82 1 18,25,4,4,6,600,30,'S4W3 ' 1,1,0.00
82 1 19,5,5,7,2,100,399,'S4VJ3 ' 2,1,0.00
02 1 20,7,6,4,12,356,620, 'M3S2VJ2 ,1,1,0.00
82 1 21,9,4,2,7,355,399,'VJ3 1,2,0.00
82 1 22,12,1,7,10,356,620,'IÎ3S2VJ2 ' ,2,1,0.00
32 1 23,14,4,1,4,205,299,'34 ,1,2,0.00
82 1 24,16,7,7,4,100,35,'LÎ3S4 ' 1,1,0.00
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82 1 25 ,20,3,7,2,100,320 , 'IÎ2S2 ' ,2,2,0.00
82 1 26 ,17,5,4,4,400,30, 'S2W3 ' ,1,1,0.00
82 1 27 ,20,5,7,2,100,299 , 'IÎ1 ' ,1,2,0.00
82 1 20 ,23,4,2,12,999,520, 'S4 ' ,1,1,0.00
82 1 29 ,27,6,5,3,502,000 , ' S4IJ3 ' ,1,2,0.00
82 1 30 ,24,5,7,2,100,300 ,'S4W3 ' ,1,2,0.00
82 1 31 ,26,8,7,1,400,30, 'U4 ' ,1,1,0.00
82 1 32 ,29,6,3,9,502,999 , 'U1 ',1,2,0.00
82 1 33 ,20,3,6,7,400,30, ' S2W3 ',3,1,0.00
32 1 34 ,38,3,5,8,993,399 , 'IÎ3S2 ',1,2,0.00
32 1 35 ,20,1,2,7,355,340 , 'W1 ',1,1,0.00
82 1 36 ,2,1,2,12,993,5.0 ,'S4 ',1,1,0.00
82 1 37 ,9,3,7,4,100,35,'M3S4 ',2,2,0.00
82 1 30 ,4,5,6,2,353,30,'W3 ,3,2,0.00
82 1 39 ,7,2,2,4,353,30,"•J3 ',1,1,0.00
82 1 40 ,16,4,2,3,993,410 ,'M3S3 ',1,1,0.00
82 1 41 ,23,4,2,7,355,340 ,'S4W3 ',2,2,0.00
82 1 42 ,22,5,7,2,100,399 ,'S2W3 ',1,1,0.00
82 1 43 ,9,4,2,4,350,999, 'W3 ',1,2,0.00
82 1 44 ,2,4,2,4,400,30,' W4 ',2,1,0.00
82 1 45 ,3,5,7,2,100,399, 'S4W3 ',1,1,0.00
82 1 46 ,9,4,2,4,350,999, 'W3 ',1,2,0.00
82 1 47 ,25,4,2,4,400,30, 'W4 ',1,2,0.00
82 1 48 ,9,5,7,2,100,399, 'S4W3 ',1,2,0.00
82 1 49 ,9,4,3,4,993,520, 'S4 ',1,2,0.00
82 1 50 ,25,1,6,4,400,30, 'W34 ',2,1,0.00
82 2 1, 9,4,2,4,993,520,' S4 ',1,2,0.00
82 2 2, 9,4,2,4,993,520,' 54 ',1,1,0.00
82 2 3, 9,4,3,4,993,520,' 54 ',1,2,0.00
82 2 4, 9,4,2,8,400,30,'W4 ',1,2,0.00
82 2 5, 2,4,2,8,400,30,'W4 2,2,0.00
82 2 6, 4,5,6,11,400,30,'W34 ',3,1,0.00
82 2 7, 5,6,6,6,355,30,'W34 1,1,0.00
82 2 8, 13,4,7,2,100,399, 'S4W3 ',1,2,0.00
82 2 9, 19,4,6,2,400,30,'W34 ',1,2,0.00
82 2 10 ,17,1,6,2,353,30, 'W34 ',2,2,0.00
82 2 11 ,30,3,2,5,993,350 , 'W3 ',2,2,0.00
82 2 12 ,4,5,6,11,400,30, 'W34 ',1,2,0.00
82 2 13 ,25,4,2,4,993,420 ,'84 ',1,2,0.00
82 2 14 ,8,5,7,2,100,399, 'S4W3 ',1,1,0.00
82 2 15 ,9,4,7,2,100,399, 'M4S2W4 ’ ,1,2,0.00
82 2 16 ,25,5,6,2,353,30, 'W3 ',1,2,0.00
82 2 17 ,14,4,2,4,205,999 ,'84 ',1,1,0.00
82 2 18 ,16,5,7,2,100,399 , 'W3 ' ,1,2,0.00
82 2 19 ,18,4,2,4,350,999 ,'M4W3 ',1,2,0.00
82 2 20 ,25,4,2,4,350,999 ,'M4W3 ' ,1,1,0.00
82 2 21 ,9,4,2,8,350,999, 'M4W3 ',1,1,0.00
82 2 22 ,24,4,2,4,400,30, 'W4 ' ,1,1,0.00
82 2 23 ,26,5,7,2,100,399 ,'M482W4',1,1,0.00
82 2 24 ,28,5,7,2,100,299 ,'M282W3',1,1,0.00
82 2 25 ,30,4,2,8,350,999 ,'M4W3 ' ,1,1,0.00
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82,2,26
82.2.27
82.2.28
82.2.29
82.2.30
82.2.31
82.2.32
82.2.33
82.2.34
82.2.35
82.2.36
82.2.37
82.2.38
82.2.39
82.2.40
,7,4,2,8,350,999,
,9,5,7,2,100,399,
,13,4,2,8,350,999
,7,4,2,8,350,999,
,5,4,2,8,350,999,
,3,6,2,4,353,30,'S2W3 ’,1,1,0.00
,9,4,2,4,993,520,
,9,5,7,2,100,399,
,9,4,7,2,100,999,
,9,3,0,0,0,520,'
,1,4,0,0,0,520,’
,2,3,0,0,0,30,’
,3,5,0,0,0,100,’
,4,4,0,0,0,30,’
,1,2,0,0,0,520,’
M4W3 ’,1,1,0.00 
M4S2W4',1,1,0.00 
’M4W3 ’,1,1,0.00
M4W3 ’,1,1,0.00 
M4W3 ’,1,1,0.00
S4 ,1,2 ,0.00
M4S2W4',1,2,0.00 
M4S2W4’,1,2,0.00 
’ ,0,0,12.64 
' ,0,0,00.00 
’ ,0,0 ,00.00 
’,0,0,6.18 
’,0,0,23.48 
’,0,0,.41
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F-2. Data Set for Accident Causation Report
820101 1, 1 0,0, t 0,0, W 1,0
820102 30 f ,0,0 1 ,0,0 'W ,2,0
820103 12 'M ,2,0 'S ,4,0 'W ,3,0
820104 29 'M ,2,0 'S ,2,0 'W ,3,0
820105 8, M ’ 2,0, S' 2,0, t 0,0
820106 4, 1 0,0, S' 4,0, w 3,0
820107 5, 1 0,0, f 0,0, w 1,0
820108 9, 1 0,0, S ’ 4,0, » 0,0
820109 3, 1 0,0, S' 2,0, w 3,0
820110 1, M' 4,0, S' 4,0, w 3,0
820111 10 • M ,4,0 'S ,4,0 'W ,3,0
820112 13 • ,0,0 1 ,0,0 'W ,4,3
820113 15 1 ,0,0 1 ,0,0 'W ,4,0
820114 11 1 ,0,0 'S ,4,0 'W ,3,0
820115 25 1 ,0,0 'S ,2,0 'W ,3,0
820116 21 1 ,0,0 'S ,4,3 'W ,1,0
820117 22 t ,0,0 'S ,3,4 'W ,1,0
820118 25 f ,0,0 'S ,3,4 'W ,3,4
820119 6, t 0,0, S' 4,0, w 3,0
820120 7, M ’ 3,0, S' 2,0, w 2,0
820121 9, t 0,0, f 0,0, w 3,4
820122 12 • M ,3,0 'S ,2,0 'W ,2,0
820123 14 I ,0,0 'S ,4,0 1 ,0,0
820124 16 •M ,3,0 'S ,4,0 1 ,0,0
820125 18 <M ,2,0 'S ,2,0 1 ,0,0
820126 17 1 ,0,0 'S ,2,0 'W ,3,0
820127 20 ,1,0 1 ,0,0 1 ,0,0
820128 23 1 ,0,0 'S ,4,0 1 ,0,0
820129 27 1 ,0,0 'S ,4,0 'W ,3,0
820130 24 f ,0,0 'S ,4,0 'W ,3,0
820131 26 1 ,0,0 1 ,0,0 'W ,4,0
820132 f29 1 ,0,0 1 ,0,0 •w ,1,0
820133 28 1 ,0,0 'S ,2,0 'W ,3,0
820134 28 •M ,3,0 •s ,2,0 r ,0,0
820135 20 1 ,0,0 1 ,0,0 'W ,1,0
820136 2, 1 0,0, S' 4,0, 1 0,0
820137 9, M ’ 3,0, S' 4,0, 1 0,0
820138 4, 1 0,0, 1 0,0, w 3,0
820139 7, f 0,0, 1 0,0, w 3,0
820140 16 ,3,0 'S ,3,0 1 ,0,0
820141 23 1 ,0,0 'S ,4,0 'W ,3,0
820142 22 1 ,0,0 'S ,2,0 'W ,3,0
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820142.9,
820144.2,
820145.3,
820146.9, 
820147,25
820148.9,
,0,0,' ',0,0,'W',3,0 
',0,0,' ',0,0,'W',4,0 
',0,0,'S',4,0,'W',3,0
',0,0: ,0,0,'W',3,0
',0,0,' ',0,0,'W',4,0 
',0,0,'S',4,0,'W',3,0 
820149,9,' ',0,0,'S',4,0,' ',0,0 
820150,25,' ',0,0,'S',3,0, ' W ,3,4
CSJ
4J CM CM CNJ CM CM
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81 2 19,20,2,2,11,3,2
81 2 20,31,5,6,6,1,2
81 2 21,6,2,4,5,3,2
81 2 22,31,5,7,12,1,1
81 2 23,10,4,4,5,1,2
81 3 1,9,2,2,6,1,2
81 3 2,10,4,2,7,1,2
81 3 3,31,6,6,5,1,2
81 3 4,31,5,7,2,1,1
81 3 5,31,5,7,2,3,2
81 3 6,31,3,3,6,2,1
81 3 7,31,5,4,2,1,2
81 3 8,31,5,4,11,1,2
81 3 9,14,3,2,6,1,2
81 3 10,10,4,2,6,1,2
81 3 11,31,5,4,12,3,2
81 3 12,31,5,2,12,1,1
81 3 13,21,2,4,1,1,2
81 3 14,8,3,6,1,3,2
81 3 15,17,4,7,2,1,1
81 3 16,31,5,2,12,1,1
81 3 17,1,2,3,5,3,1
81 3 18,6,4,2,10,1,2
81 3 19,9,4,3,6,1,2
81 3 20,1,3,2,12,1,2
81 3 21,14,1,4,8,3,2
81 3 22,17,4,4,2,1,2
81 3 23,20,4,5,1,2,1
81 3 24,31,5,7,2,4,2
81 3 25,14,1,2,3,2,1
81 3 26,14,7,7,5,1,2
81 3 27,2,5,3,7,1,2
81 3 28,31,6,6,2,1,1
81 3 29,2,3,1,6,1,1
81 3 30,24,4,3,5,1,1
81 3 31,13,4,4,11,1,2
81 3 32,13,3,2,11,1,2
81 3 33,24,2,4,1,1,2
81 3 34,24,3,3,9,1,1
81 3 35,22,3,2,3,1,2
81 3 36,1,1,3,6,1,2
81 3 37,5,4,2,5,1,2
81 3 38,16,6,5,4,2,2
81 4 1,11,4,4,5,1,2
81 4 2,31,6,6,8,4,2
81 4 3,31,5,2,12,1,2
81 4 4,31,5,7,2,1,2
81 4 5,2,4,2,6,1,2
81 4 6,10,4,2,8,1,2
81 4 7,31,6,4,1,2,2
81 4 8,31,6,4,6,1,2
81 4 9,3,4,2,6,2,2
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81 4
81 4
81 4
81 4
81 4
81 4
81 4
81 4
81 4
81 4
81 4
81 4
81 4
81 4
81 4
81 4
81 4
81 4
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81 4
81 4
81 4
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
81 5
10.20.3.6.3.1.2
11.4.4.2.6.1.2 
12,1,2,2,11,1,1
13.4.4.2.5.1.2
14.4.1.2.7.1.2
15.31.6.2.12.1.1
16.31.6.7.2.1.2
17.31.6.7.2.4.2
18.24.3.3.4.1.1
19.20.2.4.11.1.1
20.12.4.2.6.3.2
21.19.2.2.5.1.2
22.31.5.7.2.1.2
23.31.5.2.11.1.2
24.21.4.2.6.1.2
25.23.4.2.6.1.2
26.5.1.2.6.3.2
27.13.7.2.5.1.1
28.8.4.4.1.1.2
29.5.4.2.10.1.2
30.5.4.2.8.1.2
31.17.3.4.2.2.2
1.18.3.2.8.1.1
2.31.6.2.5.4.2
3.17.4.2.7.1.1
4.18.4.4.5.1.1
5.4.3.4.4.1.2
6.31.5.2.3.1.2
7.24.2.7.2.1.2
8.21.3.4.2.1.2
9.2.4.2.3.1.2
10.10.4.2.3.1.2
11.13.4.2.6.1.2
12.7.4.7.2.1.1
13.7.4.4.1.2.2
14.4.4.7.2.1.2
15.9.2.2.7.1.2
16.17.2.2.12.1.2
17.31.6.7.2.1.1
18.31.5.7.2.1.2
19.21.3.4.6.1.2
20.31.5.7.2.1.2
21.31.5.2.6.1.2
22.24.4.4.5.1.2
23.22.3.2.11.2.1
24.17.3.2.11.1.2
25.23.1.2.5.3.2
26.23.4.1.6.1.1
27.21.3.2.4.2.1
28.31.5.7.2.1.2
29.5.3.7.2.1.2
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81 8 11 ,31,5,7,2,1,2
81 8 12 ,31,5,2,12,1,2
81 8 13 ,23,2,2,11,1,2
81 8 14,6,3,2,11,1,1
81 8 15 ,31,5,4,2,1,2
81 8 16 ,1,3,6,4,1,2
81 8 17 ,25,4,2,11,1,1
81 8 18 ,18,2,6,8,4,2
81 8 19 ,11,4,4,5,1,2
81 8 20 ,5,4,4,6,1,2
81 8 21 ,25,4,6,4,1,1
81 8 22 ,9,4,2,3,1,2
81 8 23 ,24,3,7,2,1,2
81 8 24 ,24,3,6,6,1,2
81 8 25 ,31,5,6,8,1,2
81 8 26 ,22,3,6,1,2,2
81 8 27 ,21,4,4,4,1,2
81 8 28 ,25,4,2,6,1,1
81 8 29 ,27,5,2,8,4,2
81 8 30 ,31,5,5,1,3,2
81 8 31 ,31,5,6,12,1,2
81 8 32 ,11,3,6,4,1,2
81 8 33 ,2,4,7,2,1,2
81 8 34 ,31,5,7,2,1,1
81 8 35 ,2,1,2,7,1,2
81 8 36 ,31,5,2,7,1,2
81 9 1, 31,1,6,3,3,2
81 9 2,20,4,2,8,1,2
81 9 3,18,4,2,8,1,1
81 9 4, 31,5,4,4,1,2
81 9 5,18,4,2,8,1,1
81 9 6,31,5,7,2,1,2
81 9 7, 31,5,7,8,1,1
81 9 8, 24^1,7,2,3,2
81 9 9, 2,3,2,6,1,2
81 9 10 ,1,7,6,12,3,2
81 9 11 ,16,3,6,9,2,2
81 9 12 ,31,6,2,8,1,2
81 9 13 ,23,4,2,6,1,2
81 9 14,4,4,4,4,1,2
81 9 15 ,14,4,2,12,1,1
81 9 16 ,24,3,7,2,1,2
81 9 17 ,10,4,2,6,1,2
81 9 18 ,11,1,2,7,1,2
81 9 19 ,22,3,6,8,1,2
81 9 20 ,31,5,4,11,1,2
81 9 21 ,31,5,7,2,1,2
81 9 22 ,31,6,4,4,1,2
81 9 23 ,13,4,2,6,1,2
81 9 24 ,13,4,2,6,1,2
81 9 25 ,9,4,2,7,1,1
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81 9,26 31,5,2. 5,1,1
91 9,27 9,4,6,6,1,2
81 9,28 11,2,2 6,1,1
81 9,29 20,3,6 6,1,2
81 9,30 20,4,2 8,1,2
81 9,31 20,3,2 9,1,2
81 9,32 7,7,3,( ,1,2
81 9,33 16,2,6 6,1,2
81 9,34 20,4,2 8,1,1
81 9,35 31,5,2 7,2,2
81 9,36 31,5,2 3,1,2
81 9,37 31,5,5 5,1,2
81 9,38 14,7,7 2,1,2
81 9,39 5,1,2,. ,1,2
81 9,40 31,5,7 2,2,2
81 9,41 16,2,7 2,1,2
81 9,42 31,5,7 2,1,2
81 9,43 31,5,6 1,1,2
81 9,44 20,4,3 4,1,1
81 9,45 2,4,6,11,1,2
81 9,46 22,3,2 5,2,2
81 9,47 24,1,2 3,1,2
81 9,48 8,4,4,/ ,1,2
81 9,49 21,4,4 1,1,2
81 9,50 9,4,2, ,2,2
81 9,51 31,5,6 7,2,2
81 9,51 31,5,6 7,2,2
81 9,53 10,4,7 1,1,2
81 9,54 12,2,2 8,1,2
81 9,55 31,5,6 7,3,2
81 9,56 31,5,2 7,1,2
81 9,57 11,3,4 2,2,2
81 10,1 11,7,2 7,4,2
81 10,2 8,2,2, ,1,2
81 10,3 31,5,7 2,1,1
81 10,4 31,5,7 2,1,2
81 10,5 22,2,1 6,2,1
81 10,6 24,1,6 2,2,2
81 10,7 24,2,2 11,1,1
81 10,8 31,5,6 2,2,2
81 10,9 31,5,5 2,1,2
81 10,10,31,5, 2,7,3,1
81 10,11,4,1,2 7,1,1
81 10,12,31,5, 7,2,4,2
81 10,13,3,3,7 2,1,2
81 10,14,20,6, 6,1,3,2
81 10,15,31,5, 2,11,1,
81 10,16,4,6,7 ,2,4,2
81 10,17,31,5, 7,2,1,2
81 10,18,31,5, 5,2,1,2
81 10,19,31,3, 4,6,3,2
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81 10 20 31,5,6,5,1,2
81 10 21 31,5,7,2,2,2
81 10 22 31,5,6,6,1,2
81 10 23 31,5,6,13,1,2
81 10 24 25,4,7,2,1,2
81 10 25 11,1,2,11,3,2
81 10 26 5,4,6,3,1,2
81 10 27 5,2,2,6,1,2
81 10 28 25,4,7,2,1,2
81 10 29 25,2,2,12,1,2
81 10 30 20,4,2,7,1,2
81 10 31 25,3,2,12,1,2
81 10 32 12,1,7,2,1,2
81 10 33 12,4,2,6,1,2
81 10 34 24,3,4,4,1,2
81 10 35 31,5,2,12,1,2
81 10 36 24,1,7,2,2,2
81 10 37 31,6,2,7,2,2
81 10 38 4,1,2,12,1,1
81 10 39 4,4,2,3,1,1
81 10 40 22,1,2,11,1,1
81 10 41 10,7,2,12,1,1
81 10 42 31,5,6,12,1,2
81 10 42 31,5,7,2,1,2
81 10 44 4,4,2,3,1,2
81 10 45 12,1,6,1,1,2
81 10 46 22,2,1,6,1,1
81 10 47 5,2,2,12,1,1
81 10 48 24,2,3,11,1,1
81 11 1,4,3,6,6,1,2
81 11 2,31,4,2,6,1,2
81 11 3,30,4,7,2,1,2
81 11 4,11,4,3,4,1,1
81 11 5,2,4,5,7,1,2
81 11 6,2,4,2,6,2,2
81 11 7,5,3,2,5,1,2
81 11 8,31,5,7,2,1,2
81 11 9,14,4,2,6,1,2
81 11 10 ,31,6,7,6,4,2
81 11 11 ,10,6,7,1,1,1
81 11 12 ,30,5,5,5,1,2
81 11 13 ,16,4,6,6,1,2
81 11 14 ,25,4,6,6,1,2
81 11 15 ,31,4,7,2,1,1
81 11 16 ,31,5,5,2,3,2
81 11 17 ,31,5,2,11,1,1
81 11 18 ,19,4,4,1,3,2
81 11 19 ,22,4,4,1,1,2
81 11 20 ,31,5,7,2,1,2
81 11 21 ,31,5,5,2,1,2
81 11 22,12,5,4,1,4,2
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GLOSSARY*
*Most of the definitions of terms are compiled from the 
following publications:
1. Ron Baker. A Primer of Oil Well Drilling (Austin: 
Texas University Press, 1969)
2. Petroleum Extension Service and IADC. The Rotary 
Rig and its Components. Unit I, Lessonl. 3rd e31 (Austin: 
Texas University Press, 1980)
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Accident n: is an unplanned not necessarily injurious or
damaging event, that interrupts the completion of an ac­
tivity and is invariably proceeded by an unsafe act and or 
an unsafe condition or some combination of unsafe acts and/ 
or unsafe conditions (Tarrant, 1980).
Accumulator n: is a storage device for nitrogen-pressurized
hydrolic fluid, which is used in closing the blowout pre­
venters .
Back off V: to unscrew one threaded piece (as a section of
pipe) from another.
Back up V: to hold one section of an object (as pipe) while
another is being screwed into or out of it.
Bail n: a cylindrical steel bar (similar to the handle or
bail of a bucket, only much larger) that supports the 
swivel and connects it to the hook. Sometimes, the two 
cylindrical bars that support the elevators and attach 
them to the hook are called bails, v: to recover bottorn-
hole fluids, samples, or drill cuttings by lowering a 
cylindrical vessel called a bailer to the bottom of a well, 
filling it, and retrieving it.
Belt n: a flexible band or cord connecting and passing a- 
bout each of two or more pulleys to transmit power or 
impart motion.
Bit n; the cutting or boring element used in drilling oil 
and gas wells. The bit consits of the cutting element and 
the circulating element. The circulating element permits 
the passage of drilling fluid and utilizes the hydrolic 
force of the fluid stream to improve drilling rates. In 
a rotary drilling, several drill collars are joined to the 
bottom end of the drill pipe column. The bit is attached 
to the drill collar. Most bits used in rotary drilling 
are roller cone bits.
Block n: any assembly of pulleys on a common framework; in
mechanics, one or more pulleys, or sheaves, mounted to 
rotate on a common axis. The crown block is an assembly 
of sheaves mounted on beams at the top of the derrick.
The drilling line is reeved over the sheaves of the cro\m 
block alternately with the sheaves of the traveling block, 
which is hoisted and lowered in the derrick by the drill­
ing line. When elevators are attached to a hook on a tra­
veling block, and when drill pipe is latched to the 
elevators, the pipe can be raised or lowered in the derrick 
or mast.
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Blowout n: an uncontrolled flow of gas, oil, or other well
fluids into the atmosphere. . A blowout, or gusher, occurs 
when a formation pressure exceeds the pressure applied to 
it by the column of drilling fluid. A kick warns of an 
impending blowout.
BOP abbr: blowout preventer.
Borehole n: the wellborej the hole made by drilling or boring.
Bottomhole n: the lowest or deepest part of a well, adj:
pertaining to the bottom of the wellbore.
Break out v: 1. to unscrew one section of pipe from another
section, especially drill pipe while it is being with­
drawn from the wellbore. During this operation, the tongs 
are used to start the unscrewing operation. 2. to sepa­
rate, as gas from liquid.
Breakout tongs n: tongs that are used to start unscrewing one
section of pipe from another section, especially drill pipe
coming out of a hole. Also called lead tongs.
Buck up v: to tighten up a threaded connection (as two
joints of drill pipe).
Cable n: a rope or wire, hemp, or other strong fibers.
Cathead n; a spool-shaped attachement on a winch around
which rope for hoisting and pulling is wound.
Catline n: a hoisting or pulling line powered by the cathead
and used to lift heavy equipment on the rig.
Chain drive n: a drive system using a chain and chain gears
to transmit power. Power transmissions use a roller chain, 
in which each link is made of side bars, transverse pins, 
and rollers on the pins. A double roller chain is made 
of two connected rows of kinks, a triple roller chain of 
three,etc.
Chain tongs n: a tool consisting of a handle and releasable
chain used for turning pipe or fittings of a diameter 
larger than that which a pipe wrench would fit. The 
chain is looped and tightened around the pipe or fitting, 
and the handle is used to turn the tool so that the pipe 
or fitting can be tightened or loosened.
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Choke manifold n: the arrangement of piping and special
valves, called chokes, through which drilling mud is cir­
culated when the blowout preventers are closed to control 
the pressures encountered during a kick.
Circulation n: the movement of drilling fluid out of the mud
pits, down the drill stem, up the annulus, and back to the 
pits.
Come out of the hole v: to pull the drill stem out of the
wellbore. This withdrawal is necessary to change the bit, 
run electric logs, prepare for a drill stem test, run cas­
ing.
Crown block n: an assembly of sheaves or pulleys mounted on
beams at the top of a derrick over which the drilling line 
is reeved.
Damage n: is the severity of an injury or the physical, func­
tional, or monetary loss that could result if control of a 
hazard is lost (hammer, 1972).
Danger n: expresses a relative exposure to a hazard. A
hazard may be present, but there is little danger because 
of the precautions taken. A person working on a very high 
structure is subject to the hazard that he could fall to his 
death. When he wears an anchored safety harness, the 
danger is reduced but is still present since the harness 
break (Hammer, 1972).
Deadline n: the drilling line for the crown block sheave to
the anchor, so called because it does not move.
Degasser n: the equipment used to remove unwanted gas from
a liquid, especially from drilling fluid.
Derrick n: a large load-bearing structure, usually of bolted
construction. In drilling, a standard derrick has four 
legs standing at the corners of the substructures and 
reaching to the crown block. The substructure is an 
assembly of heavy beams used to elevate the derrick and 
provide space to install blowout preventers, casingheads, 
and so forth. Because the standard derrick must be 
assembled piece by piece, it has largely been replaced by a 
mast, which can be lowered and raised without assembly.
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Desander n: a centrifugal device for removing sand from dril­
ling fluid to prevent abrasion of the pumps. It may be 
operated mechanically or by a fast moving stream of fluid 
inside a special cone-shaped vessel, in which case it is 
sometimes called a hydrocyclone.
Desilter n: a centrifugal device for removing very fine parti­
cles, or silt, from drilling fluid to keep the amount of 
solids in the fluid to the lowest possible point. Usually, 
the lower the solid content of the mud, the faster the 
rate of penetration. It works on the same principles as 
a desander.
Doghouse n: a small enclosure on the rig floor used as an
office for the driller or as a storehouse for small ob­
jects .
Drawworks n: the hoisting mechanism on a drilling rig. It
is essentially a large winch that spools off or takes in 
the drilling line and thus raises or lowers the drill stem 
and bit.
Drill collar n: a heavy, thick walled tube, usually steel,
used between the drill pipe and the bit in the drill stem. 
Drill collars are used to put weight on the bit so that 
the bit can drill.
Drilling fluid n: circulating fluid, one function of which
is to force cuttings out of the wellbore and to the surface. 
While a mixture of clay water, and other chemical addi­
tives is the most common drilling fluid, wells can also be 
drilled using air, gas, or water as the drilling fluid.
Also called circulating fluid.
Drill stem n: all members in the assembly used for drilling
by the rotary method from the swivel to the bit, including 
the kelly, drill pipe and tool joints, drill collars, sta­
bilizers, and various subsequent items.
Drill string n: the column or string of drill pipe with
attached tooljoints that transmits fluid and rotational 
power from the kelly to the drill collars and bit. Often, 
especially in the oil patch, the term is loosely applied 
to include both drill pipes and drill collars.
Elevator n: a set of clamps that grips a stand, or column of
casing, tubing, or drill pipe so that the stand can be 
raised or lowered into the hole.
Fingerboard n: a rack that supports the tops of the stands
of pipes being stacked in the derrick or mast. It has
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several steel finger-like projections that form a series 
of slots into which the derrickman can set a stand of 
drill pipe as it is pulled out of the hole.
Hazard n: is a condition with the potential of causing injury
to personnel, damage to equipment or structure, loss of 
material, or lessening the ability to perform a prescribed 
function. When a hazard is present, the possibility of 
adverse effects occurring exists (Hammer, 1972).
Hoist n: an arrangement of pulleys and wire rope or chain
used for lifting heavy objects; a winch or similar device; 
the drawworks.
Hook n: a large hook-shaped device from which the swivel is
suspended. It is designed to carry maximum loads ranging 
from 100 to 550 tons and turns on bearings in its sup­
porting housing. A strong spring within the assembly cush­
ions the weight of a stand (90 ft) of drill pipe, thus 
permitting the pipe to be made up and broken out with less 
damage to the tool joint threads. Smaller hooks without 
the spring are used for handling tubing and sucker rods.
Information n: meaningful data; it is the aggregate of facts
or data organized into knowledge or intelligence (O'Brien, 
1970, Bedford and Onsi, 1966).
Joint n: a single length (about 30 ft) of drill pipe or of
drill collar, casing, or tubing, that has threaded con­
nections at both ends. Several joints screwed together 
constitute a stand of pipe.
Kelly n: the heavy steel member, four-or six-sided, suspended
from the swivel through the rotary table and connected to 
the topmost joint of drill pipe to turn the drill stem as 
the rotary table turns. It has a bored passageway that 
permits fluid to be circulated into the drill stem and up 
the annulus. or vice versa.
Kelly bushing n: a special device, that when fitted into the
master bushing, transmits torque to the kelly and simul­
taneously permits vertical movement of the kelly to make 
the hole. It may be shaped to fit the rotary opening or 
have pins for transmitting torque. Also called the drive 
bushing.
Kick n: an entry of water, gas, oil, or other formation fluid 
into the wellbore. It occurs because the pressure exerted 
by the column of the drilling fluid is not great enough 
to overcome the pressure exerted by the fluids in the for­
mation drilled. If prompt action is not taken to control 
the kick or kill the well, a blowout will occur.
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Latch on v: to attach elevators to a section of pipe to pull
it out of or run it into the hole.
Lead tongs n: the pipe tongs suspended in the derrick or
mast operated by a wireline connected to the breakout 
cathead. Also called breakout tongs.
Make a connection v: to attach a joint of drill pipe onto the
drill stem suspended in the wellbore to permit deepening 
of the wellbore.
Make a trip v: to hoist the drill stem out of the wellbore
to perform one or a number of operations, such as changing 
the bits, taking a core, and so forth, and then return the 
the drill stem to the wellbore.
Make up a joint v: to screw a length of pipe into another
length of pipe.
Management n: the planning and control of the physical and 
personnel resources of the company in order to reach the 
company's objectives (Kanter, *1977).
Mast n: a portable derrick capable of being erected as a unit
as distinguished from a standard derrick that can not be 
raised to a working position as a unit. For transporting 
by land, the mast can be divided into two or more sections 
to avoid excessive length extending from the truck beds on 
the highway.
Master bushing n; a device that fits into the rotary table.
It accomodates the slips and drives the kelly bushing so 
that the rotating motion of the rotary table can be trans­
mitted to the kelly. Also called rotary bushing.
Mechanical rig n: a drilling rig in which the source of power
is one or more internal-combustion engines and in which the 
power is distributed to the rig component through me­
chanical devices (as chains, sprockets, clutches, and 
shafts). It is also called a power rig.
Monkeyboard n: the derrickman's working platform. As pipe or 
tubing is run into or out of the hole, the derrickman must 
handle the top end of the pipe, which may be as high as 
90 ft in the derrick or mast. The monkeyboard provides a 
small platform to raise him to the proper height to be 
able to handle the top of the pipe.
Mousehole n: an opening through the rig floor, usually lined
with the pipe, into which a length of drill pipe is placed 
temporarily for later connection to the drill string.
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Mud -n: the liquid circulated through the wellbore during
rotary drilling operations. In addition to its functions 
of bringing cuttings to the surface, drilling mud. cools 
and lubricates the bit and the drill stem, protects against 
blowouts by holding back subsurface pressures, and deposits 
a mud cake on the wall of the borehole to prevent loss of 
fluids to the formation. Although it originally was a sus­
pensions of earth solids (especially clays) in water, the 
mud used in modern drilling operations is a more complex 
three phased mixture of liquids, reactive solids, and inert 
solids. The liquid phase may be fresh water, diesel oil, 
or crude oil and may contain one or more conditioners.
Mud pit n: a series of open tanks, usually made of steel
plates, through which the drilling mud is cycled to allow 
sands a and sediments to settle out. Actives are mixed 
with the mud in the pit, and the fluid is temporarily 
stored there before being pumped back into the well. Modern 
rotary drilling rigs are generally provided with three or 
more pits, usually fabricated steel tanks fitted with built- 
in pipings, valves, and mud agitators. Mud pits are also 
called shaker pits, settling pits, and suction pits, de­
pending on their main purpose.
Mud pump n: a large, reciprocating pumps used to circulate
mud on a drilling rig. A typical mud pump is a single or 
double acting, two- or three- cylinder piston pump whose 
pistons travel in replaceable liners and are driven by a 
crankshaft actuated by an engine or motor. Also called a 
slush pump.
Mud return line n: a through or pipe placed between the
surface connections at the wellbore and the shale shaker, 
through which drilling mud flows upon its return to the 
surface from the hole.
Mud screen n: see shale shaker.
Processor n: is that element in a system which involves a
transformation or conversion process which modifies the 
input into the output format (Luchsinger and Dock, 1975).
Pump n: a device that increases the pressure on a fluid or
raises it to a higher level. Various types of pumps in­
clude the reciprocating pump, centrifugal pump, rotary 
pump, jet pump, hydraulic pump, mud pump, submersible pump, 
and bottom hole pump.
Rathole n: 1. a hole in the rig floor 30 to 35 feet deep,
lined with casing that projects above the floor, into 
which the kelly and swivel are placed when hoisting operations
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are in progress. 2. a hole of a diameter smaller than the 
main hole that is drilled in the bottom of the main hole, 
v: to reduce the size of the wellbore and drill ahead.
Reserve pit n: 1. a mud pit in which a supply of drilling
fluid was stored. 2. a waste pit, usually an excavated, 
earthen walled pit. It may be lined with plastic to pre­
vent contamination of the soil.
Rig n: the derrick or mast, drawworks, and attendant surface
equipment of a drilling unit.
Rig down v: to dismantle the drilling rig and auxiliary equip­
ment following the completion of drilling operations; also 
called tear do\m.
Rig up V: to prepare the drilling rig for making a hole; to
install tools and machinery before drilling is started.
Risk n: an expression of possible loss over a specific
period of time or number of operational cycles (Hammer,
1972).
Rotary bushing n:. see master bus.hing.
Rotary drilling n: a drilling method in which a hole is drill­
ed by a rotary bit to which downward force is applied.
The bit is fastened to and rotated by the drill stem, which 
also provides a passageway through which the drilling 
fluid is circulated. Additional joints of drill pipe are 
added as drilling progresses.
Rotary hose n: a reinforced, flexible tube on a rotary drill­
ing rig that conducts the drilling fluid from the mud pump 
and stand pipe to the swivel and kelly; also called the mud 
hose or the kelly hose.
Rotary table n: the principal component of the rotary or
machine, used to turn the drill stem and support the drill­
ing assembly. It has a beveled gear arrangement to create 
the rotational motion and an opening into which bushings 
are fitted to drive and support the drilling assembly.
Round trip n: the action of pulling out and subsequently run­
ning back into the hole a string of drill pipe or tubing.
It is also called tripping.
Run in v; to go into the hole with tubing, drill pipe, and 
so forth.
Safety n: the absence of errors that interrupt business. It 
is the result of doing things the right way (Jones, 1981).
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Shaker n: shortened form of shale shaker.
Shale shaker n: a series of trays with sieves that vibrate
to remove cutting from the circulating fluid in rotary 
drilling operations. The size of the openings in the sieves 
are carefully selected to match the size of the solids in 
the drilling fluid and the anticipated size of the cuttings. 
Also called a shaker or mud screen.
Slips n: pi: wedge shaped pieces of metal with teeth or
other gripping elements that are used to prevent pipes from 
slipping down into the hole or to hold the pipe in place. 
Rotary slips fit around the drill pipe and wedge against 
the master bushing to support the pipe. wer slips are 
pneumatically or hydraulically actuated devices that allow 
the crew to dispense with the manual handling of slips when 
making a connection. Packers and other downhole equipment 
are secured in position by slips that engage the pipe by 
action directed at the surface.
Spinning cathead n: a spooling attachment on the makeup cat­
head to permit use of a spinning chain to spin up or make 
up drill pipe.
Spinning chain n: a Y-shaped chain used to spin up (tighten)
one joint of drill pipe into another. In use, one end of 
the chain is attached to the tongs, another end to the 
spinning cathead, and the third end is free. The free end 
is wrapped around the tool joint, and the cathead pulls 
the chain off the joint, causing the joint to spin (turn) 
rapidly and tightened up. After the chain is pulled off 
the joint, the tongs are secured in the same spot, and 
the cathead continues to pull on the chain (and thus the 
tongs).making up the joint to the final tightness.
Spud in V: to begin drilling; to start a hole.
Stab V: to guide the end of the pipe into a coupling or tool
joint when making up a connection.
Stand n: the connected joints of pipe racked in the derrick
or mast when making a trip. On a rig, the usual stand is 
90 feat long (three lengths of pipe screwed together) or 
a thribble.
String n: the entire length of casing, tubing, or drill pipe
run into a hole; the casing string.
Subsystems n: a separate parts of the total system which
perform some specific useful purposes, but are not them­
selves of sufficient scope to be considered a system in the
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context of the total system (Methlie, 1968).
Swivel n: a rotary tool that is hung from the rotary hook and
traveling block to suspend and permit free rotation of 
the drill stem. It also provides a connection for the 
rotary hose and a passageway for the drilling fluid into 
the drill stem.
System n: a collection of interrelated parts which is
unifeid by design to obtain one or more objectives 
(Luchsinger and Dock, 1977).
Throw the chain v: to flip the spinning chain up from a tool
joint box so that the chain wraps around the tool joint 
pin after it is stabbed into the box. The stand or joint 
of drill pipe is turned or spun by a pull on the spinning 
chain from the cathead on the drawworks.
Tongs n pi: the large wrenches used for turning when making
up or breaking out drill pipe; variously called casing 
tongs, rotary tongs, and so forth, according to their spe­
cific use.
Tool joint n: a heavy coupling element for drill pipe made
of special alloy steel. Tool joints have coarse, tapered 
threads and seating shoulders designed to sustain the 
weight of the drill stem, withstand the strain of frequent 
coupling, and provide a leakproof seal. The male section 
of the joint, or the pin, is attached to one end of a
length of drill pipe, and the female section or box, is
attached to the other end. The tool joint may be welded 
to the end of the pipe or screwed on or both. A hard 
metal facing is often applied in a band around the outside 
of the tool joint to enable it to resist abrasion from the 
walls of the borehole.
Torque n: the turning force that is applied to a shaft or
other rotary mechanism to cause it to rotate or tend to do
so. Torque is measured in foot pounds, joules, meter-kilo- 
grams, etc.
Tour n: (pronounced "tower") an 8-hour shift worked by a
drilling crew or other oil field workers. Sometimes, 12- 
hour tours are used, especially on offshore rigs. The 
most common division of tours are daylight, evening, and 
graveyard, if 8-hour tours are employed.
Traveling Block n: an arrangement of pulleys, or sheaves,
through which drilling cable is reeved and moves up 
and down in the derrick or mast.
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Trip n: the operation of hoisting the drill stem from and
returning it to the wellbore.
Wellbore n: a borehole; the hole drilled by the bit.
Wellhead n: the equipment installed at the surface of the
wellbore. A wellhead includes such equipment as the cas­
inghead and the tubing head.
Wireline n; a slender, rodr-like or thread-like piece of metal 
usually small in diameter, that is used for lowering 
special tools (such as logging sondes, perforating guns, 
and so forth) into the well.
Wire rope n: a cable composed of steel wires twisted around
a central core of hemp or other fiber to create a rope of 
great strength and considerable flexibility. Wire rope is 
used as drilling line, core line, servicing line, winch 
line, and so on. It is often called cable or wireline; 
however, wireline is a single slender metal rod, usually 
very flexible.
